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Introduction
The recent financial crisis, and the “Great Recession” that accompanied it, has
revived interest in activist fiscal policy as a way to stabilization the business cycle
and has put back the evaluation of fiscal policy at the core of the economic debate.
This is the main question of this dissertation, which addresses three distinct,
although tightly related, issues on the fiscal policy in context of the business
cycle: (i) the empirical evaluation of the potency of fiscal policy by means of the
comparison of the fiscal multipliers following a shock affecting one of the main
components of government spending —government consumption, investment, and
labor compensation—in a unified framework , (ii) the evaluation of the potency
and efficiency of individual fiscal instruments, typically used by governments for
public debt financing, in stabilizing the business cycle in a medium scale Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, and (iii) the quantitative evaluation
of employment (and output) losses generated by fiscal consolidation policies.
Governments in most industrialized countries have responded to the Great
Recession by designing rather aggressive stimulus packages, which combine increases
in government expenditures —both consumption and investment expenditures—
and tax cuts. Chapter 1 of the dissertation addresses the question of the effectiveness
of such policy measures by evaluating the size of the multipliers associated with such
policies. It provides a comparison of dynamics, both in terms of impulse responses
and multipliers, of the main macroeconomic aggregates following a shock affecting
one of the main components of government spending –i.e. government consumption,
government investment or labor compensation. This chapter, in particular, attempts
to fill the existing gap in literature by studying the potential differences existing
2 Introduction
between unproductive and productive expenditures and transfers. This is achieved
by providing a unified framework relying on a Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model.
These models allow to recover the dynamics of various variables in the aftermath of
structural shocks that hit the system, the so called impulse–propagation framework.
The question is then that of the identification of the structural shocks. In this
chapter, I rely on the identification scheme proposed by Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
whereby sign restrictions are used to place restrictions on the response of the main
macroeconomic aggregates to identify the shocks of interest. These restrictions
are then used to recover, in the following order, (i) a business cycle shock, (ii) a
monetary policy shock, (iii) a government spending shock and (iv) a government
revenue shock, which are all mutually orthogonal. This approach ensures that the
so recovered government shock does not reflect the endogenous response of fiscal
authorities to alternative macroeconomic shocks. The main results indicate that
government consumption shocks —either affecting total expenditures or defense
expenditures only— lead to a mild positive response of both consumption and
output with the associated multipliers below unity for both output and consumption.
The shock crowds out the private investment and this effect is stronger when the
shock affects productive expenditures –i.e. government investment. Furthermore
the results show, in line with the theory, that a shock to government investment
generates through the accumulation of public capital, a positive wealth effect that
makes the multipliers larger in the longer run. These results remain unaffected
when we consider either total government or defense expenditures. When the
shock affects labor compensation then multipliers are larger (about 1.5) due to
the absence of crowding out effect on the good market. They also reveal that
the size of the associated multipliers is sensitive to the sample. In particular, the
inclusion of the most recent period, where financial frictions were more prominent,
tends to increase quite dramatically the size of the multipliers. This is reminiscent
of recent theoretical papers, such as Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) or Canzoneri,
Collard, Dellas, and Diba (Forthcoming), which suggest that the presence of
stronger financial frictions has a non-linear effect on the transmission of fiscal
shocks and amplify their effect on aggregate variables. The chapter therefore offers
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an investigation of the potential non-linear effects associated with the financial
conditions through the estimation of a non-linear VAR in which an indicator of
financial conditions is interacted with macroeconomic variables. The presence of
the non-linearity complicates the computation of impulse responses, and I rely on
the Generalized Impulse Function analysis a` la Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996)
to properly capture all potential effects of these non-linearities. The results are,
again, in line with the theory in that the size of the multiplier is larger as financial
conditions deteriorate. They indicate in particular that multipliers are larger when
the financial conditions are tight and that a deterioration of financial conditions
leads to an increase in the multiplier associated with a government consumption
(resp. investment) shock of about 25% (resp. 25%). Using the same methodology,
we also show that when the economy hits the zero lower bound, the multiplier
increases further by about 40% in the case of a government consumption shock
and 25% in the case of a public investment shock. We conclude this interaction
between financial frictions and monetary policy accounts for the increase in the
multiplier during the last financial crisis.
Governments’ responses to the Great Recession have resulted in significant
public debt buildups that, in turn, have raised concerns about the financing of the
various fiscal stimulus packages adopted by most industrialized countries. Between
2004 and 2012 the sovereign debt to GDP has increased around 35 percentage
points for France, Greece, and United States; and for countries like Portugal and
United Kingdom the corresponding increase reached 60 percentage points. There
thus seems to exist a trade-off between using fiscal instruments as a way to stabilize
the business cycle and fiscal discipline, as manifested by the posted willingness
of governments to keep public debt under control. This trade-off ought to limit
the effectiveness of governments in stabilizing the business cycle. The objective
of Chapter 2 is to investigate this issue by asking, in particular, the question of
implementation of fiscal rules in a full-fledged estimated DSGE model.
This chapter extends a medium scale DSGE model a` la Smets and Wouters
(2007) to the presence of an active fiscal policy. The model therefore features
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nominal frictions in the form of sticky prices and sticky wages, an active monetary
policy in the form of a Taylor rule and various real rigidities (habit persistence,
investment adjustment costs,. . . ). On the fiscal policy front, the model features
distortionary taxes (consumption, labor and capital) as well as an explicit fiscal
rule. Contrary to the existing literature on fiscal rule which specifies a rule for each
tax/spending instrument, fiscal policy is modeled as a single rule where the total
tax revenues responds both to a measure of the output gap and to the level of public
debt. Such a design of the rule therefore does not take a stand a priori on which
of the two sides of the aforementioned trade-off matters the most –stabilization
or fiscal discipline– instead it lets the data speak. Given exogenous government
spendings, this rule can, alternatively, be given a “deficit rule” interpretation.
Hence, the government has a primary deficit objective which aims at achieving
output stabilization while maintaining public debt under control. It then adjusts
the tax system to finance it. Which of the tax should be adjusted is a priori
indeterminate. Only one instrument, at the time, is therefore used to achieve this
increase in tax revenues, holding all other distortionary tax rates (and the lump
sum tax) constant. One contribution of this chapter is to propose a modeling that
allows for a separation between the stabilization policy from its financing, and as
such provides us with a structured framework to understand these two aspects
of fiscal policy. The question of the implementation is important as different tax
instruments may lead to different outcomes both in terms of potency and efficiency.
Furthermore, the model takes into account the interaction between fiscal and
monetary policies, which ought to have significant implications both for financing
of public debt and output stability. The model is estimated on U.S. data using a
Bayesian maximum likelihood method in the frequency domain. This approach
allows to focus on business cycle frequencies, which are of interest for stabilization
purposes.
One result of this chapter is that once the objective is set, its exact
implementation does not matter from a positive point of view. Indeed, the results
indicate that the choice of the tax instrument used to balance the government budget
constraint quantitatively affects the propagation of shocks. The most stabilizing
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tax, in terms of unconditional output volatility, is the lump sum tax as it does not
distort any of the agents’ decisions. However, since the lump sum tax is essentially
absent from most tax systems governments have to rely on distortionary taxation.
Ignoring the lump sum tax, the labor tax is the most stabilizing tax, in terms of
output volatility, followed by the consumption tax and the capital tax. However
the differences are quantitatively small, suggesting that the implementation does
not matter much for unconditional volatility. Thus, as soon as the government
uses a deficit rule, the exact details of its financing have very little quantitative
consequences for the positive properties of the economy. This stands in contrast
to models that specify a rule for each tax rate in the system (for example Leeper,
Plante, and Traum (2010)) where altering one particular tax rate (and hence one
of the tax rules) can have sizable consequences for the business cycle properties of
the model –both in terms of volatility or co-movements. Furthermore, the results
show that the policymaker is not in a position to affect the contribution of each
shock to the business cycle by simply varying the tax instrument she uses while
using a simple deficit (or total tax revenue) rule.
The preceding results however do not totally rule out the potential importance
of the implementation. In fact, this chapter shows that the labor tax model allows
to achieve output stabilization without much volatility in tax revenues and public
debt. Expressed differently, the positive properties of the tax system are strongly
affected by the implementation and it ought to have strong implications for a
normative analysis. Such an analysis is however beyond the scope of this chapter,
but two points are noteworthy. First, the presence of a time varying tax adds an
additional time varying distortion in the model beyond the price and wage markups,
which can add to the welfare cost of fluctuations for the agents. Second, when the
central bank takes fiscal policy as given, the presence of a time varying tax rate
affects the form of optimal monetary policy by re-introducing the inflation output
stabilization trade-off.
Chapter 3 then investigates the implications of fiscal consolidation policies for
unemployment. High levels of public debt that accumulated following the Great
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Recession have significant economic consequences and in particular in terms of
growth (see Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)). Thus, in an attempt to reduce public
debt governments in most advanced economies have been making efforts to design
and implement most appropriate fiscal consolidation plans. A sizable literature
that studies that effect of fiscal consolidation has shown that the effects of fiscal
consolidation episodes on output vary significantly with the fiscal instrument
used to achieve the fiscal consolidation, the timing, the speed and the size of
the consolidation. This then hints to the importance of “right” design of a fiscal
consolidation plan.
Although the literature has extensively analyzed the output losses associated
with the consolidation episodes, the effect on the (un-)employment remain largely
unconsidered. This is however of interest because (i) most of the countries that
undergo a fiscal consolidation are countries that experience high and persistent
unemployment rate, and (ii) countries in which unemployment is still at a low
level may also need to evaluate the potential output loss for monetary policy
considerations. It is therefore of interest to evaluate (i) the potential employment
loss (rise in unemployment) associated with debt consolidation episodes and (ii) the
persistence of this loss. This chapter therefore offers a theoretical framework —a
dynamic general equilibrium model— that permits such an evaluation. In particular,
it extends the standard neoclassical growth model to (i) the presence of public debt
and (ii) the search and matching frictions in the labor market. The existence of
frictions on the labor market, in particular, permits to study employment dynamics
and to derive a measure of employment loss associated with fiscal consolidation
episodes.
In the model, sovereign debt reduction is achieved either by tax hikes or
government expenditures cuts, which plunges the economy in a persistent recession
and therefore generates output and employment losses. In the main experiment
—a targeted 25% debt reduction— unemployment increases by about 50%, starting
from 5.5% and reaching 7.3% after 3.35 years. These employment losses are
persistent and last on average 12 years. Furthermore, at the trough of the recession
(4.5 years following the beginning of the adjustment), output is 1.5% below its
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initial steady state. During the times of recession, these losses are especially severe
due to the competing goals imposed on the labor tax adjustment by (i) fiscal
consolidation and (ii) output stabilization.
Further results suggest that sizable and faster debt adjustments are associated
with bigger employment and output losses. One the one hand, the quicker debt
reduction involves bigger initial adjustment which magnifies the employment loss
in the short–run. However, economy recovers quicker compared to a gradualist
approach. On the other hand, a slower adjustment allows for smoother debt
adjustment that limits the initial employment loss, which, however, lasts longer,
therefore implying a lower but more persistent effort. These findings point to
the existence of an intertemporal trade–off between short–run losses from fiscal
consolidation and long–run gains from reduced debt. Furthermore, the results
indicate that the exact details of the consolidation plan do matter; government
spending cut versus tax hikes, the type of tax instrument used to achieve fiscal
adjustment, and the timing of the plan. The chapter also investigates, as an
extension, a version of the model featuring nominal frictions and monetary policy.
In that particular setting, monetary and fiscal policies interact. For instance, an
increase in the interest rate triggered by the central bank raises debt services, which
leads the government to adjust the tax (as debt has to be reduced), which impacts
on the tax burden faced by the households.

Chapter 1
The Effects of Government Policy
Shocks∗
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis, and the “Great Recession” that accompanied it, has
put back the evaluation of fiscal multipliers at the core of the economic debate.
Governments in most industrialized countries have responded to the Great Recession
by designing stimulus packages, which combine increase in government expenditures
and tax cuts1. The question of the effectiveness of such policy measures led to
a revival of exercises aiming at evaluating the size of fiscal multipliers. However,
besides some rare exceptions (see for example Pappa (2009)), most studies focus
∗This chapter was co-authored with Fabrice Collard.
1As outlined in a “European Economic Recovery Plan” issued on 26 November 2008 in Brussels,
the European Union passed a 200 billion euros stimulus plan. In particular, a plan required that
each member country develops their own national plans, worth 170 billion to 200 billion euros
in total, and an EU-wide plan of 30 billion euros coming from EU funding. For example, the
United Kingdom in “Pre–Budget Report 2008” outlined a stimulus plan totaling around 20 billion
pounds (and not including loan guarantees). The US Congress passed the “Economic Stimulus
Act of 2008” outlining a fiscal stimulus package, including more than $100 billion of personal
tax rebates and further measures aimed at stimulating business investment. The United States
combined many stimulus measures into the “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009”,
a $787 billion bill covering a variety of expenditures from rebates on taxes to business investment.
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on unproductive expenditures, therefore ignoring the potential differences existing
between this type of expenditures and productive expenditures or transfers. This
paper is an attempt to fill this gap using a unified framework, namely a Vector
AutoRegressive (VAR) model. Beyond offering a comparison of multipliers across
types of expenditures, we investigate whether there was indeed something “special”
about the last recession episode, or whether the size of multipliers is simply affected
by financial conditions.
This paper is related to the vast empirical literature (see for example Fata´s
and Mihov (2001), Favero (2002)) that, following the seminal paper by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002b), attempted to recover the effects of government expenditures
shocks on macroeconomic activity and the level of the associated multipliers in
VAR models. In these VARs the government expenditure shock is identified by
assuming that macroeconomic aggregates respond to this shock with a lag, which
therefore amounts to rely on the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix
of the residuals of a VAR model. We do not follow this approach and rather use
the identification scheme proposed by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who impose
sign restrictions on the impulse responses in identifying, in the following order, (i)
a business cycle shock, (ii) a monetary policy shock, (iii) a government spending
shock and (iv) a government revenue shock, which are all mutually orthogonal.
An advantage of this approach is that it permits to ensure that the so recovered
government shock does not reflect the endogenous response of fiscal authorities
to alternative macroeconomic shocks. We however depart from Mountford and
Uhlig (2009) in that we do not restrict our approach to unproductive government
consumption expenditures, we also investigate the effects of productive public
investment expenditures and government compensation. We also consider total and
defense expenditures, the latter being usually thought of as essentially exogenous
with regard to the business cycle. In that respect, our paper is close to that of
Pappa (2009) who also investigates this issue but mainly focuses on its effects on
employment. Our aim instead is mainly to recover the effects of such shocks on
aggregate output, consumption and investment and to also compute the associated
1.1. INTRODUCTION 11
fiscal multipliers.2 We also investigate systematically how the inclusion of the
financial crisis has potentially affected the size of the multiplier. In particular,
we highlight the differences between the various types of spending and how these
results are actually sensitive to the sample we use. The VARs are estimated for
two time frames: (i) the pre-financial crisis period, 1955I-2007IV, and (ii) for the
period including the financial crisis, 1955I-2012IV.
Our paper also relates to the recent literature that, following Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012), attempts to investigate to what extent fiscal multipliers
are state dependent—e.g whether their size and persistence vary over the business
cycle. For instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) report that multipliers are
typically well above unity during recessions—e.g. of the order of 2.5, and fall below
one during booms.3 We however depart from their approach in two significant ways.
First, we do not attempt to assess the potential state dependence of the multiplier
with respect to the business cycle itself, but rather to financial conditions. In that
respect this paper relates to Afonso, Baxa, and Slav´ık (2011), Ferraresi, Roventini,
and Fagiolo (2014) or Bernardini and Peersman (2015) who report evidence that
the size of the multiplier is significantly affected by either credit spreads, or debt
overhang. We however depart from these papers in that we use a direct measure
of global financial conditions (National Financial Conditions Index) and by the
methodology. A second important point of departure with respect to Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) relates to the treatment of the non-linearity, which relies on
a Smooth Transition VAR modeling in which the switching variable is assumed to
be exogenous. In this paper we explicitly model the dynamics of the interaction
term —e.g. financial conditions— implying that they also react to the shock. We
2Ramey (2011) offers an alternative way of computing multipliers based on Jorda` (2005) which
amounts to compute a series of local projections of changes in output on changes in a variable
that captures news in government spending.
3This view was recently challenged by Ramey and Zubairy (2014). They consider the simple
regression model that relates changes in output to news about government spending, but in which
they also add a non-linear component that interact these news with the slackness of the business
cycle (unemployment). Using the local projection technique proposed by Jorda` (2005), they then
compute multipliers and found no evidence in favor of higher multipliers in bad states.
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therefore rely on Generalized Impulse Function analysis a` la Koop, Pesaran, and
Potter (1996) to properly capture all potential effects of non-linearities.
We first estimate a VAR model for the pre–financial crisis period, stopping in
2007:IV, and recover, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2009), a business cycle shock, a
monetary policy shock, a government spending shock and a government revenue
shock. The business cycle and monetary shock produce the expected results. A
shock to unproductive government spending that keeps government consumption
above trend for 4 periods leads to a mild increase in output and consumption, but
crowds out private investment. The associated short-run multipliers remain below
unity, but increases over time. This is true regardless of whether total or defense
government consumption is used. The results are more pronounced for productive
government spending which persistently crowd out private investment. Accordingly,
the associated short-run multiplier is even smaller (about one half) in the short-run,
but, as predicted by theory, larger in the longer run. Again the use of total or
defense spending does not alter the broad picture. The multipliers associated to
labor compensation spending are found to be larger than unity on impact (of the
order of 1.5) and remain above one at longer horizons, and labor compensation is
not found to create any crowding out effect. The effects of a tax cut —a shock that
keeps government revenues below trend for 4 periods— increases aggregate output,
private consumption and total private investment. The associated multiplier is
below unity in the short run, but above 3.5 after 5 years. Again these results are in
line with theory, We then re-estimate the VAR over the period running from 1955:I
to 2012:IV, therefore extending the sample to include the financial crisis. While the
results are qualitatively left unaffected by the inclusion of the financial crisis for all
shocks, they differ quantitatively. In particular, the short-run multipliers associated
to both productive and unproductive government spending increase substantially.
For instance, the impact multiplier associated with total government consumption
is 1 on impact (0.87 in the pre-crisis period), in the case of public investment the
increase is more striking (0.90 versus 0.48). The increase is even more pronounced
when the focus is placed on defense spending. For instance, the multiplier on
defense consumption increases by 2/3 (0.6 to 1) while the multiplier associated
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with defense investment is multiplied by a factor of 5. Labor compensation is, on
the contrary, not affected. In the longer run —at the 5 years horizon— the opposite
pattern obtains. These findings are found to be robust to the way the increase in
expenditures is financed, either by letting the deficit increase or insuring a balanced
budget. Note however, that while financing the increase in government spending
by deficit increase usually leads to an increase in the multipliers, using a balanced
budget in the first 4 quarters limits the potency of the fiscal expansion.
This suggests that the financial crisis, and the associated financial frictions,
played a role in shaping the multipliers. This finding is consistent with the
theoretical work of Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) or Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and
Diba (Forthcoming) which showed, in general equilibrium models, that financial
conditions affect the transmission of fiscal policy. As a way to investigate this
issue, we extend our set of variables to include the National Financial Conditions
Index (NFCI) which is a measure of risk, liquidity and leverage in money markets
and debt and equity markets as well as in the traditional and shadow banking
systems. As Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba (Forthcoming) showed, financial
conditions ought to have non-linear implications for the propagation of government
shocks and may induce some form of state dependence. To capture these non-
linearities we estimate a non-linear version of the VAR in which the lagged variables
are considered in interaction with financial conditions. Our results indicate that
tighter financial conditions indeed accounts for a substantial part of the rise in
the multiplier for our extended sample. For instance, we consider a shock taking
place in the third quarter of 2001, when the economy faced a significant drop
in cyclical output but still faced loose financial conditions, and repeat the same
experiment starting the dynamics in the fourth quarter of 2008, where financial
stress was high.4 We find that moving from loose to tight financial conditions
leads to an increase in the multiplier associated with a government consumption
(resp. investment) shock of 25% (resp. 25%). We repeat the exercise starting again
the economy in 2008:IV, but also starting from 1981:III where the economy faced
similar output and financial conditions, but where the interest rate was clearly
4In both cases output was below trend by about about the same percentage deviation.
14 CHAPTER 1. THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY SHOCKS
away from the zero lower bound. Our results then indicate that the multiplier
increases further by about 40% in the case of a government consumption shock
and 25% in the case of an public investment shock. We conclude that it is the
interaction between monetary policy and financial constraints that explains the
bulk of the increase in the multiplier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the
data and summarize the methodology we use to recover the fiscal shock. Section
1.3 presents our main results, putting some emphasis on the role of the financial
crisis in the propagation of government shocks. In the lines of Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), Section 1.4 offers some extensions. In particular, we consider what happens
when the shocks are announced, we also investigate the role of financing in the
size of the multipliers. Section 1.5 investigates the role of financial conditions in a
non-linear setting. A last section concludes.
1.2 Data and Methodology
This section describes the data and the methodology we use to recover the effects
of government policy shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
1.2.1 Data
Our baseline VAR essentially replicates Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and features
10 variables.5 We do consider several other versions of the VAR model. In
particular, the main focus, as in most of the literature, is placed on the real effects
of government policy shocks. To this end, the VAR features real GDP, private
consumption of non-durables and services, total private investment (gross private
domestic investment and durable consumption). Following Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) we also include non-residential investment. Furthermore, given the potential
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, the VAR also features the federal
fund rate, the GDP deflator, a measure of commodity prices and adjusted reserves.
5See Appendix 1.B for further details on the construction of variables.
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Moreover, since one of our objective is to identify a government revenue shock we
also include net taxes as a measure of government revenues to help identification.
Finally, the VAR features an indicator of government spending as a way to identify
the government spending shock.
We depart from the standard practice in the literature that looks at the effects
of total government expenditures. Instead we break them into their investment and
consumption components as a way to disentangle the effects of productive versus
non-productive expenditures. The aim is to investigate whether disentangling the
effects of various fiscal variables may be critical to understand fiscal policies.
1.2.2 Methodology
Most of the empirical literature that has attempted to recover the dynamic effects of
government spending shocks on macroeconomic variables have used a linear vector
autoregression (VAR) framework.6 In this paper, these effects are also identified
using a VAR of the form (abstracting from any deterministic part)7
Yt =
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i + ut (1.1)
where Yt is a (k × 1) vector of time series, ut is a vector of residuals satisfying
E(ut) = 0, E(utu′t) = Σ and E(utut−τ ) = 0 for τ = 1, . . . ,∞. The VAR is
estimated using Bayesian methods. A Minnesota prior is assumed and the posterior
distribution is obtained using a standard Gibbs sample (see appendix for technical
details on the priors and the Gibbs sampler). Once the posterior distribution is
available we use 1,000 draws from it to recover the impulse responses of the main
macroeconomic aggregates to the government shock. This points to the problem of
identification of the shocks and the computation of the impulse response functions.
6Notable exceptions are Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) who use a smooth threshold
vector autoregression process as a mean to acknowledge the potential state dependency of the
dynamic effects of government spending shocks, or Ramey and Zubairy (2014) who favor Jorda`’s
(2005) local projection approach also as a way to recover the state dependent effects of government
spending shocks.
7In the application we allow for a constant and use 4 lags.
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To recover a set of “fundamental” shocks, εt, that can be given a meaningful
structural interpretation, we assume that there exists a matrix S such that
ut = Sεt with E(εtε′t) = I
Given that the matrix S has k2 elements whereas Σ has k(k + 1)/2 elements, the
identification of the fundamental shocks requires imposing at least k(k − 1)/2
restrictions. Given that we are only interested in identifying a subset of the shocks
we will not impose as many restrictions. It is common practice in the literature
to impose short-run restrictions a` la Sims (1980), or long-run restrictions a` la
Blanchard and Quah (1989). In this paper, we instead follow Uhlig (2005) and
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and impose sign restrictions on the impulse responses
to the various shocks, which will be discussed when presenting the results. This
presentation closely follows Uhlig (2005), who gives greater details in the appendix
of his paper.
Uhlig (2005) shows that the matrix S can be conveniently rewritten as S = S˜Q
where S˜ is the Cholesky decomposition of the matrix Σ (which would correspond
to imposing short-run identifying restrictions), and Q is an orthonormal matrix
(QQ′ = I). It is important to note that the matrix S˜ could consist of any other
convenient decomposition of the matrix Σ without affecting the results in any
manner (it would just lead to an adjustment of the matrix Q). In that setting, the
computation of the impulse response function to a shock can be obtained in two
steps. First the set of impulse response of variable j to the i–th shock at horizon τ ,
denoted x˜ji,τ , is obtained for all shocks associated to the Cholesky decomposition.
In that context, the impulse response function of variable j to shock s at horizon
τ , xjs,τ is given by
xjs,τ =
k∑
i=1
Qi,sx˜
j
i,τ (1.2)
The matrix Q is obtained by minimizing a penalty function that penalizes rotations
of the Cholesky impulse matrix that do not satisfy the set of identifying restrictions
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we impose. More precisely, Q is given by
Q = argmin
Q˜
P(Q˜) (1.3)
s.t. Q˜Q˜′ = I
where the penalty function P is borrowed from Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and
Uhlig (2009):
P(Q) = ∑
j∈J+
m−1∑
τ=0
f
(
−x
j
s,τ
σj
)
+
∑
j∈J−
m−1∑
τ=0
f
(
xjs,τ
σj
)
where J+ (resp. J−) denotes the set of variables for which the identification imposes
a positive (resp. negative) response of the variable to the shock for the first m
periods. Note that the impulse response function of each variable is normalized
by its standard deviation as a way to avoid scale effects problem. The function
f(·) penalizes Q matrices that do not satisfy the restrictions imposed by the
econometrician.8
1.2.3 Identifying Assumptions
We follow closely Mountford and Uhlig (2009) in identifying the shocks. More
precisely, we follow their strategy and identify (i) a business cycle shock, (ii) a
monetary policy shock, (iii) a government spending shock and (iv) a government
revenue shock, which are all mutually orthogonal.
The business cycle shock —shall it capture supply side or demand side
phenomena— is identified as a shock that increases output, consumption,
investment, and non-residential investment during the first 4 quarters following the
shock. The monetary policy shock is identified as a shock that (i) is orthogonal
to the business cycle shock and (ii) raises the nominal interest rate and decreases
8Rubio-Ramı´rez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010) offer an alternative approach to recover the IRFs
in the case of sign restrictions, which rely on the simulation of a rotation matrix, as obtained
from the QR decomposition of a randomly generated matrix. Only the draws that satisfy the
sign restrictions are then kept. Using this approach rather than the penalty function approach
led to very similar results.
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prices and adjusted reserves in 4 quarters following the shock. Note that, the
identification of these two shocks is not strictly needed to recover the fiscal shocks.9
However, the identification of the business cycle and the monetary policy shocks
proves useful as it prevents the response of macroeconomic aggregates to fiscal
shocks to be contaminated by phenomena pertaining to the business cycle and/or
monetary policy.
We identify two fiscal shocks: (i) a spending shock and (ii) a revenue shock.
In both cases, the government spending (resp. revenue) shock is identified by
restricting government spending —be it consumption or investment, or defense
versus total spending— (resp. revenues) to increase in the initial 4 periods after the
shock. No other variable is restricted. On the one hand, the restriction is rather
weak as only the response of the government variable is used for identification.
On the other hand, it is quite strong in the sense it precludes identifying a purely
transient government shock or a shock that would raise, say, public spending on
impact but lead to a decrease in the period that follows. As such this identification
scheme, therefore, identifies shocks that indeed are persistent —not transient—
positive shocks to government spending or revenues. Importantly, these two shocks
are orthogonal to the business cycle and the monetary policy shocks, and are also
mutually orthogonal.
1.3 Results
This section presents our main results. We first discuss the dynamic implications
of the business cycle shock and the monetary policy shock. We then describe our
main findings pertaining to an increase in government spending. In particular,
we highlight the differences between the various types of spending and how these
results are actually sensitive to the sample we use. We finally discuss the effects of
a tax cut.
9For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002b) directly recover the government spending shock
by imposing the sole restriction that this shock shifts government spending without affecting
other aggregates on impact.
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1.3.1 Non–Government Shocks
Business Cycle Shock: Figures 1.1 and 1.2 report the dynamics of the variables
to a business cycle shock in each of the baseline VARs we estimated (one for each
type of government spending) with a sample starting in 1955. Figure 1.1 focuses
on the non-government spending variables (output, private consumption, private
investment, non residential investment, the nominal interest rate, the aggregate
price level, the commodity price and adjusted reserves) as obtained from a VAR
featuring total government consumption as the government spending variable.10
Figure 1.2 focuses on the response of the various types of government spending in
each VAR model.
Each figure reports the median dynamics for the pre-financial crisis period
(plain line), 1955I-2007IV, and for the period including the financial crisis (marked
line), 1955I-2012IV. The results are reminiscent of Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
By construction, output, private consumption, private investment, non-residential
investment and government revenue increase on impact, and so do the federal
fund rate and prices. Adjusted reserves respond negatively, which is consistent
with the increase in the nominal interest rate that the price increase triggers. All
responses display persistence, but only non-residential investment and the federal
fund rate exhibit a hump shaped response. As expected, the response of private
consumption is smaller than that of output, hence witnessing the existence of a
consumption smoothing behavior, while private investment is much more responsive
to the shock. Interestingly, the impulse responses reveal that the inclusion of the
financial crisis in the sample makes the economy more resilient to the business cycle
shock. Output, private consumption and investment and the nominal variables
respond more to the shock in the whole sample than in the pre-financial crisis
sample. Note, however, that the impact effect of the shock does not differ across
10We did not report the IRFs of the non-government spending variables across the various
VARs as they do not differ significantly. These figures are available in the companion technical
appendix to this paper. Also note that the similarity across VARs suggests that the identification
of the business cycle shock is not sensitive to the exact specification of the fiscal side of the
information set available to the econometrician.
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Figure 1.1: Business Cycle Shock (Total Government Consumption VAR)
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the two samples, the IRFs start to depart from each other as of the second quarter
after the shock. This suggests that this difference in the responses is due more to
a change in the mechanisms that propagate the shocks than to the shock itself.
The behavior of adjusted reserves varies considerably across the two samples. This
is largely explained by the drastic change of role played by this variable in the
conduct of monetary policy during the period 2008IV-2012IV. Quantitative easing
made adjusted reserves surge in that period, which led to a strong amplification of
the effects of a given shock on this variable.
Figure 1.2: Business Cycle Shock: Government Spending
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Figure 1.2 provides information on the endogenous –systematic– component of
government spending as it reports how the various types of spending we consider
in this paper reacts to the business cycle shock. This contains useful information
regarding the formulation of a government spending rule. Figure 1.2 indicates that
there exists substantial heterogeneity across such rules.
Following a positive business cycle shock, total government consumption does
not respond, on impact. This is true both for total and defense consumption
expenditures. After one year, government consumption reacts positively therefore
suggesting that the government simply takes advantage of the increase in government
revenues to increase its consumption. We obtain similar findings for the total
government compensation, indicating that the government uses good times to
either raise government employment and/or increase the wage of its employees. It
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is however worth noting that the responses of both consumption expenditures (both
total and defense) and compensation do not differ across two samples. Likewise,
when the sample period is restricted to start later, the impact effect of the business
cycle shock on government consumption and compensation is not statistically
significant from zero. The response turns positive after one and a half year in the
case of consumption and about 3 years in the case of government compensation.
The results differ for government investment. The responses suggest that
good times are used to increase both total and defense government investments.
Productive government expenditures are therefore mostly driven by income effects
rather than by stabilizing motives. However, just as for government consumption,
the impact response of public investment is not affected by the inclusion of the
financial crisis in the sample. When the VAR is estimated over the sample period
1980I–2007IV (or 2012IV), the median impact effect of the business cycle shock
on total government investment is statistically insignificant. And, just as for
consumption, the implicit investment rule followed by the government became less
procyclical in the latest part of the sample.
Monetary Policy Shock: Figures 1.3 and 1.4 report the dynamics of the
macroeconomic aggregates to a monetary policy shock for each specification we
estimated. As in the case of the business cycle shock, we only report, in Figure
1.3, the response of the non-government spending variables in the case of a VAR
featuring total government consumption as the government spending variable.
Figure 1.4 focuses on the response of the various types of government spending.
Recall that, by construction, the monetary policy shock raises the nominal
interest but cannot lead to an increase in prices and adjusted reserves in the first
four periods following the shock. In line with the prediction of most DSGE models,
a positive shift in the nominal interest rate plunges the economy in a recession;
output, private consumption, private investment drop. The shock exerting a
persistent effect on the interest rate, the recession also displays persistence, and the
trough is reached after 10 quarters. It is also sizable as, in the pre-crisis sample, a
65 basis point increase in the nominal interest rate drives output 0.27% below trend
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Figure 1.3: Monetary Policy Shock (Total Government Consumption VAR)
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at the trough, which brings about a cumulative output loss of 2%. Likewise, private
consumption and private investment suffer a sizable cumulative loss of, respectively,
1.7% and 5.1%. Interestingly, the presence of the financial crisis observations led
to milder responses of the main aggregates, most of the shock being absorbed by
prices and adjusted reserves.
Somewhat puzzling is the rise in government revenue in response to the increase
in interest rates. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) report similarly that a monetary
policy shock increases government revenue. A possible explanation, although not
the only, is that over the sample period monetary and fiscal policy are coordinated
so that a monetary tightening is accompanied by a fiscal tightening via an increase
in taxes. In which case, the additional restrictions requiring monetary policy shock
to be orthogonal to fiscal policy shock. They find, however, that controlling for the
fiscal shock is not important for the consequences of monetary policy. 11
Figure 1.4: Monetary Policy Shock: Government Spending
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Figure 1.4 illustrates how monetary and fiscal policies interact. Total government
consumption decreases following the increase in the nominal interest rate —whether
the financial crisis is taken into account or not. Similar results are obtained for
11Mountford and Uhlig (2009) conducted robustness analysis by identifying fiscal shocks both
second (orthogonal to only the business cycle shock) and third (orthogonal to both the business
cycle and monetary policy shocks). They find that the responses of the real variables are very
similar in both these specifications and hence any bias is small. This may be because monetary
policy shocks do not appear have a large effect on real macroeconomic variables.
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the defense consumption expenditures. However, the responses are not statistically
different from zero. As the sample is started later, we find similar response of
government spending to the monetary shock. For instance, starting the sample in
1980I implies that both government consumption and government investment drop,
respectively, by 0.15 and 0.18% following a 35 basis point positive shock on the
interest rate. However, they also remain statistically indifferent from zero.
1.3.2 The Government Spending Shock
This section investigates the response of the economy to a shock that raises
government spending for a year. Each VAR includes a different government
spending variable, which implies that the government spending shock receives a
different interpretation in each case. Figure 1.5 reports the response of government
spending, government revenues, output, private consumption and private investment
to the shock.12 Table 1.1 reports the associated discounted multipliers for output
at horizons of 1 quarter, and then 1, 2 and 5 years, respectively. Ramey (2016)
noted in her recent survey of the government spending multipliers that there exist
a potential problem in the calculation of multipliers in the literature, rendering
them incomparable across the studies. Specifically, researchers tend to follow
Blanchard and Perotti (2002b) by calculating multipliers by comparing the peak
output response to the initial government spending impact effect. Although, as
noted by Ramey (2016) comparing values of impulse responses at peaks or troughs
is a useful way to compare impulse responses, it is not a good way to calculate a
multiplier. As argued by Ramey (2016) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) multipliers
should instead be calculated as the present value of the output response divided by
the present value government spending response. This is a correct way to compute
multipliers because the present value multipliers address the relevant policy question
as they measure the cumulative GDP gain relative to the cumulative government
spending during a given period. Thus, in this paper we follow approach suggested
by Ramey (2016) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) by computing multiplier as the
ratio of the present value output and government spending responses, adjusted
12The full set of impulse responses can be found in the companion technical appendix.
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for the average government spending share. More precisely, let us yxk denote the
response of (log-)output to the (log-)government spending shock at horizon k
and xk denote the response of (log-)government spendings to the shock, then the
discounted multiplier mk(y, x) is given by
mk(y, x) =
∑k−1
t=0 β
kyxk∑k−1
t=0 β
kxk
×
(
y
x
)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor,13 x/y denotes the average share of
government spending x in total output.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.5 displays the dynamics of the main aggregates to a
positive shock to total government consumption. Output responds positively on
impact, although the response is mild. One standard interpretation of this positive
response in the business cycle literature is related to the existence of an associated
negative wealth effect which makes the agents anticipate higher tax rates in the
future –as a way for the government to finance its consumption– which in turn
prompts agents to increase their labor supply and hence aggregate output. However,
neither the response of government revenue nor that of consumption do sustain this
mechanism. Government revenues fall on impact while private consumption mildly
increases on impact. Should the negative wealth effect drive the result, the opposite
pattern in the response of the two latter aggregates should be observed. This,
however, does not mean that government consumption does not exert any form of
crowding out. Private investment decreases on impact and remains below trend for
1 year. These responses –in particular the positive response of consumption– are
reminiscent of earlier findings by Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007) and might
be explained by a model featuring nominal rigidities and rule-of-thumb consumers
a` la Mankiw (2000) or a model in which household cannot observe perfectly the
shocks (see Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba (2012)). Once we consider the
financial crisis, we find that for the shocks to total government consumption and
government compensation the responses across both samples are remarkably close.
Some differences do emerge, but not particularly large, when we consider other
three shocks (notably, government investment, defense consumption and defense
13In practice we use the average effective real interest rate over the sample to compute β = 11+r .
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investment shocks).
Panel (b) of Figure 1.5 reports the dynamics of aggregates following a positive
shock to government labor compensation.14 The results are very similar to those in
the case of government consumption. Output and consumption mildly increase in
the short-run and continue to do so in the next few years. It is worth noting that
the crowding-out effect that government consumption exerted on private investment
is mitigated when the shock hits labor compensation. Interestingly, the dynamics
of the government wage bill differs substantially from government consumption
as it displays a clear hump-shaped pattern, which the government’s willingness
to smooth its wage bill.15 The multiplier associated with the wage bill is higher
than those of the government consumption. A key difference emerges from the
two experiments. The multipliers associated with government compensation are
essentially not affected by the inclusion of the financial crisis in the sample. In
fact the response of output to the government compensation shock is left virtually
unaffected. The reaction of the wage bill to a shock is milder and less persistent.
One potential interpretation of this result is that the financial crisis somehow
imposed some discipline on the government and called for a better control of the
wage bill. An alternative interpretation, although non exclusive, is that the financial
crisis may have weakened the outside options of the employees during the wage
bargaining process.16
Panel (c) of Figure 1.5 plots the impulse response of the economy following a
positive shock to total government investment, hence shedding light on the role of
productive government expenditures over the business cycle. Just as government
consumption, government investment exerts a positive effect on output and private
consumption in the short-run. However, their response is small, as reflected in
14In this experiment, we do not take a stand on whether the government increases the number
of its employees, or the wage it pays to its employees, but rather investigate the effects of an
increase in government’s total wage bill.
15An alternative explanation is based on the existence of trade unions that protect the
employment of their members while using their bargaining power to smooth the real wage.
16Note however that these interpretations are rather speculative as the identification procedure
does not permit to recover the mechanism that underlies these responses.
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Figure 1.5: Government Spending Shock
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the size of the impact multiplier which is clearly below unity — 0.5 in the pre-
crisis sample. In other words there is no such thing as a productive government
spending multiplier in the short-run. The main reason for this finding is found
in the crowding-out effect that public investment has on private investment (see
right panel of panel c). The effects of a government investment shock become
more potent as the horizon increases. For instance, at the horizon of 5 years, the
discounted multiplier for productive expenditures is larger than for consumption
(2.7 versus 2.3), which is in line with previous findings by Baxter and King (1993)
in a real business cycle type of model and the associated positive wealth effect
productive spending traditionally exert in this class of models. Like for the other
types of expenditures, the inclusion of the financial crisis in the sample somewhat
alters the properties of the dynamics. More precisely, while output and –to a
lesser extent– consumption respond more favorably to the shock in the short-run,
the longer-run effect on output and consumption is substantially weakened. For
instance, output increases by 0.1% on impact in the crisis sample (0.05% in the
pre-crisis period). After 1 year, public investment crowds out private investment by
more when the financial crisis is taken into account. In the short-run, taking into
account the financial crisis dampens the negative response of private investment to
the public investment shock –therefore limiting the crowding out effect. However,
the long-run effect on output is not statistically different from zero.
Panel (d) of Figure 1.5 reports the dynamics of aggregates following a positive
shock to defense government consumption. The responses are very similar to those
obtained for the total government consumption shock.17 In the presence of financial
crisis, the impact response of the government consumption variable remains the
same across the two samples, the short-run response of output increases in the
crisis period. This is confirmed by size of the impact and 1 year ahead discounted
multipliers. When the financial crisis is excluded from the sample, the impact
17Defense government consumption is usually considered to be less sensitive to the business
cycle and therefore closer to be exogenous than total government consumption. In our sample
both display very similar properties. For instance the correlation between HP-filtered output and
government consumption for the period 1955I-2007IV (resp. 1955I-2012IV) is -0.03 (resp. -0.12)
for total consumption and -0.08 (resp. -0.15) in the case of defense consumption.
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multiplier on output is 0.87 (1.22 at the 1 year horizon). Bringing back information
about the financial crisis the multiplier raises to 1 (1.27 at the 1 year horizon). The
increase in the multiplier is more pronounced in the case of defense consumption
expenditures going from 0.59 in the pre-crisis sample to 0.96 as the financial crisis
is included.18 However, as for the total government investment shock the long-run
effects on the output are not statistically significant for the financial crisis period.
There are essentially two candidate explanations to this change in the size of the
multiplier as we include the crisis; (i) the share of the government consumption in
output spending decreased and/or (ii) the propagation mechanisms were affected by
the crisis. The first explanation is not supported by the data. For instance, in the
pre-crisis period the total (resp. defense) government consumption share was 16%
of GDP (resp. 5.7%), and it remains at 16% (resp. 5.6%) when the crisis is included
in the sample. This therefore points more to an explanation based on a change
in the propagation mechanisms induced by the crisis itself and/or the reaction of
monetary policy to the crisis.19 Indeed, while the response of total government
consumption is left essentially unaffected by the inclusion of the financial crisis, the
response of output is slightly larger on impact (0.14% versus 0.17%). Note that
even though the inclusion of the financial crisis in the sample leads to an increase in
the multiplier in the short-run, the multiplier remains below unity, which is in line
with previous recent findings (see, among others,Mountford and Uhlig (2009) in a
linear setting, and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) in a setting taking state dependence
into account).20 In the longer run, the results reverse and the crisis sample shows
a smaller multiplier at the 5 years horizon than the pre-crisis sample. The main
reason for this result is that the inclusion of the financial crisis in the sample makes
output revert faster (see panel (a) of the figure).
To summarize, we consistently find a positive effect of public spending on
18The next section will investigate more systematically the sensitivity of the multipliers to the
sample.
19This view is actually supported by the change in the behavior of adjusted reserves in the
crisis sample that we already discussed in the previous section.
20Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) challenge these findings and argue, using a Smooth
Transition VAR model, that the multiplier increases dramatically during recessions.
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Table 1.1: Government Spending Discounted Multipliers
1955I–2007IV 1955I–2012IV
Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
Output
Total Government
C 0.87 1.22 1.59 2.36 1.00 1.27 1.57 2.14
[0.76, 1.00] [0.94, 1.56] [1.25, 1.89] [1.74, 2.68] [0.74, 1.41] [1.11, 1.34] [1.17, 2.04] [1.37, 2.35]
W 1.58 2.45 3.09 4.08 1.62 2.55 3.25 4.18
[1.18, 1.84] [2.07, 3.30] [0.72, 4.38] [2.22, 5.78] [0.92, 2.28] [1.78, 3.38] [2.62, 4.18] [3.52, 5.38]
I 0.48 0.81 1.20 2.63 0.90 1.12 1.35 2.19
[-0.18, 1.34] [0.11, 1.23] [0.92, 1.98] [1.22, 3.11] [0.08, 1.69] [-0.11, 2.28] [-0.32, 2.68] [-0.24, 4.78]
Defense Component
C 0.59 0.74 0.87 1.09 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.64
[0.09, 1.12] [0.26, 1.18] [0.62, 1.68] [-0.43, 2.21] [0.33, 1.43] [0.48, 1.28] [0.55, 1.18] [-0.13, 1.38]
I 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.99 0.76 0.36 −0.60
[-0.02, 0.64] [-0.13, 0.91] [-0.11, 0.58] [-0.12, 0.57] [0.43, 1.13] [-0.38, 1.51] [-0.13, 0.81] [-0.78, 0.13]
Private Consumption
Total Government
C 0.22 0.32 0.45 0.77 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.78
[0.09, 0.44] [0.18, 0.66] [0.31, 0.81] [0.19, 1.07] [0.14, 0.83] [0.24, 0.91] [0.11, 0.91] [0.38, 1.13]
W 0.09 0.45 0.80 1.39 0.16 0.47 0.80 1.38
[0.01, 0.44] [0.11, 0.97] [0.12, 0.95] [0.57, 1.99] [0.03, 0.73] [0.31, 0.91] [0.03, 1.11] [0.77, 1.93]
I 0.26 0.38 0.55 1.18 0.34 0.47 0.64 1.18
[0.12, 0.66] [0.15, 0.84] [0.17, 0.78] [0.72, 1.47] [0.13, 0.93] [0.28, 1.01] [0.43, 0.91] [0.98, 1.73]
Defense Component
C 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.29
[-0.22, 0.64] [-0.42, 0.51] [-0.10, 0.58] [-0.12, 0.67] [-0.23, 0.93] [-0.18, 0.91] [-0.23, 0.90] [-0.28, 0.73]
I 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.57 0.62 0.56 0.32
[-0.08, 0.58] [-0.10, 0.73] [-0.10, 0.56] [-0.18, 0.77] [0.23, 0.83] [-0.28, 0.91] [-0.17, 0.94] [-0.18, 0.73]
Note: Y: Output, C: consumption, I: Investment, W: Labor Compensation. Median
multipliers and in brackets confidence interval 16th, 84th quantiles
32 CHAPTER 1. THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY SHOCKS
output and private consumption, but a marked crowding out effect on private
investment. Accordingly discounted multipliers are less than unity in the short run
for all types of expenditures, but are significantly larger for consumption spending
than for investment spending in the short-run. On the contrary, in the longer run,
investment spending exhibits a larger discounted multiplier possibly due to the
associated positive wealth effect. Another important finding from the analysis is
that the size of multipliers, for government spending and compensation shocks,
is affected by the inclusion of the financial crisis in the sample. However, for the
government investment and defense shocks the inclusion of financial crisis has no
statistically significant effect.
A potential reason for larger effect, in case of government spending and
compensation shocks, is that by shifting the ending date of the sample forward,
more weight is given to the information pertaining to the financial crisis. Hence, if
it is indeed the case that, as argued by Eggertsson (2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2011) or Erceg and Linde´ (2014), fiscal multipliers are much larger at
the zero lower bound,21, then multipliers are indeed expected to raise as the sample
gives greater weight to the recent financial crisis where nominal interest rates have
been driven to zero. This actually prompts to the question of the importance of the
sample for the transmission of government shocks and their associated multipliers.
In order to tackle this question, Figure 1.6 reports the level of discounted
multipliers at various horizon when the sample is started from various years22 and
ends either in the last quarter of 2007 (pre-crisis sample) or in the last quarter of
2012 to include the financial crisis. The plain dark line corresponds to the level of
the multiplier attained in the pre-crisis sample, the gray one in the whole sample.
The exercise is repeated for each type of public expenditures. Figure 1.6 first
indicates that, for all types of government spending –to the notable exception of
21Halrom and Sarte (2014) and Braun and Ko¨rber (2014) however show that multipliers in a
liquidity trap depends on many modeling details. The existence of a liquidity trap therefore does
not guarantee, theoretically, the existence of large multipliers. In a quantitative new Keynesian
model, Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) find no evidence favoring a positive role of the
zero lower bound on the size of the multiplier.
22The sample is started from the first quarter of each of the specified year.
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government compensation– including the financial crisis magnifies the short-run
discounted multipliers, whatever the initial dates of the sample is. The increase
in the impact multiplier is more pronounced as the starting date of the sample
increases. However, this cannot be the whole story. Indeed, as can be seen from
the figure, impact multipliers (and to a large extent the 1 year multipliers) also
increase in the pre-crisis sample.
Figure 1.6: Multipliers over Time
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19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Gov. Consumption
(Total)
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Gov. Investment
(Total)
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
0
1
2
3
4
5
Gov. Compensation
(Total)
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Gov. Consumption
(Defense)
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
0
1
2
3
4
Gov. Investment
(Defense)
(b) 1 Year Multiplier
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T0–2007IV, T0–2012IV, where T0 denotes the starting date of the sample
(reported on the x-axis).
The multiplier associated to total government consumption varies from 0.87
when the sample is started from 1955 to 1.8 when the sample starts in 1980 —
which therefore restricts the sample to the post-Volcker period. In fact, as the
starting date of the sample is shifted forward, more weight is put on the post-Volcker
period in the sample, and hence on inflation stabilization. Inspection of the IRFs
of the aggregate price level to the government consumption shock (not reported)
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confirms it. For instance, the median impact effect of government consumption
shock in the 1980I-2007IV sample is three times smaller than in the 1955I-2007IV
sample. In a new Keynesian framework, greater price sluggishness leads to greater
adjustments of quantities. This view is supported by the data as the median
impact response of output increases by 22%. In that context, the government
consumption multiplier increases. This way of interpreting the results pushes the
view that the endogenous part of monetary policy created favorable conditions
for enhancing the potency of fiscal policy. However, part of the increase in the
multiplier should also be found in the fiscal policy rule itself. In particular, the larger
the degree of countercyclicality of the government rule, the larger the multiplier
should be. Figure 1.7 reports the correlation between the cyclical component of
Figure 1.7: Cyclicality of Government Spending
(a) Contemporaneous Correlation: Corr(ghpt , yhpt )
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(b) 1 Year Correlation: Corr(ghpt , yhpt+4)
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T0–2007IV, T0–2012IV, where T0 denotes the starting date of the sample
(reported on the x-axis).
1.3. RESULTS 35
government spending and the cyclical component of output.23 Panel (a) of the
figure reports the contemporaneous correlation, Panel (b) the correlation where
output was led by 1 year. As can be seen from Panel (a) of the figure, total
government consumption dynamics is more countercyclical as the starting date is
shifted forward –the phenomenon being even more pronounced as the financial crisis
is included in the sample. This countercyclical behavior of government consumption
is actually more pronounced for defense purposes consumption. The same greater
countercyclical behavior of government consumption can be observed for the 1 year
ahead correlation, hence explaining the increase of the discounted multiplier at the
1 year horizon. A similar pattern obtains for government compensation –although
it is not countercyclical for the 50’s and the 60’s. The correlation between output
and government compensation decreases over time (and becomes negative when
the sample is started in the 70’s onward). This lower correlation witnesses that the
positive systematic link between the government wage bill and output is somehow
broken, which implies the compensation of government employees can have been
used more effectively to stimulate activity.
The multipliers associated to government investment, be it total or for defense
purposes, also increase as the starting date of the sample is shifted forward.
For instance, in the pre-crisis sample the median impact multiplier is 0.5 does
not exhibit countercyclical behavior (except for the post-Volcker sample). Its
contemporaneous correlation with output also becomes more negative in the whole
sample as the sample initial date is shifted forward, which reveals again that
greater countercyclicality is associated with greater multipliers. The results are
less supportive of this view in the pre-crisis period suggesting that alternative
mechanisms can also be at work. In Section 1.5 we suggest that part of the
explanation can be found in the presence of financial frictions.
23The cyclical component is obtained by applying the bandpass filter of Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003) for frequencies ranging from 6 to 32 quarters.
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1.3.3 The Government Revenue Shock
We now investigate the implications of a tax cut for the economy. Figure 1.8 reports
the dynamics of government revenues, output, private consumption and investment
for the sample 1955:I-2012:IV. We only report the dynamics as estimated from
the model featuring total government consumption as the results for the other
models are very similar.24 Table 1.2 reports the associated discounted multipliers
for output at horizons of 1 quarters, and of 1, 2 and 5 years. In the case of a cut in
government revenue, following Ramey (2016) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009), the
multiplier mk(y, τ) is computed as
mk(y, τ) = −
∑k−1
t=0 β
kyτk∑k−1
t=0 β
kτk
×
(
y
τ
)
where τ/y denotes the average share of government revenue in total output.
Table 1.2: Government Revenue Multipliers
1955I–2007IV 1955I–2012IV
Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
0.61 1.01 1.81 3.79 0.53 1.02 1.98 2.52
[0.22, 0.97] [0.33, 1.72] [0.51, 2.58] [2.92, 4.77] [0.23, 1.03] [0.98, 1.41] [1.13, 2.51] [1.77, 3.03]
Note: Median multipliers and 68% HPDI
As indicated in the Figure 1.8, the cut in government revenue frees up some
resources for the private sector. Output, private consumption and investment
(including non-residential investment) all increase on impact; it is also worth noting
that, in all VARs, the measure of government spending co-moves positively with
output. Government revenue remains below trend during 8 periods, which translates
into a persistent boom in the economy. Consequently, the responses of output,
consumption and investment also display persistence and all exhibit hump-shaped
24The interested reader is referred to the companion appendix for the IRFs obtained from the
other models.
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dynamics with a peak in the IRF of output (resp. investment and consumption)
7 quarters (resp. 5 and 10 quarters) after the shock. The associated short-run
multiplier is clearly below unity (0.61 on impact), and it only reaches unity after
one year thereby reflecting the hump-shaped behavior of the response of output to
the tax cut. The positive effects of the tax cut materialize in the longer run, as, for
instance, the multiplier reaches 3.8 after 5 years.
Figure 1.8: Government Revenue Shock
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The inclusion of the financial crisis in the sample has very little consequences
for the dynamics of output in the short run. However, after one year, output starts
being less responsive than in the pre-crisis sample. This translates into very similar
short-run multipliers across the two samples (0.61 in the pre-crisis sample versus
0.53 in the crisis sample). Differences emerge as the time horizon increases, and
after 5 years the multiplier in the pre-crisis period is 50% greater than when the
financial crisis is included (3.80 versus 2.5). One potential interpretation of this
result is that the private resources that are now available to the private agents in
the economy cannot be allocated efficiently due to financial frictions, which leads
to a relative loss of output — accompanied with a relative loss of consumption
and investment due to the negative wealth effect created by the mis-allocation of
resources — in the longer run.
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1.4 Extensions
This section offers some extensions to the baseline results, focusing essentially on
the public spending. In particular, we investigate the role of the announcement of
public expenditures for the propagation of fiscal shocks. We also assess the role of
the financing of the public spending.
1.4.1 The Role of Announcements
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 compare the average dynamic responses of aggregates to the
various government spending shocks under two alternative timing of announcement.
The first one corresponds to our previous baseline experiment, the shock is
unannounced and surprises the agents. In the second, the shock is announced one
year before it effectively hits the economy. One striking result that emerges
from the figure is that, contrary to the case of an unannounced shock, the
government spending variable reacts gradually after the first four quarters and
builds up over time. Also, note that the inclusion of the financial crisis does
not affect the response of government spending, implying that any difference in
the response of macroeconomic aggregates can only be due to a change in the
propagation mechanisms during that period. The main conclusion that can be
drawn from the figure is that the announcement of the shock —by giving the
agents the opportunity to smooth out its effects— reduces its effects on output and
consumption. Interestingly, restricting attention to defense spending –either its
consumption or investment– leads to a drop in both output and consumption, which
is even more pronounced when the financial crisis is included in the sample. As in
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), the announcement of the shock also mitigates the
crowding out effect on investment (except in the case of government compensation
shock). Finally, once the crisis is included in the sample, the positive effects on
the output and private consumption of the announced government consumption
and investment shocks are much milder than in the pre-crisis sample. For the
announced defense spending shocks the negative effect on the output and private
consumption are more pronounced than in the pre-crisis sample. But the financial
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Figure 1.9: Announced Government Spending Shock (I)
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Figure 1.10: Announced Government Spending Shock (II)
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crisis, however, have no significant effect on the output and private consumption
for the announced government compensation shock.
1.4.2 The Role of Financing
In this section, we investigate how the response of the economy and the multipliers
are affected by the way a one year 1% increase of public expenditures is financed.
We consider two ways of financing these expenditures. In the first one, we assume
that the increase in public expenditures is fully financed by adjusting the deficit.
Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009), we implement this restriction by assuming
that government revenues are held constant in the first four period following the
shock. In the second one, we assume that the government makes sure that the
increase in public spending is neutral for the budget. This is achieved by assuming
that tax revenues vary so as to balance the increase in government spending
in the first four periods following the shock. These restrictions can be simply
implemented by combining the impulse responses of aggregate variables to the
government spending and revenue shocks. One just need to recover weights αk
and βk, k = 1, . . . , 4, that (i) ensures that government spending is 1% above trend
during the initial 4 quarters, and (ii) that deviations of tax revenue (resp. tax
revenue net of government spending) from their long run trend are identically 0
during 4 quarters. For instance, in the case of the deficit financing restriction, the
weights αk and βk solve
4∑
k=1
αkGg,4−τ + βkRg,4−τ = 1
4∑
k=1
αkGr,4−τ + βkRr,4−τ = 0
where G˜s,τ (resp. R˜s,τ ) denotes the response of government spending (resp. revenue)
to shock s = g, r at horizon τ . In the case of the balanced budget restriction, the
second equation reads
4∑
k=1
αkGr,4−τ + βkRr,4−τ = G/R
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where G/R denotes the average government spending to revenue ratio.25 Figures
1.11–1.14 report the dynamics to a government spending shock assuming that the
shock is purely financed by increasing the deficit, or constraining the revenue to
balance the budget. Table 1.3 reports the associated discounted multipliers.
Figure 1.11: Government Spending Shock: Deficit (I)
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25This expression can actually be derived from the log-linear version of the definition of deficit
(Dt = Gt −Rt), which reads DR d̂t = GR ĝt − r̂t. A balanced budget then imposes d̂t = 0.
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Table 1.3: Government Spending Discounted Multipliers
1955I–2007IV 1955I–2012IV
Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
Total Government Consumption
A 0.87 1.22 1.59 2.36 1.00 1.27 1.57 2.14
[0.76, 1.00] [0.94, 1.56] [1.25, 1.89] [1.74, 2.68] [0.74, 1.41] [1.11, 1.34] [1.17, 2.04] [1.37, 2.35]
D 0.84 1.15 1.50 2.28 0.91 1.09 1.35 1.95
[0.46, 1.03] [0.98, 1.62] [1.15, 1.78] [1.66, 2.56] [0.63, 1.33] [0.91, 1.15] [1.03, 1.81] [1.55, 2.23]
B 0.23 0.21 0.32 1.00 0.35 0.19 0.18 0.84
[-0.07, 0.67] [-0.01, 0.61] [-0.15, 0.75] [-0.77, 1.66] [-0.13, 0.53] [-0.02, 0.45] [-0.03, 0.71] [-0.55, 1.43]
Total Government Compensation
A 1.58 2.45 3.09 4.08 1.62 2.55 3.25 4.18
[1.18, 1.84] [2.07, 3.30] [0.72, 4.38] [2.22, 5.78] [0.92, 2.28] [1.78, 3.38] [2.62, 4.18] [3.52, 5.38]
D 1.36 2.25 2.92 3.93 1.22 2.16 2.89 3.94
[1.04, 1.61] [1.97, 2.95] [0.68, 4.08] [2.03, 5.38] [0.56, 1.87] [1.33, 2.97] [2.22, 3.77] [3.27, 5.01]
B 0.79 1.45 2.01 3.07 0.67 1.35 1.99 3.26
[0.44, 1.12] [1.07, 1.95] [1.80, 2.26] [2.83, 3.31] [0.31, 1.05] [1.03, 1.67] [1.42, 2.67] [2.88, 3.69]
Total Government Investment
A 0.48 0.81 1.20 2.63 0.90 1.12 1.35 2.19
[-0.18, 1.34] [0.11, 1.23] [0.92, 1.98] [1.22, 3.11] [0.08, 1.69] [-0.11, 2.28] [-0.32, 2.68] [-0.24, 4.78]
D 0.70 1.19 1.73 3.40 0.99 1.22 1.43 2.19
[0.33, 1.04] [0.53, 1.65] [1.41, 2.51] [0.62, 3.93] [0.03, 1.80] [-0.09, 2.41] [-0.70, 2.88] [-1.55, 3.79]
B 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.98 0.30 0.08 −0.11 0.25
[-0.13, 0.15] [-0.35, 0.40] [0.01, 0.27] [0.32, 1.63] [-0.13, 0.54] [-0.18, 0.34] [-0.20, 0.32] [-0.25, 0.47]
Defense Government Consumption
A 0.59 0.74 0.87 1.09 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.64
[0.09, 1.12] [0.26, 1.18] [0.62, 1.68] [-0.43, 2.21] [0.33, 1.43] [0.48, 1.28] [0.55, 1.18] [-0.13, 1.38]
D 0.73 0.94 1.11 1.38 0.86 0.83 0.75 0.49
[0.29, 1.13] [0.47, 1.39] [0.85, 1.94] [-0.74, 2.53] [0.24, 1.34] [0.38, 1.17] [0.41, 1.04] [-0.10, 0.98]
B 0.02 −0.16 −0.33 −0.33 0.19 −0.24 −0.65 −0.93
[-0.13, 0.16] [-0.37, 0.14] [-0.54, 0.11] [-0.55, 0.25] [-0.03, 0.38] [-0.64, 0.21] [-1.05, 0.44] [-2.15, 1.11]
Defense Government Investment
A 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.99 0.76 0.36 −0.60
[-0.02, 0.64] [-0.13, 0.91] [-0.11, 0.58] [-0.12, 0.57] [0.43, 1.13] [-0.38, 1.51] [-0.13, 0.81] [-0.78, 0.13]
D 0.43 0.74 0.95 1.32 0.81 0.63 0.26 −0.76
[-0.24, 0.98] [-0.52, 1.41] [-0.81, 2.27] [-1.02, 1.77] [0.23, 1.68] [-0.25, 1.48] [-0.03, 0.70] [-0.94, -0.11]
B −0.29 −0.45 −0.64 −0.87 0.08 −0.53 −1.27 −2.57
[-0.74, 0.15] [-1.21, 0.36] [-1.73, 0.57] [-2.20, 0.53] [-0.12, 0.30] [-1.18, 0.19] [-3.29, 0.83] [-8.14, 1.81]
Note: A: Baseline, D: Deficit, B: Balanced Budget. Median multipliers and 68% HPDI in brackets.
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Figure 1.12: Government Spending Shock: Deficit
(d) Defense Government Consumption
Gov. Consumption
(Defense)
Quarters
5 10 15 20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Gov. Revenue
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Output
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Priv. Cons.
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Total Priv. Inv.
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
(e) Defense Government Investment
Gov. Investment
(Defense)
Quarters
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Gov. Revenue
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
Output
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Priv. Cons.
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Total Priv. Inv.
Quarters
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
median IRF (1955I–2007IV) 68% HPDI (1955I–2007IV)
median IRF (1955I–2012IV) 68% HPDI (1955I–2012IV)
1.4. EXTENSIONS 45
Figure 1.13: Government Spending Shock: Balanced Budget
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Figure 1.14: Government Spending Shock: Balanced Budget
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The inspection of Table 1.3 reveals that the multiplier associated to a shock to
total government consumption is the same as in the baseline experiment and in the
deficit financed case. This comes as no surprise as the comparison of Panel (a) of
Figures 1.5 and 1.11 show that the response of government spending and revenues
are extremely similar, leading to almost identical dynamics for the aggregates
(output, private consumption and private investment). This finding is actually
reminiscent of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who also find it for total government
expenditures. However, the similarities stop here. Indeed as soon as deficit financed
total government investment of labor compensation are considered, the multipliers
—especially the impact multipliers— differ from the baseline experiment. The
multiplier is larger for investment, smaller for government compensation. Panel (c)
of Figures 1.5 and 1.11 reveal that in the baseline experiment the shock to total
government investment requires an increase in government revenues which crowd
out private investment and limits the response of output. This is obviously not
the case when the shock is deficit-financed as government revenues do not adjust.
Results are qualitatively similar for defense spending such that the multipliers
associated to both defense spending are larger —it doubles in the case of defense
investment.
Table 1.3 also reveals that the differences between the pre-crisis and crisis
samples are attenuated in the case of deficit-financed fiscal policy for all of the
shocks, with an exception of the government investment shock. However, the output
multipliers for both samples are only statistically significant for the government
consumption and compensation shocks, and not for defense expenditure shocks.
For government investment shocks, the output multipliers for the deficit-financed
fiscal policy in the pre-crisis period are statistically positive and increasing over
the horizon, but statistically insignificant throughout the crisis period. In case of
a shock to total government consumption, the impact multiplier increased from
0.87 to 1 between the pre-crisis and the crisis sample — a 15% increase. In the
deficit finance experiment, the corresponding multiplier increases from 0.84 to 0.91
—a 8% increase, about half of what obtained in the previous experiment. These
findings are reversed in the government compensation case, the multiplier is higher
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in the crisis sample in the deficit financed case. A candidate explanation for the
smaller differences across the sample can be found in the absence of adjustment
of government revenues. Indeed, if the lack of adjustment of government revenue
is accompanied/achieved by the absence of reaction of distorting taxation, this
then does not add to the distortions induced by tighter financial conditions and
therefore limits the distinction between the two samples.
When we impose the restriction that the tax revenue must be adjusted to
guarantee a balanced budget in the year that follows the shock, the fiscal multipliers
are statistically insignificant (with a notable exception of government compensation
shock).
1.5 The role of Financial Conditions
This section investigates further the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis for the
transmission of government shocks by studying a version of our VAR controlling
for financial conditions. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas,
and Diba (Forthcoming), among others, have shown in general equilibrium models
that financial conditions affect the transmission of fiscal policy and suggest that
they should be controlled for in order to properly recover multipliers. As a way to
investigate this issue, we first simply extend our set of variables to the National
Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) which is a measure of risk, liquidity and leverage
in money markets and debt and equity markets as well as in the traditional and
shadow banking systems.26 In that case, due to availability of the NFCI variable,
the sample is restricted to the post 1973 period.
As shown in Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba (Forthcoming), financial
conditions ought to have non-linear implications for the propagation of government
shocks and may induce some form of state dependence. To capture these non-
linearities we also estimate a non-linear version of the VAR in which the lagged
variables are considered in interaction with financial conditions. More precisely,
26Positive values indicate financial conditions that are tighter than average, while negative
values indicate financial conditions that are looser than average.
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let us define Xt ≡ (Yt, ϕt), where Yt collects all the variables of our linear VAR
(see Section 1.2.1) and ϕt is the financial condition variable, NFCI. Our non-linear
VAR takes the form
Xt =
p∑
i=1
AiXt−i +
p∑
i=1
Bi zt−i ×Xt−i + ut (1.4)
where zt = exp(ϕt)/(1 + exp(ϕt)) guarantees that the distortion lies between 0 and
1. Our specification departs from that proposed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012), who consider a Smooth-Threshold VAR, in several dimensions. First, the
model is not intended to recover the dynamics in different regimes characterizing the
business cycle, but rather to compute the interactions between financial conditions
and fiscal policy. We therefore do not model the transition probability between
regimes. This permits to consider the simpler form of non-linearity in (1.4). Second,
because the model is not to be interpreted as a regime switching model, there
is no need to model state dependent covariance matrices. Third —and this is
an implication of the last two observations— the non-linearity is found in the
propagation of shocks only. Finally, contrary to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012), we do not consider the interaction variable —the equivalent to their switching
variable27— as exogenous, but rather explicitly model its dynamics (last equation
in the non-linear VAR, Equation (1.4)). An implication of the assumed endogeneity
of financial conditions is that the computation of impulse response functions is
fundamentally non-linear. We therefore adopt the generalized impulse response
approach proposed by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) to compute the dynamics
of aggregates after a shock.
We consider three situations, which all correspond to specific conditions on
financial markets. We are not interested in recovering multipliers in recessions
versus expansions, but rather aim at characterizing the way financial conditions
shape the multipliers. We start by investigating the response of the economy to a
government shock, and the level of the associated multiplier, when the economy
27Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) consider, as switching variable, a backward-forward
moving average of output growth and compute their Impulse response function without taking
into account that, along the dynamics, the switching variable may vary.
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Figure 1.15: Data: Financial Conditions and Interest Rate
Output: bandpass filter 6-32 Quarters
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-4
-2
0
2
4
National Financial Conditions Index
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-2
0
2
4
6
Federal Fund Rate (Annualized, %)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
10
20
Note: The shaded areas correspond to recessions as
identified by the NBER.
1.5. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 51
faces loose financial stress while being in a recession. This is achieved by using,
as initial condition to build the generalized impulse responses, the state of the
economy in the third quarter of 2001. We then compare the so-obtained set of IRFs
to what obtains when the economy is started in the last quarter of 2008, where the
financial index indicates that the economy is under high financial stress.28 Note
however that the economy actually faces two important frictions that ought to
affect the multiplier: tight financial conditions and the zero lower bound (ZLB).
Therefore, in order to tell apart the effects of financial conditions and those of the
ZLB, we also report results when the economy is started in the third quarter of
1981, where the economy faced a recession of a similar size as in 2008 and very
similar index of financial conditions, but was clearly not at the ZLB (See Figure
1.15).
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the median of the discounted fiscal multipliers
associated with consumption and investment expenditures29 and Figure 1.16 the
associated impulse responses. As suggested by the results of Section 1.3, the
multipliers obtained over the period 1973I-2012IV in the linear VAR are larger than
those in the full sample. For example, the impact multipliers of total government
consumption and investment are, respectively, 1.77 and 2.18 over the post 1973
period, versus 1.00 and 0.90 in the full sample. The results for the non-linear
VAR are also in line with previous results by Afonso, Baxa, and Slav´ık (2011)
and Ferraresi, Roventini, and Fagiolo (2014) in threshold VARs. Under loose
financial conditions, the impact multiplier is close to that obtained in the linear
VAR, although slightly lower.30 Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 1.16 the
response of most variables are extremely close to those obtained in the linear
VAR when financial conditions are loose (dashed line). This is true both for total
government consumption and investment expenditures. Note that the difference is
more pronounced when defense spending are considered, with a multiplier in loose
28We chose these two episodes such that the size of the drop in output from peak to trough is
comparable.
29We omit government compensation as, in the non-linear setting, the impulse responses are
explosive.
30This last finding reflects the fact that, on average, financial conditions are loose.
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Table 1.4: Discounted Multipliers: Financial Conditions
Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
Total Government Consumption
Linear 1.77 1.12 0.55 −0.25
[0.95, 2.57] [0.77, 1.53] [0.43, 0.68] [-2.00,1.59]
Loose 1.72 1.20 0.64 −0.25
[1.23, 2.15] [0.81, 1.64] [0.49, 0.77] [-2.32, 2.06]
Tight 2.12 1.11 0.23 −0.35
[1.17, 3.23] [0.84, 1.55] [-0.63, 1.10] [-2.16, 1.89]
Tight-ZLB 2.99 1.00 −0.31 −1.37
[2.49, 3.36] [0.74, 1.41] [-2.33, 1.89] [-3.28, 0.54]
Total Government Investment
Linear 2.18 1.71 0.99 −0.74
[1.38, 2.87] [0.95, 2.57] [0.53, 1.40] [-1.93, 1.24]
Loose 2.37 1.91 0.77 −1.92
[1.77, 3.11] [1.44, 2.47] [0.30, 1.17] [-3.98, 0.45]
Tight 2.97 2.81 2.02 −0.13
[2.20, 3.47] [2.28, 3.53] [1.40, 2.71] [-2.32, 2.06]
Tight-ZLB 3.70 2.46 0.57 −2.72
[3.15, 4.40] [2.01, 3.04] [0.08, 1.15] [-12.11, 9.22]
Note: Median multipliers and in brackets 68% HPDI
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Table 1.5: Discounted Multipliers (Defense): Financial Conditions
Impact 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years
Defense Government Consumption
Linear 1.96 1.38 0.62 −0.97
[1.14, 2.81] [0.54, 2.15] [-0.49, 1.67] [-1.94, 0.04]
Loose 1.38 1.80 1.85 0.98
[1.21, 1.44] [1.38, 2.27] [1.04, 2.78] [-0.56, 2.63]
Tight 2.29 1.22 0.12 −1.22
[0.92, 3.55] [1.11, 1.34] [-0.32, 0.64] [-3.08, 0.34]
Tight-ZLB 2.85 1.35 −0.05 −1.77
[ 1.57, 4.24] [0.54, 2.15] [-1.12, 1.00] [-3.78, 0.25]
Defense Government Investment
Linear 2.51 1.80 0.88 −1.50
[1.70, 3.32] [ 0.62, 3.01] [-0.17, 1.69] [-3.28, 0.54]
Loose 1.59 2.86 3.26 1.41
[1.27, 1.91] [2.35, 3.36] [1.94, 4.69] [-1.26, 3.78]
Tight 4.49 2.77 1.02 −1.61
[ 4.03, 5.10] [2.21, 3.24] [0.40, 1.65] [-3.66, 0.13]
Tight-ZLB 4.66 2.60 0.77 −1.97
[ 3.99, 5.24] [2.09, 3.13] [0.32, 1.19] [-4.19, 0.17]
Note: Median multipliers and in brackets 68% HPDI
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financial conditions way below that observed in the linear VAR.
The figures change quite dramatically when financial conditions are tight, as
was the case during the 1981 recession. The impact multiplier then increases
and is well above that obtained in the linear VAR. For instance, a shock to total
(and defense) consumption expenditures leads to a multiplier above 2 on impact.
Similarly, the impact multipliers associated with investment spending are above
3. In both cases they decline quite quickly and become negative within 5 years.
The results are consistent with results obtained by Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and
Diba (Forthcoming) in a DSGE model featuring financial frictions a` la Curdia
and Woodford (2010).31 When the economy reaches the zero lower bound, as was
the case during the 2007-2009 recession, the impact multiplier is even stronger,
reaching 3 in the case of a government consumption shock and almost 4 in the
case of a government investment shock. This result is consistent with Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and others who showed when the nominal interest
rate is stuck at zero the rise in expected inflation that follows the fiscal stimulus
drives down the real interest rate and therefore stimulates private spending and
hence output. But it also rises the marginal cost and triggers another increase in
expected inflation that feeds the decrease in the real interest rate. Multipliers can
then be quite large.32
It is important to note that we only consider recessions episodes in our
experiments, and our results suggest that the multiplier is actually sensitive to
the tightness of the financial conditions. The financial tightness accounts for a
substantial part of the rise in the multiplier. For instance, moving from loose to
31Their model features a countercyclical financial accelerator embodied in the spread between the
borrowing rate and the lending rate. The countercyclicality is the result of the countercyclicality
of bank intermediation costs In a recession the cost of bank intermediation increases and so
does the spread, therefore worsening financial conditions. An increase in government spending
stimulates the economy which reduces the spread and lowers the borrowing rate which stimulates
consumption and in turn output, leading to a further decrease in the spread and feeding the
boom. The same mechanism works symmetrically during booms, but the initial expansion is
limited due to the non-linearities at work in the model.
32Note however that the size of the multiplier is also determined by other factors that can limit
its increase. See Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010).
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Figure 1.16: Government Spending Shock: Non linear VAR
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tight financial conditions leads to an increase in the multiplier associated with a
government consumption (resp. investment) shock of 23% —from 1.72 to 2.12—
(resp. 25%, from 2.37 to 2.97). But the ZLB leads (holding financial tightness
constant) to a further 41% increase in the impact multiplier associated to the
government consumption shock (25% in the case of an investment spending shock).
These results are in line with the theoretical work of Eggertsson (2010), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) or Braun and Ko¨rber (2014) which shows that
the fiscal multiplier increases dramatically in a liquidity trap. It is therefore the
interaction between monetary policy and financial constraints that explains the
bulk of the increase in the multiplier.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was twofold. First it aimed at comparing of dynamics, both in
terms of impulse responses and multipliers, of the main macroeconomic aggregates
following a shock affecting one of the main components of government spending
–i.e. government consumption, government investment or labor compensation– in
a unified framework. Our results indicate that government consumption shocks—
either affecting total expenditures or defense expenditures only— lead to a mild
positive response of both consumption and output, but exerts a crowding out
effect on private investment. Accordingly, the associated short-run multipliers
are below unity both for output and consumption. The crowding out effect on
private investment is stronger when the shock affects productive expenditures –i.e.
government investment– and the short-run multiplier is, not surprisingly, lower
than in the case of a government consumption shock. But, in line with the theory,
a shock to government investment generates, through the accumulation of public
capital, a positive wealth effect that makes the multipliers larger in the longer run.
These results remain similar whether we consider total government expenditures or
those pertaining to defense purposes only. Multipliers are larger (about 1.5) when
the shock affects labor compensation, as it is found not to create crowding out effect
on the good market. Interestingly, fiscal spending shocks (notably government
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consumption and compensation shocks) have a larger impact when the sample
includes the “Great Recession” episode. One potential explanation for this result
lies in the fact that the cyclical component of government expenditures become
more countercyclical as we include the financial crisis in the sample.
We therefore investigate –and this is the second aim of this paper– the possibility
that, as suggested by several recent theoretical papers (see e.g. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
(2010) or Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba (Forthcoming)), the presence
of stronger financial frictions has had an impact on the transmission of fiscal
shocks, therefore amplifying their effect on aggregate variables. The aforementioned
theoretical work however highlighted that such an effect transit through non-
linear mechanisms. Accordingly, we rely on a non-linear VAR model allowing
us to investigate the role of the interaction between financial conditions and
macroeconomic dynamics and we indeed find evidence in favor of a significant role
of financial frictions. More specifically, our results indicate that multipliers are larger
when the financial conditions are tight. In particular, a deterioration of financial
conditions leads to an increase in the multiplier associated with a government
consumption (resp. investment) shock of about 25% (resp. 25%). Using the same
methodology, we also show that when the economy hits the zero lower bound, the
multiplier increases further by about 40% in the case of a government consumption
shock and 25% in the case of a public investment shock –hence confirming previous
work by Eggertsson (2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) or Braun
and Ko¨rber (2014). We conclude this interaction between financial frictions and
monetary policy accounts for the increase in the multiplier during the last financial
crisis.
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appendix
1.A Estimation
1.A.1 The Minnesota Prior
The Minnesota prior incorporates the belief that the endogenous variables in the
VAR follow either a random walk or a stationary AR(1) process. Hence, for a VAR
of the form
Yt = C +
p∑
τ=1
AτYt−τ + ut (1.A.1)
where Yt is (n × 1), the Minnesota prior imposes the following structure on the
belief
Yt =

0
...
0
+

ρ011 0 · · · 0
0 ρ022 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · ρ0kk
Yt−1 +
p∑
τ=2

0 · · · 0
... . . . ...
0 · · · 0
Yt−τ + ut
where ρ0ii = 1 in the case of a random walk prior, ρ0ii = ρ ∈ (−1, 1) in the case of
the AR(1) prior. Then the prior distribution of the vector θ of parameters of the
VAR is Gaussian with mean θ0 and covariance matrix Ω0 where
θ0 =

θ01
...
θ0k

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with
θ0i = (0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
cj
1 Coef.
, 0, · · · , ρ0i , · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1i
n Coef.
, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1j
(p−1)n Coef.
)′
where θ0i collects the coefficients of the equation describing the dynamics of the
endogenous variable Yit, p is the number of lags and n the number of endogenous
variables. The covariance matrix Ω0 is a diagonal matrix with elements λ20σ2i for
the coefficients pertaining to the exogenous variables (the deterministic part in
1.A.1), and
ψij,τ =

(
λ1
τη
)2
for element Ai,`j, ` = j(
σiλ1λ2
σjτη
)2
for element Ai,`j, ` 6= j
for the coefficients governing the dynamics of variables. The role of the various
coefficients entering the priors is clear. The coefficient λ0 controls for the tightness
of the prior on exogenous variables (λ0 → 0 implies that the coefficient is set exactly
at its prior mean, 0). Likewise λ1 controls for the tightness of the prior of the
coefficient controlling the response of an endogenous variable to its own past. λ2
controls the tightness of the prior of an endogenous variable to the past of one
of the other endogenous variables. In particular when λ2 = 1 no distinction is
made between the response to its own past or to the past of the other endogenous
variables (once the relative volatilities are controlled for). Recalling that p is the
number of lags, the parameter η controls the degree of response of the variable
to further past. The larger η, the faster the effects of the past vanishes (as the
coefficients shrink to 0 at a faster pace for larger values of η). The Ω0 has therefore
the form
Ω0 =

Ω01 · · · 0
... . . . ...
0 · · · Ω0k

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where
Ω0i =

λ20σ
2
i 0
0 Ψi1 0 · · · 0
0 0 Ψi2 · · · 0
0 0 ... . . . ...
0 0 0 · · · Ψik

where
Ψiτ =

ψi1,τ 0 · · · 0
0 ψi2,τ · · · 0
... . . . . . . ...
0 0 · · · ψin,τ

In this application, we follow Canova (2007) and set λ0 = 105, λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.5
and λ3 = 2. Sensitivity analysis revealed the robustness of our findings to changes
in these parameters.
Under this prior, θ is distributed as N (θ0,Ω0) while the conjugate prior for the
covariance matrix of the VAR, Σ is an inverse Wishart (IW) distribution with prior
scale S and prior degrees of freedom, κ.
1.A.2 The Gibbs Sampler
Using the prior described in the previous section, an algorithm for the Gibbs
sampler works as follows:
1. Set an initial value for Σ. In practice we used the OLS estimate.
2. Sample the coefficients of the VAR from the conditional posterior distribution
Fθ(θ|Σ, Yt) = N (θ?,Ω?) where
θ? = (Ω−10 + Σ−1 ⊗X ′X)−1(Ω−10 θ0 + Σ−1 ⊗X ′Xθ̂)
Ω? = (Ω−10 + Σ−1 ⊗X ′X)−1
where X is a (T, n× (p+ 1)) matrix gathering all regressors (lagged variables
and constant), Γ denotes the current draw of the covariance matrix of the
VAR, θ̂ denotes the OLS estimates of the (vectorized) coefficients of the VAR,
1.A. ESTIMATION 61
θ0 is the prior mean of the VAR coefficients, and Ω0 the associated prior of
the covariance matrix. A new draw of the coefficients is then obtained as
θ˜ = θ? + s˜Ω?1/2
where s˜; N (0, I).
3. Sample Σ from its conditional posterior distribution FΣ(Σ|j, Yt) = IW(Σ, T +
κ) where
Σ = S + (Y −Xθ˜)′(Y −Xθ˜)
where θ˜ is the draw of the VAR coefficients obtained in the previous step.33
These steps are repeated N times to obtain draws from the posterior distribution
{θ˜s, Σ˜s}Ns=1, which are then used to compute the confidence bands for the impulse
functions.
1.A.3 The Penalty Function
Recall that the matrix Q is obtained by minimizing a penalty function that penalizes
rotations of the Cholesky impulse matrix that do not satisfy the set of identifying
restrictions imposed by the econometrician and solves the problem
min
Q˜
P(Q˜) (1.A.2)
s.t. Q˜Q˜′ = I
where the penalty function P is borrowed from Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and
Uhlig (2009):
P(Q) = ∑
j∈J+
m−1∑
τ=0
f
(
−x
j
s,τ
σj
)
+
∑
j∈J−
m−1∑
τ=0
f
(
xjs,τ
σj
)
where J+ (resp. J−) denotes the set of variables for which the identification imposes
a positive (resp. negative) response of the variable to the shock for the first m
33As explained in Uhlig (2005), drawing from an inverse Wishart distribution IW(S, κ) can
be simply achieved by drawing a matrix Z(n × κ) from a N (0, S−1) and then computing
Σ˜ = (
∑n
i=1 ZiZ
′
i)
−1.
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periods. Note that the impulse response function of each variable is normalized by
its standard deviation as a way to avoid scale effects problem. The function f(·)
takes the form f(x) = λx if x > 0 with λ > 1 and f(x) = 0 if x < 0. The choice of
λ is not innocuous. If λ is too small, the penalty is not stringent enough, if its too
large numerical problems may affect the minimization. We follow Uhlig (2005) and
use λ = 100.34
From a practical point of view, this procedure is implemented sequentially. The
business cycle shock is identified first, which amounts to select a vector Q1 that
solves problem (1.A.2) with the sole constraint Q′1Q1 = 1. The second shock is
then identified, which amounts to solve a second problem of the type of (1.A.2),
imposing the constraints Q′2Q2 = 1 and Q′2Q1 = 0. This extends to the other
shocks. From a numerical point of view the minimization is performed using the
constrained minimization procedure as implemented by Matlab (fmincon).
1.A.4 Computation of Generalized Impulse Response Func-
tions
The computation of Impulse Response Functions (IRF) is conducted in the lines of
Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996). In case of an arbitrary shock of magnitude ∆,
given state variables at time 0, an IRF for variable x at horizon h is defined as:
Ix(h,∆, 0) = E[xt+h|∆; I0]− E0[xt+h|I0]
where I0 is the information set. Conditional expectations, involved in IRF
computations, are calculated using Monte-Carlo integration. Then IRF are obtained
as follows:
Step 1: We set the horizon H of IRF. The economy is placed at a particular point
of the sample. We draw N random vector uh, h = 1, . . . , H, from the distribution
of the fundamental shocks of the nonlinear VAR.
Step 2: We simulate N time series of length (H) for the vector of variables using
the nonlinear VAR (1.4). These time series are denoted xnh(A0, zh) for n = 1, . . . , N
34We also experimented with alternative values for λ and found that the results were left
unaffected.
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and h = 1, . . . , H.
Step 3: We replicate the computation of step 2, where the structural shock under
study is perturbed by 1 standard deviation. The so–obtained time series, which
correspond the shocked time series, are denoted xnh(A0, z˜h(∆)) for n = 1, . . . , N
and h = 1, . . . , H.
Step 4: We form the averages for each simulated data:
x¯Nh,0 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
xhn(A0, zh) , h = 0, . . . , H
x¯Nh,∆,0 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
xhn(A0, z˜h(∆)) , h = 0, . . . , H
(1.A.3)
Step 5: We compute the IRF as the difference between the two averages :
INx (h,∆, 0) = x¯Nh,δ,0 − x¯Nh,0 h = 0, . . . , H
For N large, we have:
lim
N→∞
INx (h, δ, 0) = Ix(h,∆, 0) h = 0, . . . , H
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1.B Description of the Data
All variables are expressed in real terms per capita by dividing them by the implicit
price deflator of GDP, (Line 1 from NIPA Table 1.1.9), and population (Line 40from
NIPA Table 2.1). The other variables are then constructed using their relative
share in GDP. Consumption and investment shares are obtained relying on the
NIPA Table 1.1.5.
• Gross Domestic Product: Line 1
• Non Durable Consumption: Line 5
• Services Consumption: Line 6
• Total Consumption: (Line 5+Line 6)
• Total Investment (Gross private domestic investment + durable consumption):
(Line 7+Line 4)
• Residential Investment: Line 13
• Non Residential Investment: Line 9
Variables pertaining to government spending and revenues are built in the same
way. The shares are obtained by dividing the various indicators (as obtained from
NIPA Tables 3.1, 3.9.5 and 3.10.5)
• Net Taxes (Current receipts-Transfer payments-Interest payments): Line
1-Line 19-Line 24 of Table 3.1
• Total Government Consumption: Line 2 of Table 3.9.5
• Total Government Investment: Line 3 of Table 3.9.5
• National Defense Government Consumption: Line 18 of Table 3.9.5
• National Defense Investment: Line 19 of Table 3.9.5
• Compensation of General Government Employees: Line 4 of Table 3.10.5
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• Aggregate price level corresponds to the Log of the implicit GDP deflator (as
obtained from FRED, GDPDEF)
• Interest rate corresponds to the 3-Month treasury bill: Secondary Market (as
obtained from FRED, TB3MS). We also used the Effective Federal Fund rate
(as obtained from FRED, FEDFUNDS)
• The commodity price is measured by the Producer Price Index: Crude
Materials for Further Processing (as obtained from FRED, PPICRM)
• Adjusted reserves are measured by the adjusted monetary base (as obtained
from FRED, ADJRESSL)
• To measure financial conditions, we use the National Financial Conditions
Index (as obtained from FRED, NFCI) which is a measure of risk, liquidity
and leverage in money markets and debt and equity markets as well as
in the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. Positive values indicate
financial conditions that are tighter than average, while negative values
indicate financial conditions that are looser than average.
Note that arithmetic averages were used to convert monthly figures to quarterly
figures.

Chapter 2
Fiscal Policy Rule: Does
Implementation Matter?
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has revived interest in activist fiscal policy as a way
to stabilization the business cycle. Governments have responded to the “Great
Recession” relying on rather aggressive stimulus packages as a way to stimulate
demand with lower taxes and higher government spending. However, the resulting
public debt buildups have raised concerns about the financing of these measures,
which in turned fueled the debate on the potency of fiscal instruments. There thus
seems to exist a trade-off between using fiscal instruments as a way to stabilize
the business cycle and fiscal discipline, as manifested by the posted willingness
of governments to keep public debt under control. This trade-off ought to limit
the effectiveness of governments in stabilizing the business cycle. The objective
of this paper is to investigate this issue, in particular asking the question of the
implementation of fiscal rules.
Unlike monetary policy, where the Taylor (1993) rule is commonly viewed
as a fairly accurate representation of most Central Banks’ behavior, there is no
widely accepted fiscal rule. Taylor (1996, 2000), in the spirit of the monetary
policy rule, reported empirical evidence supporting the view that a fiscal rule
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relating a measure of fiscal stances to a measure of the output gap exists for the
United States. Recessions are associated with reductions in fiscal stances indicating
that fiscal policy is countercyclical. Bohn (1998) reports empirical evidence in
favor of a positive relationship between the government surplus to GDP ratio (a
measure of fiscal stances) and the government debt to GDP ratio –indicating that
government deficits (surplus) are used to stabilize the evolution of debt. Favero
and Monacelli (2005) showed that the fiscal policy regime in the United States
can be adequately described in terms of a systematic simple rule in which both
the debt and output gap stabilization motives are present. The present paper
proposes an integrated approach in which the government deficit (or total tax
revenues) respond both to a measure of the output gap, as in Taylor (1996, 2000),
and also to the level of public debt, as in Bohn (1998). The paper therefore
does not take a stand a priori on which of the two sides of the aforementioned
trade-off matters the most –stabilization or fiscal discipline– instead it lets the
data speak. Another point of departure of the present paper from the previous
literature is that, in the latter, the relationship between fiscal stances and the
other measure was contrived to a framework that ignored the potential feedback
effects they generate.1 On the contrary, the present paper estimates the fiscal
rule in a full-fledged general equilibrium model, therefore taking into account all
potential interactions between fiscal policy and the macroeconomy. In that sense,
the paper belongs to the literature that studies fiscal policy in dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In particular, it relates to the seminal paper
by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) which offered an analysis of the financing of
government debt in the US and of the role of fiscal policy in shaping the business
cycle. In their setting, fiscal policy consists of a set of rules –one for each fiscal
policy instrument2– that respond both to a measure of the output gap and to
1Like the approach taken by Taylor (1993) these papers adopt a single equation estimation
framework that ignores the potential feedback effects present in a general equilibrium model
during estimation. For instance, any modification of fiscal stances exerts an effect on the level of
output (or debt) through its effects on the behavior of the other agents in the economy, which in
turn requires a modification of fiscal policy by the governmental authorities.
2Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) consider capital, labor, and consumption taxes, government
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public debt. The present paper borrows from Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)
in the sense that fiscal policy also responds to the output gap and public debt. It
however departs from it in two important ways. First, while Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2010) consider a real model, the present paper models an economy featuring
nominal rigidities, therefore allowing to explicitly take into account the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policies, which ought to have significant implications
both for financing of public debt and output stability. A second important point
of departure from their analysis is found in the exact modeling of fiscal policy.
Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) formulate a specific rule of each of the fiscal
policy instrument they consider. An advantage of their approach is that it gives a
lot of degrees of freedom to improve the fit of the model.3 One drawback is that
it does not separate the policy objective from the way it is implemented. In the
present paper, fiscal policy is modeled as a single rule relating total fiscal stances
to a measure of the output gap and public debt. In particular, given exogenous
government spendings, this rule can be given a “deficit rule” interpretation. Hence,
in the current model, the government has a primary deficit objective which aims
at achieving output stabilization while maintaining public debt under control. It
then adjusts the tax system to finance it. Which of the tax should be adjusted is a
priori indeterminate in a positive context. Following Tinbergen’s rule, only one
instrument at a time is used to achieve this increase in tax revenues, holding all
other tax rates (and the lump sum tax) constant.4 This setup allows for a separation
between the stabilization policy from its financing, and as such provides us with a
better structured framework to understand these two aspects of fiscal policy. The
question of the implementation is important as different tax instruments may lead
to different outcomes both in terms of potency and efficiency.
The model builds upon the standard DSGE model a` la Smets and Wouters
spending, and lump sum transfers.
3One may actually overturn this argument arguing that it does not lead to a parsimonious
model.
4For example, to implement the rule by labor tax adjustment then only labor tax is allowed
to vary and all the other ones are kept constant.
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(2007) or Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)5 extended to the presence of
explicit fiscal stabilization policy. As already discussed, fiscal policy is modeled as
a tax income rule which serves two main purposes: (i) to achieve output stability
and (ii) to discipline the evolution of real debt and aid its sustainability. The
motivation for this extension is grounded in the question addressed in this paper:
the evaluation of the effectiveness of individual tax instruments (a lump sum tax
or either a labor, a capital or a consumption tax), used to finance public debt, to
stabilize the business cycle. The model is then estimated on US quarterly data for
the period 1960Q1–2007Q46 using Bayesian maximum likelihood in the frequency
domain as recently advocated by Christiano and Vigfusson (2003) and Sala (2012).
An advantage of this approach is that it permits to focus explicitly on business
cycle frequencies. The stabilization and fiscal discipline properties of the rule are
then assessed by looking at the response of the main aggregates to the shocks
hitting the economy, and by looking at their second order moments.7 The potency
of individual tax instruments is then assessed by comparing their performance in
terms of reduction of output volatility and the elasticity of output to changes in
each tax in face of the various shocks in the model.
The results indicate that the choice of the tax instrument used to balance the
government budget constraint quantitatively affects the propagation of shocks. The
most stabilizing tax, in terms of unconditional output volatility, is the lump sum
tax. This comes as no surprise as, by not distorting any of the decisions of the
agents, this tax does not create any additional incentive at the margin to vary
hours worked or investment more than what the standard wealth and substitution
effects would prescribe. However, such a tax is essentially absent from most tax
systems which essentially rely on distortionary taxation. The labor tax is the
5The model therefore features nominal rigidities a` la Calvo (1983) affecting both prices and
nominal wages, an explicit monetary policy that takes the form of a Taylor rule, habit persistence,
investment adjustment costs and endogenous utilization.
6This sample therefore excludes the recent financial crisis for which the model we consider is
not suited.
7The analysis is therefore strictly positive, and the paper is silent about the normative aspects
of fiscal policy.
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most stabilizing tax, in terms of output volatility, followed by the consumption tax
and the capital tax. However the differences are quantitatively small, suggesting
that the implementation does not matter much for unconditional volatility. The
same result holds for co-movements. These results indicate that as long as the
government uses a deficit rule, the exact details of its implementation have very little
quantitative consequences for the positive properties of the economy. This stands in
contrast to models that specify a rule for each tax rate in the system (for example
Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)).8 Likewise the choice of the tax instrument
does not affect much the contribution of each shock to output volatility. The main
contributors to output volatility are the neutral technology and cost push shocks
(both 16% on impact in the baseline model), the investment efficiency shock (27%)
and the wage markup shock (22%), although for the latter the contribution becomes
more sizable as the horizon increases (55% after 5 years). Furthermore, the results
indicate that letting either the labor tax, the consumption tax, the capital tax or
the lump-sum component of the tax adjust does not affect neither qualitatively
nor quantitatively the contribution of each shock to the dynamics of output. In
other words, the policymaker is not in a position to affect the contribution of each
shock to the business cycle by simply varying the tax instrument she uses while
using a simple deficit (or total tax revenue) rule. Does it mean that the choice
of the tax is irrelevant? The answer is no. Differences are more clear-cut when
the focus is shifted towards the response of the economy to individual shocks. For
example, the wage markup shock affects directly the wage markups and the labor
tax that are the main driver of the labor wedge –which has been found by Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) to be key in shaping the business cycle– such that
alternative tax instrument then have stronger implications on the dynamics than a
technology shock. Furthermore, the choice of the tax affects the tax elasticity of
output conditional on each shock in each variant of the model, which provides a
measure of the potency of particular fiscal instruments for stabilizing output in face
of a particular shock. The labor tax adjustment model generates the highest tax
8However, in these models, the presence of one specific rule for each tax rate makes the
comparison difficult.
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elasticity of output, then the capital tax model, followed by the consumption and
lump-sum tax models. This ranking applies for any shock and is robust to changes
in the total horizon considered in the calculation of the elasticity. Fiscal policy
exhibits maximum efficacy to stabilize output fluctuations in the aftermaths of
markup shocks (wage and cost push) and technology shocks (neutral and investment
efficiency). These findings highlight the well-known role of the labor wedge in the
propagation of shocks over the business cycle.
Although the effects of fiscal policy adjustments are quantitatively small, the
implementation does matter. In fact, we do find that the baseline labor tax model
allows to achieve output stabilization without requiring too much volatility in tax
revenues and public debt. In other words, the positive properties of the tax system
are strongly affected by the implementation. Whereas this is innocuous from a
positive point of view, it ought to have strong implications for a normative analysis.
Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, two points are worth
mentioning. The presence of a time varying labor (or capital or consumption) tax
adds an additional time varying distortion to the model beyond the price and wage
markups, which can add to the welfare cost of fluctuations for the agents. Second,
in a world where the central bank takes fiscal policy as given, the presence of a
time varying tax rate can bring back an inflation output stabilization trade-off that
would affect the shape of optimal monetary policy.
To provide better understanding of debt financing dynamics, the sensitivity
of these findings is then assessed to alternative settings. In particular, the
sensitivity to alternative fiscal rule parameterizations, the role of monetary policy,
and the presence of alternative instruments (endogenous government spending).
The sensitivity analysis shows that, unsurprisingly, lower output volatility is
achieved when the government’s fiscal rule allows for a greater focus on the output
stabilization. As government’s concern for the debt stabilization increases the fiscal
policy potency improves –as indicated by the output elasticities which rises for each
shock. Higher concern for output stabilization by the central bank sees positive
spillovers from monetary to fiscal policy grow –the fiscal authority needs less to
worry about stabilizing the output and is thus freer to focus on debt stabilization.
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In other words, the fiscal policy potency is improved for all the shocks –with a
sole exception of a wage markup shock– as confirmed by higher output elasticities.
Fiscal policy potency is reduced, although marginally, under monetary policy rule
in which the interest rate does not respond to the output gap. Moreover, the results
show that endogenous government spending used to achieve debt financing improves
the fiscal policy potency, but it leads to the more volatile output, unconditional
of any shocks hitting the economy. These results are found to be robust to the
exclusion of nominal wage rigidities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 describes the econometric framework of the analysis. Section
4 discusses the parameterization of the model including the posterior estimates.
Section 5 discusses the positive implications of the tax instrument choice used to
finance the stabilization policy –in particular, the role of this decision is assessed
on the propagation of shocks and the volatility of the business cycle. Section 6
conducts a sensitivity analysis of the results to alternative monetary and fiscal
policies, and to nominal rigidities. A last section concludes.
2.2 The Model
This section presents a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model a` la Smets and Wouters (2007) or Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti
(2010) extended to the presence of explicit fiscal stabilization policy. Stabilization
policy is modeled as a tax income rule which reacts both to fluctuations in output,
and the debt/ouptut ratio. We then consider situations where increases in tax
revenues can be achieved by adjusting the lump sum component of the tax or either
a labor, a capital or a consumption tax.
Fluctuations are driven by six orthogonal structural shocks as in Smets and
Wouters (2007) plus two fiscal shocks. The shocks include total factor productivity
shocks, two shocks that affect the intertemporal margin (risk premium shocks and
investment–specific technology shocks), two shocks that affect the intratemporal
margin (wage and price mark–up shocks), and three policy shocks (exogenous
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government spending, fiscal receipts, and monetary policy shocks).9
2.2.1 Labor Market
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2010), each household j ∈ (0, 1) is assumed
to supply a specialized labor, Lt(i) to a fully competitive “employment agency”
–hereafter dubbed as the labor packer, which combines these differentiated labor
inputs to produce a composite homogeneous labor service, Lt, by using the following
Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
Lt(j)
1
1+εw
t di
)1+εwt
. (2.1)
εwt > 1 is the desired markup of wages over the household’s marginal rate of
substitution. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), εwt is assumed to be time
varying, subject to stochastic shocks, and follows the ARMA(1,1) process
log εwt = ρw log εwt−1 + (1− ρw) log εw + wt − θwwt−1, (2.2)
where |ρw| < 1, |θw| < 1, εw > 0 and wt ∼ N(0, σw). A positive realization of wt
drives the wage upward, and is the equivalent to a cost-push shock in the standard
New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
The demand for labor of type j– as obtained by cost minimizing the total wage
bill,
∫ !
0 Wt(j)Lt(j)dj, and taking as given the individual wage costs of household i,
Wt(j)– is given by
Lt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t
Lt (2.3)
The aggregate wage, derived from the zero-profit condition of a labor packer, is
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
− 1
εw
t dj
)−εwt
(2.4)
The homogeneous labor is then supplied to intermediate goods producing firms to
use in the intermediate goods production.
9The companion technical appendix details the analytical derivation of the model.
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2.2.2 Households
Each infinitely lived household j ∈ (0, 1) has preferences over consumption, Ct, and
leisure represented by the following intertemporal utility function10
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtεbt
(
log(Ct − χCt−1)− ϑLt(j)
1+ν
1 + ν
)
(2.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the psychological discount factor, ν ≥ 0 is the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϑ > 0 is a constant and the habit parameter
χ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of habit persistence in consumption. εbt is an
intertemporal preference shock that is assumed to follow the AR(1) stochastic
process
log εbt = ρb log εbt−1 + bt , bt ∼ N(0, σb) (2.6)
where |ρb| < 1 and bt ∼ N(0, σb).
The household enters a period with financial wealth Bt−1, that yields a gross
nominal return Rt−1, earns the nominal wage Wt(j) per hour of work Lt(j), pays
a proportional labor tax τwt ∈ (0, 1), such that the total after tax labor income is
given by (1− τwt )Wt(j)Lt(j).
The household leases a flow of capital services Kst at the after–tax rental rate
PtR
k
t (1− τ kt ), where τ kt ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital income tax. Capital services
are given by Kst = ZtKt, where Zt is the utilization rate of the household i’s capital
stock Kt. Thus, the after-tax capital income is (1− τ kt )RktZtKt. Each household
also receives a share of the profits in the economy, Πt, and a lump–sum transfer, Tt,
from the government. This income is then used to consume, Ct, which is subject to
a consumption tax τ ct ∈ (0, 1), invest, It, purchase assets, Bt, as a way to transfer
wealth towards the next period and pay for a resource costs, Φz(Zt)Kt, associated
with utilization of capital. The utilization cost function Φz(Z) is assumed to be
increasing, convex and satisfies Φz(1) = 0 and Φ′′z(1)/Φ′z(1) = σz > 0. Under these
10To save on notations, and because the household are ex-post identical, the index j will be
omitted in the sequel. It will only be preserved for labor as a way to remind the reader about the
existence of differentiated labor inputs.
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assumptions, the dynamics of the model depends on σz while its steady–state does
not.
She, therefore, faces the intertemporal budget constraint (expressed in real
terms) given by
(1 + τ ct )Ct + It +
Bt
RtPt
≤Bt−1
Pt
+ (1− τwt )
Wt(j)Lt(j)
Pt
+ (1− τ kt )RktKtZt − Φz(Zt)Kt +
Πt
Pt
+ Tt (2.7)
The level of gross investment, It, leads to formation of the capital stock, Kt, which
evolves according as
Kt+1 = εit
(
1− Φi
(
It
It−1
))
It + (1− δ)Kt (2.8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the rate of depreciation of capital. Implicit in Equation
(2.8) is that changes in the investment decision are subjected to increasing and
convex adjustment costs, Φi(·), a` la Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005b).
These costs satisfy Φi(1) = Φ′i(1) = 0, such that these costs are inoperative in the
steady state, and ϕ ≡ Φ′′i (1) > 0. εit is an investment shock that shifts the efficiency
with which the final good can be turned into physical capital. It is assumed to
follow the exogenous AR(1) process
log εit = ρi log εit−1 + it, (2.9)
where |ρi| < 1 and it ∼ N(0, σi).
Each household i chooses her consumption Ct, bond holdings Bt, investment It
and capital utilization Zt by maximizing her utility (2.5) subject to her intertemporal
budget constraint (2.7) and capital accumulation constraint (2.8).11
2.2.3 Firms
Final Goods–Producing Firm
There exists a representative, perfectly competitive, firm that produces a final
homogenous good that can be either consumed, privately or publicly, or invested.
11Since the model features nominal wage rigidities, we defer the determination of the labor
decision to a later section.
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The final good is obtained by combining a continuum of continuum of intermediate
goods, Yt(i), i ∈ (0, 1), according to the technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+εp
t di
)1+εpt
(2.10)
where εpt > 0 is the desired markup of prices of each intermediate good, Pt(i), over
its marginal cost. Like the wage markup, it is assumed that the price markup is
subject to stochastic shocks modeled as an ARMA(1,1) process
log εpt = (1− ρp) log εp + ρp log εpt−1 − θppt−1 + pt , (2.11)
where ρp ∈ (0, 1), θp ∈ (0, 1), εp > 0 stands for a value of price markup in the
steady state and pt ∼ N(0, σp).
The demand for each intermediate good Yt(i), as obtained from profit
maximization of the final good firm, is then given by
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t
Yt (2.12)
where Pt is the aggregate price level. Competition in the market for the final good
drives the representative firm’s profit to zero. The zero–profit condition, along the
Equation (2.12), determines Pt as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
− 1
ε
p
t di
)−εpt
(2.13)
Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate good producers that each produce, in a
monopolistically competitive market, a specific intermediate good i ∈ (0, 1) by
means of capital services Kst (i), and labor, Lt(i), according to the technology
described by
Yt(i) = max
{
εatK
s
t (i)αLt(i)1−α − Φ, 0
}
(2.14)
where α ∈ (0, 1). The presence of the fixed cost Φ > 0 implies that the technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale. Φ is chose such that profits are zero in the
steady state. εat is a standard technology shock that is assumed to follow
log εat = ρa log εat−1 + (1− ρa) log εa + at , (2.15)
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where |ρa| < 1, εa > 0 and at ∼ N(0, σa).
Cost minimization then implies that the optimal capital labor ratio is given by
Kst (i)
Lt(i)
= α1− α
Wt
Rkt
(2.16)
which is independent from the firm (Kst (i)/Lt(i) = Kst /Lt).
The real marginal cost, MCt(i) is given by
MCt(i) =
W 1−αt Rkt
α
αα(1− α)1−αεat
(2.17)
and is also independent from the firm’s type.
2.2.4 Price and wage setting
Price setting
Intermediate good firms set their price according to a standard Calvo (1983) price
setting scheme. In each period a individual firm has a probability ξp ∈ [0, 1] of
getting a chance to reset its price. When it is not selected to re-optimize, the firm
charges Pt(i) = piιpt−1pi1−ιpPt−1(i), where ιp ∈ [0, 1] controls the degree with which
prices are indexed on past inflation as opposed to steady state inflation. A firm
that resets its price in period t selects to so as to maximize its future expected
discounted profits
max
Pt(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(1− ξp)sΨt,t+s
[
Ωpt,t+sP˜t(i)−MCt+s
]
Yt+s(i)
]
(2.18)
subject to the total demand it faces as given by Equation (2.12).12 In the latter
expression, Ωpt,t+s denotes the nominal growth component of the price setting
behavior
Ωpt,t+s ≡

1 if s = 0
Ωpt,t+s−1pi
ιp
t+s−1pi
1−ιp if s > 0
(2.19)
and Ψt,t+s ∝ βsΛt+sΛt denotes the proper stochastic discount factor.
12As shown in the companion technical appendix to this paper, the price setting behavior of
each firm i is independent from its type, P˜t(i) = P˜t.
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Using Equation (2.13) together with price indexation scheme (2.19) and the
Calvo assumption, the aggregate price index rewrites as
Pt =
(
ξpP˜
− 1
ε
p
t
t + (1− ξp)(piιpt−1pi1−ιpPt−1)
− 1
ε
p
t
)−εpt
(2.20)
Wage setting
Just like intermediate good firms, households set their price infrequently a´ la Calvo
(1983). In each period, household j gets a chance to reset its wage with probability
ξw. If she cannot reset it, her wage is indexed on steady-state and past inflation,
such that Wt(i) = piιwt−1pi1−ιwt−1 (i) where ιw ∈ (0, 1) controls for the degree with which
non–reoptimized wages are indexed on past inflation. Household j chooses her
optimal wage W˜t(j) so has to maximize the utility value of labor
max
W˜t(j)
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(β(1− ξw))s
(
Λt+s(1− τwt+s)Ωwt,t+sW˜t(j)Lt+s(j)−
Lt+s(j)1+ν
1 + ν
)]
(2.21)
subject to the demand for labor of type j (Equation 2.3). In the latter equation,
Λt+j is the marginal utility of wealth (the Lagrangian multiplier of household
problem that converts the wage revenue into utility terms) and where Ωwt,j is defined
as
Ωwt,t+s ≡

1 if s = 0
Ωwt,t+s−1piιwt+s−1pi1−ιw if s > 0
(2.22)
Using Equation (2.4) together with price indexation scheme (2.22) and the Calvo
assumption, the aggregate price index rewrites as
Wt =
(
ξwW˜
− 1
εw
t
t + (1− ξw)(piιwt−1pi1−ιwWt−1)
− 1
εw
t
)−εwt
(2.23)
The markup of the aggregate wage over the wage received by the households is
distributed to the households in the form of dividends (see Equation (2.7)).
2.2.5 Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy according to a standard Taylor
rule, and therefore adjusts short–term nominal interest rate, Rt, in response to
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deviation of inflation, pit, from its steady–state value and changes in the level of the
output gap. The output gap is defined as the difference between actual and natural
output. Consistent with DSGE model, natural output is defined as the level of
output that would prevail under flexible prices and wages and in the absence of
the two “mark–up” shocks. The monetary policy is assumed to be described by
the simple Taylor–type interest rate rule
Rt = ρrRt−1 + (1− ρr)
(
R + κy log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)
+ κpi log
(
pit
pi
))
+ εRt (2.24)
where κy ∈ R+ and κpi > 1. R is the steady state nominal rate (gross rate) and
Y Ft denotes the level of output attained in the flexible price allocation –i.e. the
natural output. The parameter ρr ∈ [0, 1] captures the degree of interest rate
smoothing. Finally, it is assumed that the monetary policy shocks εrt follow a
first–order autoregressive process with an i.i.d. normal error term
log εRt = ρr log εRt−1 + Rt , (2.25)
where |ρR| ∈ (0, 1) and Rt ∼ N(0, σr).
2.2.6 The Government
The fiscal authority collects tax revenue Ft and issues public bonds Bt as a way to
finance an exogenously given sequence of government spending {Gt}∞t=0 and service
the debt. The government budget constraint is, thus, of the form
Bt + PtFt = Rt−1Bt−1 + PtGt (2.26)
The government spending is an exogenous stochastic AR(1) process which,
following Smets and Wouters (2007), responds to productivity developments
log gt = (1− ρg) log g + ρg log gt−1 + ρgaat + gt , (2.27)
where |ρg| ∈ (0, 1), ρga ∈ R, g > 0 and gt ∼ N(0, σg).
Tax revenue, or fiscal receipts, Ft are composed of consumption tax revenue,
τ ctCt, wage tax revenue, τwt WtLt, capital tax revenue, τ kt RktKt, and lump–sum tax
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revenue, Tt, such that
Ft = τ ctCt + τwt
Wt
Pt
Lt + τ kt RktKt + Tt (2.28)
Policymakers are assumed to use the proceeds from taxation to control the path of
public debt. More precisely, the government uses the proposed rule to set the level
of fiscal receipts to stabilize the output around its steady state level while ensuring
the fiscal sustainability by stabilizing debt/output ratio around its steady state.
The fiscal authority sets the tax revenues according to the simple fiscal rule
Ft = F ? exp
(
γd
(Bt−1/Pt−1)− b
b
+ γy(log(Yt)− log Y ) + εft
)
(2.29)
where γd > 0, γy > 0 and b denotes the steady state level of real debt. First, tax
revenues are used to discipline the evolution of real debt (deflated for growth) and
ensures its sustainability by ensuring that any positive (negative) deviations of the
debt/output ratio from its steady state level leads to an increase (decrease) in tax
revenues collected by the government (γd > 0). Second, the rule also attempts to
stabilize the business cycle as any positive (negative) deviation of the output from
its steady state leads to an increases (decrease) in tax revenue that the government
should collect (γy > 0). The term εft captures the discretionary component of fiscal
policy which evolves according to an exogenous first–order autoregressive process
εft = ρfεft−1 + ft , (2.30)
where |ρf | ∈ (0, 1) and ft ∼ N(0, σf ). Note that contrary to the existing literature
that stipulates a rule for each individual tax instrument (see for example Leeper,
Plante, and Traum (2010)), this policy rather expresses the rule in terms of the
overall government’s behavior. In particular, as long as government spendings are
set exogenously, this rule can be given a “deficit rule” interpretation. One motivation
for such a simple rule is that most governments rather have primary deficit objectives
–i.e. have an implicit deficit rule, that they finance by endogenously adjusting
the tax system. This is exactly what we do in this paper, as the policymaker is
assumed to set the total tax revenues according the specified rule, and then let the
tax system adjust to ensure that the budget constraint is satisfied. Which of the
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tax should be adjusted is a priori indeterminate in a positive context.13 Following
Tinbergen’s rule, only one instrument, at the time, is used to achieve this increase
in tax revenues, holding all other tax rates (and the lump sum tax) constant. For
example, to implement the rule by labor tax adjustment then only labor tax is
allowed to vary and all the other ones are kept constant.
The fiscal setup outlined here allows to separate the problem of stabilization
from that of implementation, thus, providing with a more structured framework to
understand these two aspects of fiscal policy. The question of the implementation
is important as different tax instruments may lead to different outcomes both in
terms of potency and efficiency.
2.2.7 General Equilibrium
A competitive general equilibrium is a sequence of rates of return,Rt ≡
{Rkt+i, Rt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of prices Pt ≡ {Pt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of wages
Wt ≡ {Wt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of taxes Tt ≡ {τwt+i, τ ct+i, τ kt+i, Tt+i}∞i=0, a sequence
of policy instruments Gt ≡ {Gt+i, Ft+i}∞i=0 and a sequence of quantities Qt ≡
{Ct+i, Yt+i, Zt+i, Kt+i, Lt+i, Bt+i}∞i=0 such that
1. for a given sequence of rates of return, Rt, a sequence of prices,Pt, a sequence
of wages, Wt, a sequence of taxes, Tt, and a sequence of quantities, Qt, the
sequence of policy instruments, Gt, is set as Equations (2.27) and (2.29);
2. for a given sequence of rates of return, Rt, a sequence of prices,Pt, a sequence
of wages, Wt, a sequence of taxes, Tt and a sequence of policy instruments,
Gt, the sequence of quantities, Qt, solves the optimization problems of the
agents;
3. for a given sequence of returns, Rt, a sequence of prices, Pt, a sequence of
taxes, Tt, a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, and a sequence of quantities,
Qt, the sequence of wages, Wt, is set according to the wage setting process;
13Note that one may also ask the question of the optimal tax adjustments. Although this
question is of interest, this is beyond the scope of the current paper that rather wants to investigate
the implications of using alternative taxes to balance the budget.
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4. for a given sequence of returns, Rt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of
taxes, Tt, a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, and a sequence of quantities,
Qt, the sequence of prices, Pt, is set according to the price setting process;
5. for a given sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of prices, Pt, a sequence of
taxes, Tt, a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, and a sequence of quantities,
Qt, the sequence of returns, Rt, clear the capital and bond markets;
6. for a sequence of quantities, Qt, a sequence of rates of return, Rt, a sequence
of wages, Wt, a sequence of prices, Pt and a sequence of policy instruments,
Gt, the sequence of taxes, Tt, implies that the government budget constraint
is satisfied.
2.3 Econometric framework
This section describes the econometric framework of the analysis. The present
model is estimated with Bayesian maximum likelihood in the frequency domain,
as in Christiano and Vigfusson (2003) and Sala (2012). The benefit of this
method, relative to the standard estimation in the time domain, is to guide
the estimation of a model on the basis of its performance at frequencies chosen by
the econometrician. In particular, in this study, we are mainly interested in the
business cycle implications of fiscal stabilization policies. Therefore, we will set the
focus on phenomena taking place at frequencies ranging from 6 to 32 quarters as
opposed to frequencies that correspond to long-run trends.14
Just like in the standard approach, the set of structural parameters is estimated
14Standard Bayesian maximum likelihood is typically conducted in the time domain, which
therefore uses all frequencies (see An and Schorfheide (2007)). But, as the model generates
cross–frequency restrictions, the presence in the estimation of frequencies that the model is not
intended to explain may affect the estimates (see Hansen and Sargent (1993) study the biases
caused by misspecification of seasonal frequencies and Cogley (2001) focus on the misspecification
of the trend component). Alternatively, the Bayesian maximum likelihood can be conducted in
the frequency domain.
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so as to maximize the posterior likelihood function
L(θ|YT ) ∝ f(θ)× L(θ|YT ) (2.31)
where YT denotes the set of data (for t = 1 . . . T ) used for estimation, θ is the
vector of structural parameters to be estimated, f(θ) is the joint prior distribution
of the structural parameters, and L(θ|Yt) is the likelihood of the model expressed
in the frequency domain. We now detail the construction of this object.15
The solution of a log–linear version of the model admits the following
representation
Yt =My(θ)Xt (2.32)
Xt =Mx(θ)Xt−1 +Me(θ)t (2.33)
where Yt and Xt denote the vector of observed variables and the underlying state
vector of the model, respectively; ε is the vector of the exogenous structural shocks,
such that t ∼ N(0,Σe); My(θ) and Mx(θ) are matrices whose elements are (non–
linear) functions of the structural parameters θ; and finally Me(θ) is an impact
matrix that describes how each of the structural shocks impacts on the state vector.
The aim, here, is to identify a vector of deep parameters θ that explains most
of the business cycle at the 6 to 32 quarters frequencies. To this goal, the share
of volatility of variable yt at 6–32 quarters frequency is computed. The spectral
density of the vector Yt is given by
SY (ω, θ) =
1
2piMy(θ)(I −Mx(θ)e
−iω)−1Me(θ)ΣeMe(θ)′(I −Mx(θ)′eiω)−1My(θ)′
(2.34)
where ω ∈ [0, 2pi]. As shown in Harvey (2003), the log–likelihood function of
the state–space system (2.32)-(2.33) is asymptotically given by
log(L(θ,YT )) ∝ − 12pi
T∑
j=1
[ log(det(SY (ωj; θ)))
+ Tr(SY (ωj; θ)−1IY (ωj))] (2.35)
15This presentation closely follows Christiano and Vigfusson (2003) and Sala (2012).
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where ωj = 2pij/T , j = 1, . . . , T , SY (ωj; θ)) is the spectral density of the state–
space representation of the model (2.32)–(2.33) and IY (ωj) is the periodogram of
the observables YT evaluated at frequency ωj . The spectral density of the model is
given by
SY (ω; θ) =
1
2piMy(θ)(I −Mx(θ)e
−iω)−1Me(θ)ΣeMe(θ)′(I −Mx(θ)′eiω)−1My(θ)′′
(2.36)
where ω ∈ [0, 2pi] denotes the frequency at which the spectral density is evaluated.
The periodogram is computed as
IY (ωj) =
1
T
f(ωj)f(ωj)′ (2.37)
where
f(ωj) =
T∑
t=1
yte
−iωt
is the discrete Fourier transform of the observables yt.
In the application, I slightly depart from this specification and rather consider
the specification of the likelihood function proposed by Christiano and Vigfusson
(2003)
log(L(θ,YT )) ∝ − 12pi
T∑
j=1
w(ωj)[ log(det(SY (ωj; θ)))
+ Tr(SY (ωj; θ)−1IY (ωj))] (2.38)
which extends the standard likelihood to a specification where the econometrician
can select the frequencies at which the model is estimated. More specifically, the
weight, w(ωj), can be obtained from the spectral gain associated to a particular
filter (provided that data are treated the same way). In this case the weight,
w(ωj), is the square of the gain at frequency ωj . The weight is acquired by using a
rectangular window that assigns a unit weight to frequencies ω ∈ [ω;ω] and zero
otherwise. This amounts to apply an ideal bandpass filter to both the data and the
model. Following Christiano and Vigfusson (2003) and Sala (2012), the estimation
is conducted for a band of frequencies that focuses on phenomena taking place
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between 6 and 32 quarters. Therefore,
w(ωj) =
 1 if
2pi
32 ≤ ωj ≤ 2pi6
0 otherwise
2.4 Estimation Results
2.4.1 Data
The eight variables used in estimation are: ∆ log(Yt), ∆ log(Ct), ∆ log(It),
∆ log(Wt), ∆ log(Ft), Lt, pit, Rt. They are matched with the following key
macroeconomic quarterly US time series, for the period 1960Q1–2007Q4: the
log difference of real GDP, real consumption, real investment, the real wage, log
difference of real fiscal receipts, log hours worked, the log difference of the GDP
deflator, and the federal funds rate. The sticky–price model is estimated on the
basis of all these eight variables. A full description of the data used is given in
Appendix 2.A.
2.4.2 Estimated and calibrated parameters
Priors
Not all structural parameters are estimated. These values were kept fixed because
of identification problems. Table (2.1) presents the values assigned to the such
parameters.16 The discount factor, β, is fixed at 0.99, which implies an annual
steady state interest rate of 4%. The capital share parameter, α, is set equal to
0.3, which implies a labor share of 70%. The annual steady state depreciation rate
is 10%, implying that δ equals to 0.025. In addition, to match postwar U.S. data
the ratios of government spending and debt–to–output are set equal to 0.2 and 0.6,
respectively. Additionally, the steady–state tax rates are set equal to the mean
values of the data set used by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) in their study of
16One way to interpret this restriction is to view these parameters as estimated, assuming very
tight priors.
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fiscal rules and are specified in Table (2.1). Finally the steady state price and wage
markups are set to 10%.
Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters for the estimated model
Parameter Role Value
εp Price Markup 0.100
εw Wage Markup 0.100
β Discount Rate 0.990
δ Depreciation Rate of Capital 0.025
B/Y Debt to Output Ratio 0.600
G/Y Government Spending to Output Ratio 0.200
τ k Capital Income Tax Rate 0.184
τw Labour Income Tax Rate 0.223
τ c Consumption Tax Rate 0.028
The remaining 14 structural parameters are estimated: the elasticity of
utilization rate to the rental rate of capital, σz; the elasticity of the investment
adjustment cost function, ϕ; the habit parameter, χ, and the labor supply elasticity,
ν; the wage and price rigidity parameters, ξw and ξp; the wage and price indexation
parameters, ιw and ιpi; the monetary policy parameters ρR, κpi, and κy; and the
fiscal policy parameters ρf , γy, and γd. In addition, the autoregressive parameters
of the exogenous disturbances and the standard deviations of the innovations are
estimated.
The first three columns in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the priors used in the
estimation for the parameters in the four models. The priors are similar to those
commonly used in the literature (see Smets and Wouters (2007), Leeper, Plante,
and Traum (2010), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), for example).
The priors of utilization rate elasticity, ϕ, and the habit persistence parameter,
χ, are both beta distributed with mean 0.50 and standard deviation 0.20, while the
capital adjustment cost prior, φ, is gamma distributed with mean 4 and standard
deviation 1.50. The prior of the inverse elasticity of labor supply, ν, is gamma
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distributed with mean 2.00 and standard deviation 0.75.
The two Calvo parameters for price and wage adjustment, ξpi and ξw, are assigned
beta priors with means 0.50 and standard deviation 0.10, while the price and wage
indexation parameters, ιpi and ιw, respectively, are given a beta distribution with
mean 0.50 and standard deviation 0.15.
The response of the nominal interest rate to inflation, κpi, in the monetary policy
rule is given a normal distributed prior with mean 1.50 and standard deviation
of 0.25, while the response to the output gap, κy, is given a gamma distributed
prior with mean 0.12 and standard deviation 0.05. These priors are consistent
with original Taylor’s estimates. The coefficient of the lagged interest rate, ρR, is
assigned a beta distributed prior with mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.10.
The coefficient on the debt–to–output share, γd, and the coefficient on the
output gap in the fiscal policy rule, γy, are both given a normal distributed prior
with mean 0.50 and standard deviation 0.25.
The priors on the stochastic processes are harmonized as much as possible. All
persistence parameters of the AR(1) processes are beta distributed with mean
0.7 and standard deviation 0.1. Finally, for the standard deviation of the shock
innovations, the inverse gamma priors with mean 1.00 and standard deviation 4
are assigned, which corresponds to somewhat loose priors.
As often done in the literature (for example, see Sala (2012) and Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)), few shocks are normalized before estimation.
The price markup, εpt , and wage markup, εwt , shocks are normalized so that they
have a unitary impact on price and wage inflation, respectively.
Posterior
Sims’ optimization routine csminwel is used to maximize the posterior log-likelihood
function. We then generate the posterior distribution of the parameters’ estimates
based on the random–walk Metropolis–Hasting MCMC algorithm (see An and
Schorfheide (2007)). 2 Markov chains of length 100,000 draws each are generated
with a burn–in sample of 10,000 draws (retaining one every twenty subsequent
draws). The number of draws is sufficient to ensure the convergence of Markov
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chain (see companion technical appendix).
Four versions of the model are estimated:
(i) only lump–sum tax adjusts,
(ii) only labor tax adjusts,
(iii) only capital tax adjusts,
(iv) only consumption tax adjusts.
In each case, all other taxes are held constant at their steady state value. The
posteriors of all the parameters of four models are reported in the last four columns
of Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The posterior for both exogenous processes and structural
parameters are broadly robust across all four models (with the exception of the
investment innovation standard deviation, σi and adjustment cost parameter ϕ).
Further, the results point that the labor tax adjusting model is a preferred model
as indicated by the log–likelihood of the posterior distribution. For instance the
odds that the data support the labor tax adjustment model against the lump-sum
tax model (resp. the capital tax and the consumption tax models) are 94.7% (resp.
97.8% and 61.1%). Overall, the data are quite informative about the structural
parameters, as indicated by narrow confidence intervals of the posterior distribution
and the significant deviation of the posteriors from their prior values.
A number of observations are worth noting regarding the estimated processes
for the exogenous shock variables (see Table 2.2). Overall, the data appear to
be very informative on the stochastic processes for the exogenous disturbances.
However, the persistence parameters are lower compared to the standard literature.
For instance the persistence of the technology shock is about 0.65 in all models,
while other estimations report persistence of about 0.95. There are two reasons for
this result. Firstly, the presence of the fiscal rule, and the associated smoothing,
already accounts for some persistence in dynamics. Secondly, the focus on business
cycle frequencies also explains the lower persistence of parameters: the model does
not need to account for some medium run frequency phenomena observed in the
behavior of hours worked, interest rates and the inflation rate. As a way to assess
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the relevance of these findings, I directly estimated the process for the total factor
productivity, focusing on frequencies ranging from 6 to 32 quarters. The mean of
the posterior distribution for the persistence parameter is 0.62.
The volatility of all innovations are lower than reported by Smets and Wouters
(2007). Again, the explanation is to be found in the fact that only business cycle
frequencies are considered in the present paper. This is consistent with Sala’s
(2012) findings which indicate that the volatility of shocks decreases when attention
is restricted to business cycle phenomena.
Insofar as the preference, technology, and monetary parameters of the model
are concerned, our estimates are close to previous estimates in the literature. The
estimates of the elasticity of labor supply ν vary across the models with smaller
estimates reported for a lump-sum and consumption tax and highest for the labor
tax adjustments. I estimate the value of ν of 1.242 for the model where only labor
taxes adjust (for models where other taxes adjust the estimates tend to be lower
–with lowest estimate of 0.7327 for a capital tax adjustment). When wages are
flexible the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor equals
the real wage. Therefore, large values of this elasticity are needed to match the
observed fluctuations in hours worked. In a setting with both price and wage
nominal rigidities, real wages are sluggish, so most of the adjustments on the labor
market are made by hours worked, which are then more volatile for lower values of
ν. The posterior estimate for the elasticity of the investment adjustment cost, ϕ,
in the capital tax model reflects the lack of identification of this parameter in that
version of the model, as variations in the capital tax actually capture fluctuations
in the capital wedge, that are otherwise absorbed by the marginal adjustment cost.
Hence the posterior mean of ϕ is 3.9133, to be compared to its prior value of 4. In
all other models, the capital tax is held fixed, and the adjustment cost parameter
can then be properly identified. The posterior mean of ϕ is then lower than its
prior value, suggesting a faster response of investment (its estimate is 1.7716 for
the labor tax adjusting model). Finally, the posterior mean of the elasticity of
the marginal utilization cost function, σz, is also identified as its posterior mean is
significantly higher (0.7363) than its prior value.
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Table 2.2: Posterior Results (Forcing Variables Processes)
Priors Posterior (Tax Model)
Dist. Mean Std. Dev. Lump Sum Labor Capital Consumption
ρa B 0.70 0.10 0.6430 0.6415 0.6660 0.6449
[0.6045,0.6854] [0.6034,0.6849] [0.6299,0.7092] [0.6056,0.6902]
ρg B 0.70 0.10 0.7590 0.7527 0.7668 0.7632
[0.7305,0.7959] [0.7235,0.7907] [0.7390,0.8021] [0.7337,0.8006]
ρi B 0.70 0.10 0.5800 0.5825 0.5787 0.5953
[0.5437,0.6226] [0.5448,0.6239] [0.5416,0.6186] [0.5574,0.6336]
ρp B 0.70 0.10 0.8266 0.8281 0.8325 0.8234
[0.8038,0.8631] [0.8074,0.8638] [0.8117,0.8665] [0.8008,0.8587]
ρr B 0.70 0.10 0.5389 0.5304 0.5341 0.5430
[0.4886,0.5863] [0.4802,0.5784] [0.4835,0.5805] [0.4934,0.5892]
ρh B 0.70 0.10 0.8825 0.8901 0.8738 0.8829
[0.8674,0.9097] [0.8771,0.9172] [0.8570,0.9046] [0.8692,0.9116]
ρb B 0.70 0.10 0.6295 0.6442 0.6324 0.6194
[0.5957,0.6719] [0.6104,0.6845] [0.6001,0.6737] [0.5864,0.6598]
ρf B 0.70 0.10 0.7740 0.7633 0.7692 0.7695
[0.7472,0.8133] [0.7350,0.8032] [0.7418,0.8076] [0.7421,0.8095]
σa IG 1.00 ∞ 0.6382 0.6471 0.6340 0.6359
[0.5939,0.6695] [0.6002,0.6797] [0.5892,0.6615] [0.5917,0.6650]
σg IG 1.00 ∞ 1.9983 2.0124 1.9652 1.9910
[1.8644,2.0845] [1.8625,2.1016] [1.8271,2.0491] [1.8458,2.0785]
σi IG 1.00 ∞ 4.6687 4.0850 6.5961 5.2869
[2.8264,5.2962] [2.5772,4.5452] [5.0422,7.4063] [3.9489,6.4359]
σp IG 1.00 ∞ 0.6814 0.6639 0.6783 0.6850
[0.5910,0.7223] [0.5867,0.7056] [0.5969,0.7159] [0.5961,0.7255]
σr IG 1.00 ∞ 0.4551 0.4489 0.4512 0.4449
[0.4230,0.4759] [0.4186,0.4698] [0.4195,0.4723] [0.4152,0.4656]
σh IG 1.00 ∞ 0.7240 0.7866 0.7067 0.7361
[0.6397,0.7637] [0.6873,0.8357] [0.6311,0.7474] [0.6566,0.7803]
σb IG 1.00 ∞ 1.6254 1.7184 1.6117 1.8981
[1.4392,1.7306] [1.4885,1.8257] [1.4305,1.7106] [1.6794,2.0139]
σf IG 1.00 ∞ 1.0954 1.1564 1.1588 1.1314
[1.0027,1.1513] [1.0542,1.2228] [1.0576,1.2216] [1.0327,1.1916]
Note: B: Beta distribution, IG: Gamma Inverse distribution. 68% HPDI into brackets.
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Table 2.3: Posterior Results (Structural Parameters)
Priors Posterior (Tax Model)
Dist. Mean Std. Dev. Lump Sum Labor Capital Consumption
ρR B 0.75 0.10 0.4302 0.4373 0.4424 0.4456
[0.3929,0.4646] [0.4007,0.4732] [0.4062,0.4783] [0.4080,0.4828]
κpi G 1.50 0.25 2.2468 2.2156 2.2596 2.2636
[2.1224,2.3502] [2.0919,2.3144] [2.1307,2.3635] [2.1407,2.3678]
κy G 0.12 0.05 0.0779 0.0730 0.0804 0.0792
[0.0604,0.0879] [0.0573,0.0816] [0.0624,0.0901] [0.0611,0.0891]
ρF B 0.50 0.20 0.3681 0.3064 0.3219 0.3477
[0.3167,0.4220] [0.2543,0.3551] [0.2714,0.3721] [0.2943,0.3989]
γy N 0.50 0.25 0.7390 0.8298 0.8150 0.7670
[0.6636,0.8145] [0.7536,0.9036] [0.7416,0.8881] [0.6917,0.8398]
γd N 0.50 0.25 0.1953 0.2168 0.2039 0.1930
[0.1546,0.2283] [0.1768,0.2496] [0.1572,0.2351] [0.1485,0.2240]
ξpi B 0.50 0.10 0.6327 0.6263 0.6322 0.6329
[0.6111,0.6543] [0.6065,0.6473] [0.6121,0.6531] [0.6113,0.6537]
ιp B 0.50 0.15 0.4009 0.3900 0.4000 0.3925
[0.3225,0.4615] [0.3173,0.4486] [0.3234,0.4603] [0.3203,0.4512]
ξw B 0.50 0.10 0.6393 0.6000 0.6618 0.6304
[0.6087,0.6745] [0.5676,0.6348] [0.6351,0.6920] [0.6013,0.6637]
ιw B 0.50 0.15 0.4942 0.4920 0.4974 0.4966
[0.4248,0.5647] [0.4235,0.5599] [0.4256,0.5675] [0.4280,0.5628]
ϕ G 4.00 1.50 2.4258 1.7716 3.9133 2.9592
[1.1406,2.4456] [0.8654,2.1261] [2.9093,4.5490] [1.9672,3.8512]
χ B 0.50 0.20 0.6686 0.6807 0.5959 0.7219
[0.6462,0.7402] [0.6747,0.7697] [0.5699,0.7116] [0.7194,0.7855]
ν G 2.00 0.75 0.9740 1.2421 0.7327 0.9066
[0.6409,1.0351] [0.8153,1.3857] [0.5346,0.7918] [0.6221,0.9449]
σz B 0.50 0.20 0.7368 0.7363 0.7585 0.7323
[0.6963,0.7851] [0.6956,0.7861] [0.7209,0.8064] [0.6901,0.7814]
Log–Likelihood -164.0752 -161.1933 -164.9931 -161.6464
Note: B: Beta distribution, G: Gamma distribution, N: Normal distribution. 68% HPDI into
brackets.
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The posterior mean of Calvo probabilities for the price and wage adjustments
are in line with former estimated values. The average duration of price contracts
is about 1.6 quarters, which is lower than values reported by Bils and Klenow
(2002) or Steinsson and Nakamura (2013). The presence of the fiscal rule, and in
particular the fact it reacts to debt, give additional persistence to the model that it
does not need to pick up using nominal rigidities. Similarly, wages are re-optimized
on average every 1.6 quarters. This is somewhat lower than the value reported by
Smets and Wouters (2007) or Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010), but
close to what Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005b) found using minimum
distance estimation. The posterior mean of the monetary policy reaction function
parameters is consistent with the previous estimates in the literature.
Turning the attention to the fiscal policy reaction function parameters in the
labor tax adjusting model reveals that the posterior mean of γd and γy are reported
to be 0.2168 and 0.8298, respectively. This implies a more aggressive fiscal response
to the output gap than to public debt. The posterior estimate of γd implies that 1%
increase in the deviations of debt share leads to an increase of 0.2168% in the fiscal
revenue. The posterior mode of fiscal coefficient γy means that 1% deviations in
the positive output gap implies that government is able to raise its tax income by
0.83%. Note that this increases tax revenue and not the tax rate itself – this is not
due to the pro–cyclicality in the evolution of the tax income that the fiscal policy is
countercyclical (this issue will be further discussed in the results section). Finally,
fiscal revenues are not highly persistent, as indicated by the posterior mode of ρF
(0.3064). Interestingly, these estimated values are, to a large extent, insensitive to
the adjusted tax rate.
2.5 Does Implementation Matter?
This section discusses the positive implications of the choice of the tax instrument
used to finance the stabilization policy. In particular we assess the role of this
decision on the propagation of shocks and the volatility of the business cycle. Given
that the labor tax model has been identified as the most plausible model (in terms
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of posterior odds), this section will focus on that particular model.
2.5.1 Contribution to the Business Cycle
This section aims at identifying the main drivers of the business cycle and
investigates to what extent a change in the tax instrument that adjusts to
balance the government budget constraint matters for the contribution of shocks
to macroeconomic dynamics. As already indicated, results are reported for the
labor tax model only. However, in order to assess the role of implementation in
determining the main contributors to the business cycle, the following exercise is
performed. For each draw of the Metropolis Hasting (as obtained to compute the
posterior distribution of the labor tax model), the variance decomposition of output
is computed for the four versions of the model described in the previous section.
In other words, the variance decomposition is computed for each version using the
posterior distribution of the labor tax model only. That way, this experiments
measures solely the contribution of the change in the tax rate used to ensure the
government budget constraint is satisfied. Table 2.4 reports the share of variance
of the k-step-ahead forecast error of output attributed to individual shocks, for
horizons k = 1, 4, 8, and 20 quarters.
Panel (a) of the Table reports the variance decomposition of output in the
baseline labor tax model. Similarly to Smets and Wouters (2007) or Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) the main contributors to output volatility are
the neutral technology and cost push shocks (both 16% on impact), the investment
efficiency shock (27%) and the wage markup shock (22%), although for the latter
the contribution becomes more sizable as the horizon increases. For instance, the
wage markup shock becomes the main driver of the business cycle (55%) after 5
years. Note however that this shock plays a greater role in the short-run than in
Smets and Wouters (2007) as it accounts for one-fourth of output volatility on
impact (essentially zero at the same horizon in Smets and Wouters (2007)). One
reason for this result is that this shock affects directly the labor wedge, which
in turn has a effect on hours worked and output. This also takes place in Smets
and Wouters’ model, but in the present model, there is a second round of effect
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Table 2.4: Variance Decomposition of output
k at gt ε
i
t ε
pi
t ε
R
t ε
w
t ε
b
t ε
f
t
(a) Labor Tax Model (τw)
1 16.43 12.79 27.18 16.46 2.60 22.25 1.32 0.98
4 15.00 2.78 20.58 18.12 1.03 39.40 1.80 1.28
8 11.80 1.96 16.11 18.05 0.76 48.37 1.97 0.99
20 9.09 2.32 12.59 17.37 0.61 55.09 2.18 0.74
(b) Lump Sum Tax Model (T )
1 17.52 14.24 28.22 12.57 2.22 23.82 1.42 0.00
4 15.76 3.53 22.61 12.90 0.74 42.49 1.98 0.00
8 12.24 2.12 18.70 12.52 0.49 51.91 2.02 0.00
20 9.69 1.59 15.89 12.10 0.38 58.27 2.09 0.00
(c) Capital Tax Model (τ k)
1 15.23 11.71 26.65 17.89 2.69 23.09 1.36 1.38
4 14.67 2.40 19.87 18.01 1.02 41.28 1.95 0.80
8 11.41 1.86 15.55 17.35 0.72 50.46 2.14 0.51
20 8.53 2.45 12.17 16.34 0.56 57.04 2.38 0.54
(d) Consumption Tax Model (τ c)
1 16.75 13.17 27.74 14.20 2.37 24.10 1.49 0.17
4 15.31 2.90 21.50 14.66 0.83 42.67 2.02 0.11
8 11.89 1.73 17.42 14.12 0.55 52.09 2.12 0.08
20 9.25 1.36 14.56 13.36 0.41 58.70 2.24 0.12
Note: Posterior mean of Variance Decomposition as obtained
using the posterior distribution of the labor tax model.
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that goes through the tax adjustment, directly in the case of the labor tax or
the consumption tax model, indirectly through the wealth effect in the two other
models. The exogenous spending shock, gt accounts for 13% of output at horizon
1, but quickly vanishes after 1 year.
Panels (b) through (d) of the table report the variance decomposition of output
in variants of the model where the labor tax is now held constant, while another
tax is adjusting to satisfy the government budget constraint. The results indicate
that as far as the contribution of each shock to the business cycle is concerned, the
details of the implementation of fiscal stabilization policy through deficit does not
matter. Letting either the labor tax, the consumption tax, the capital tax or the
lump-sum component of the tax adjust does not affect neither qualitatively nor
quantitatively the contribution of each shock to the dynamics of output. In other
words, the policymaker is not in a position to affect the contribution of each shock
to the business cycle by simply varying the tax instrument she uses while using a
simple deficit (or total tax revenue) rule.17
2.5.2 Impulse responses
This section investigates the dynamics of the model in the aftermaths of a shock.
Given that the preceding section pointed to technology, investment and the wage
markup shocks as the main drivers of the business cycle, the analysis will be
restricted to this set of shocks, to which the exogenous spending shock will be added.
Accordingly, Figures 2.1–2.17 report the impulse responses following a temporary
positive one standard deviation exogenous technology, investment efficiency, wage
markup and government spending shock. As in the previous section, a first baseline
impulse response function is obtained for the baseline labor tax model. Then the
response to the shocks in the four variants of the model are considered.18
17Note however, that this does not mean that fiscal policy cannot by itself reshape the business
cycle. Using an individual rule for each tax rate ought to have such an effect.
18As in the previous case, these variants are evaluated at the posterior distribution of the
baseline model as a way to control the experiment and measure the very effect of varying the tax
instrument.
2.5. DOES IMPLEMENTATION MATTER? 97
Technology shock
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 report the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
aggregates and fiscal policy variables, respectively, to a temporary positive one
standard deviation technology shock. The model confirms the standard intuition.
Following the temporary increase in productivity, output, consumption and
investment increase. Inflation drops, and given that monetary policy is conducted
according to a Taylor rule so does the nominal interest rate. Hours worked fall due
to the presence of (i) price stickiness (see Gali (1999)) and (ii) habit in consumption
and investment adjustment costs (see Francis and Ramey (2005)). Finally because
the tax base increases (output, consumption and investment increase), fiscal receipts
increase and, accordingly, debt issuance recedes (Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.2).
Note however that, in the baseline labor tax model, because hours worked are
below their steady state on impact, the labor tax (Panel (c) of Figure 2.2) still
has to mildly increase in the short run to make sure that the government budget
constraint holds due to the initial decrease in public debt. But as of the second
quarter the tax rate passes below its steady state.
Figure 2.1: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Technology Shock)
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When the labor tax is held constant at its steady state level and the adjustment
is made by another tax, the results are qualitatively left unchanged. They however
differ from a quantitative point of view. The most stabilizing tax, in terms of
output, is the lump sum tax (dark plain line). This comes as no surprise as, by not
distorting any of the decisions of the agents, this tax does not create any additional
98 CHAPTER 2. FISCAL RULES: DOES IMPLEMENTATION MATTER?
incentive at the margin to vary hours worked or investment more than what the
standard wealth and substitution effects would prescribe. Therefore, as can be seen
from Figure 2.1, hours worked and investment —and therefore output— are the
less responsive in the lump sum tax variant.
Figure 2.2: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Technology Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Receipts
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(c) Tax Revenues
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Note: Average of posterior distribution of IRFs.
In contrast, the use of the capital tax (red plain line) to adjust the government
budget constraint creates an intertemporal distortion that tends to destabilize
output in comparison to the baseline labor tax model. On impact, just as in the
labor tax case, the required increase in the tax revenues is accompanied by an
increase in the capital tax on impact (See panel (b) of Figure 2.2). However, the
increase in the tax base together with the persistence of the technology shock make
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the agents expect the capital tax rate to decrease. It will then be profitable to
invest relatively more than in the labor tax case as of period 2, which, everything
else equal, implies that consumption will be less than under labor tax adjustment.
Consumption smoothing implies that, even though consumption rises on impact, it
increases less than in the labor tax variant (See Figure 2.1), leaving more room for
investment to increase. This also implies that the increase in consumption is less
persistent. Likewise, leisure consumption increases less than in the labor tax case,
implying that hours worked are more reactive.
The use of the consumption tax also creates an intertemporal distortion.
However, contrary to the capital tax, it leads to a relative stabilization of output
compared to the labor tax case. Indeed, while, as in the case of the other tax,
the consumption tax increases on impact, it decreases as of period 2, therefore
creating an incentive to consume more (and for a more prolonged period of
time). Hence, compared to the labor tax case, investment increases relatively
less under a consumption tax adjustment. The same phenomenon occurs for hours
worked. Output therefore reacts less. Note however that, given the low level of the
consumption tax, the magnitude of the effect is lower than for the capital tax.
Interestingly, in all cases, inflation and the nominal interest rate are essentially
unaffected by the fiscal developments.
Investment Efficiency Shock
Figures 2.18 and 2.19 report the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
aggregates and fiscal policy variables, respectively, to a temporary positive one
standard deviation shock to investment efficiency. Just like in the case of a neutral
technology shock, the impulse responses conform the intuition. An increase in the
marginal efficiency of investment leads to an increase in the demand for investment,
but creates negative comovement with consumption. The drop in consumption
then lowers the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
which, given the real wage, requires hours —and therefore output— to increase.
The increase in demand for investment creates upward pressure on the inflation
rate and so on the nominal interest rate. Overall, fiscal receipts increase and debt
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Figure 2.3: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Investment Efficiency Shock)
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Figure 2.4: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Investment Efficiency Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Receipts
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decreases. However, some heterogeneity in fiscal revenues emerge in face of an
investment efficiency shock. The increase in capital and hours implies that capital
tax and labor tax revenues increase. On the contrary, the lower consumption, by
limiting the tax base, reduces the proceeds to VAT. Interestingly, the increase in
the tax base permits a decrease in the tax rate on impact which fosters the initial
response of hours worked in the baseline model. Note, however, that this reduction
in the tax is tiny and leads to a very marginal effect on hours worked. The main
reason for the limited amplitude of the tax rate adjustment is found in the evolution
of the inflation rate. As previously, the inflation rate increases following the shock,
which, ceteris paribus, reduces debt services. Given the increase in the tax base,
the economy can even tolerate a very mild decrease in the tax rate and still ensure
that the government budget constraint holds.
Holding the labor tax constant and adjusting the government budget constraint
by another tax instrument leads to the same ranking, in terms of stabilization
of output, as what was observed in the case of a neutral technology shock. The
mechanisms leading to this ranking are essentially the same and hinge again on the
type of distortion introduced by each tax. However, in the case of a shock to the
marginal efficiency of investment, these effects are quantitatively negligible. The
main reason for this result is found in the very mild reaction of each tax rate to the
shock (less than 5 basis points in each case), which, in the presence of persistence
and smoothing mechanisms like habit persistence or investment adjustment costs,
are not enough to generate quantitatively sizable effects. Tax rates do not vary
much in face of the investment efficiency shock.
Wage Markup Shock
Figures 2.22 and 2.23 report the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
aggregates and fiscal policy variables, respectively, to a temporary positive one
standard deviation wage markup shock. The increase in the wage markup makes
labor more expensive and depresses the demand for it, hours worked go down.
Given that there is no concomitant technology shock, that capital is predetermined
and that adjusting utilization is costly, output drops. The drop in hours reduces,
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Figure 2.5: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Wage Markup Shock)
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all things equal, the marginal efficiency of capital while the drop in output exerts
a negative income effect that makes the agents both consume and invest less
(therefore reinforcing the negative wealth effect). This lower demand in turn puts
downward pressure on inflation and therefore on the interest rate. In other words,
the wage markup shock is observationally equivalent to a neutral technology shock
(although the mechanisms are different).
The drop in the tax base for both the labor, the capital and the consumption tax,
together with the increase in the debt services associated with the lower inflation
rate call for (i) an increase in debt issuance (see Panel (a) of Figure 2.23) and (ii)
an increase in the tax rate. Note that initially the tax rate mildly decreases due to
the initial debt issuance, but as of the second period the effects of the lower tax
base and the increase charge of debt services call for an persistent increase in the
labor tax rate (in the baseline model).
When alternative tax adjustments are put in place, the output stabilization
ranking is the same as for the technology shock. Note however that the amplitude
of the effects is stronger. The main reason for this is found in the key role played
by the wage markup shock in this model. One way to think about it is to appeal to
business cycle accounting arguments. The labor market equilibrium can be thought
of as
MRSt = ζtMPLt
where MRSt denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
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Figure 2.6: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Wage Markup Shock)
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leisure and MPLt is the marginal product of labor. ζt is the labor wedge measure
by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). In our setting the labor wedge is a
combination of three different wedges: (i) a time varying markups related to the
imperfect competition and nominal price rigidities on the good market, (ii) a time
varying wage markup related to the presence of imperfect competition and nominal
wage rigidities on the labor market, and (iii) time varying taxation. The wage
markup shock affects directly the wage markups and the labor tax that are the main
driver of the labor wedge, which has been found by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007) to be key in shaping the business cycle. Alternative tax instrument will then
have stronger implications on the dynamics than a technology shock.
Public Expenditures Shock
While the preceding sections were investigating the role of taxation in face of the
main drivers of the business cycle, the present section investigates how it affects the
financing of a shock to government spending (gt). Figures 2.16 and 2.17 plot IRFs
of macroeconomic aggregates and fiscal instruments to a temporary one standard
deviation exogenous positive government expenditure shock.
Figure 2.7: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Government Expenditures
Shock)
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The positive government expenditure shock also has standard implications in
the baseline labor tax model. As the increase in government spending is persistent,
households expect taxes to increase, therefore affecting negatively their permanent
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income. Consumption and investment are, accordingly, crowded out by public
spendings. The drop in consumption affects the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption an leisure and puts downward pressure on the real wage and
leads to an increase in the labor demand. Hours worked increase. This increase
in however partially mitigated by the increase in the tax rate that is required by
the need to finance the stream of government expenditures. Note that part of the
financing is achieved by issuing more debt (see Panel (a) of figure 2.16), which
increases the charge of debt services and calls for another increase in the labor tax
rate.
Figure 2.8: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Government Expenditures Shock)
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Just like what was observed for the other shocks, the tax instrument used to
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balance the government budget constraint matters for the propagation of the shock.
The stabilization effects of changes in the tax instrument are again similar to what
obtained in the case of a technology shock, they are however magnified in the case
of the government spending shock.19 For instance, while, in the case of the lump
sum tax and the consumption tax output converges monotonically to its steady
state after the shock, variants with the labor and the capital tax eventually plunge
the economy into a recession. In those cases the tax rates remain persistently
above their steady state (see Panel (b) of Figure 2.17) as public debt rises and the
tax base recedes. In the case of the baseline labor tax model, the increase in the
tax rate increases, ceteris paribus, the wage rate increases (as the households that
can re-optimize their wage in the current period want to be compensated for the
tax increase) which implies that, eventually, the demand for labor drops, and so
does output. In the case of the capital tax variant, the increase in the tax rate
discourages investment further, which magnifies the crowding out effect of public
spending. This exerts a negative demand effect on output. The same phenomenon
occurs with the consumption tax, to a lesser extent though, given the consumption
smoothing that prevents demand from dropping too much.
2.5.3 Tax Elasticities of Output
The preceding section has highlighted how different taxes can have different
implications for the dynamics of output. This section offers an alternative
perspective on this issue by calculating the tax elasticity of output conditional on
each shock in each variant of the model. An attractive feature of this calculation
is that it provides a measure of the potency of particular fiscal instruments for
stabilizing output in face of a particular shock. It therefore supplements the
preceding impulse response analysis. This elasticity is computed as the average
total elasticity of output to the tax over a sample path. Denoting by IRF xk (s)
the k-periods ahead percentage deviation of variable x following a one standard
deviation shock to forcing variable s, the elasticity conditional on s for an horizon
19The same obtains in the case of the fiscal revenue shock εft . The associated results are
reported in the companion technical appendix.
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H, E yτ (s,H) is computed as
E yτ (s,H) =
1
H
H∑
h=1
IRF yh (s)
IRF τh (s)
(2.39)
This quantity is computed for a sample of draws from the posterior distribution of
the baseline labor tax model. Table 2.17 report the posterior mean of the elasticity
for each shock in each variant of the model for a total horizon of 20 quarters.20
Table 2.5: Tax Elasticity of output (20 periods horizon)
Shock Baseline τw Lump-sum Tax τk Model τc Model
Technology −0.406 −0.038 −0.200 −0.038
Government Expenditures −0.227 −0.013 −0.115 −0.015
Investment Efficiency −0.315 −0.028 −0.227 −0.036
Cost Push −0.404 −0.042 −0.196 −0.038
Monetary Policy −0.222 −0.012 −0.108 −0.013
Wage Markup −0.818 −0.092 −0.357 −0.079
Preference −0.401 −0.037 −0.187 −0.037
Discretionary Fiscal Policy −0.094 0.000 −0.058 −0.006
All elasticities are negative pointing to the overall countercyclicality of fiscal
policy: tax rates co-move negatively with output conditionally on each and every
shock. Note however, that the tax revenues elasticity of output are positive (as
the tax base is pro-cyclical), which is in line with previous findings by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002a). Although the results exhibit a lot of variability in the size of
elasticities both across shocks and across taxes, a systematic pattern emerges from
the table. The labor tax adjustment model generates the highest tax elasticity
of output, then the capital tax model, followed, somewhat identically, by the
consumption and lump-sum tax models. This ranking applies for any shock and is
20The ranking reported in the table are robust to increasing the total horizon, only the level of
the elasticity is affected. It is however worth noting that, from a quantitative point of view, the
changes in the level are not large.
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robust to changes in the total horizon considered in the calculation of the elasticity.
In other words, adjusting the labor tax is the most potent way to stabilize output
in face of any shock, with an elasticity ranging from -0.1 for the discretionary fiscal
shock to -0.8 for the wage markup shock. Letting the capital tax rate proves less
potent with a maximal elasticity of -0.36 in the case of the wage markup shock.
Note that fiscal policy exhibits maximal efficacy to stabilize output fluctuations
in the aftermaths of markup shocks (wage and cost push) and technology shocks
(neutral and investment efficiency). This overall ranking supports our previous
findings and actually highlights the well-known role of the labor markets and capital
accumulation in the propagation of shocks in this class of models. The presence
of nominal rigidities affecting both prices and wages creates a form of real wage
rigidity that magnifies the role of labor fluctuations in shaping the business cycle.
Adjustments in the labor tax rate, by affecting the wage selected by the households
that can reset it, therefore plays a key role for output stabilization.
2.5.4 Second–order moments
The preceding results suggested that the exact implementation of the fiscal
rule (deficit rule) might matter for the shape and magnitude of the response
of macroeconomic variables to the various shocks hitting the economy. While that
information was conditional, this section investigates the implications of various
tax implementations of the rule for unconditional moments. Tables 2.20 and 2.7
report HP-filtered (λ = 1600) second-order moments –the standard deviations and
correlations with output– of the main macroeconomic variables for all four variants
of models evaluated at the posterior mode of the baseline labor tax model.
The inspection of the volatilities across models reveals that, with the exception
of the lump-sum tax model, the baseline labor tax model achieves the highest level
of output stabilization. This essentially confirms the conditional results obtained
in the IRF analysis. However, the effects are quantitatively small. For instance the
volatility of output in the baseline model is 1.6% and only raises to 1.7% in the
worst case (τ k model). Differences are more pronounced for investment volatility
and to some extent for hours worked. However, differences remain marginal. The
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same result holds for co-movements. This is an important result as it indicates that,
as soon as the government uses a deficit rule, the exact details of its implementation
have very little quantitative consequences for the positive properties of the economy.
This stands in contrast to models that specify a rule for each tax rate in the system
(see for example Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)). In such models, altering one
particular tax rule can have sizable consequences for the business cycle properties
of the model — both in terms of volatility or co-movements. However, in those
models the rule –and hence the stabilization properties– and the implementation
are mixed and cannot be separated. One important contribution of this paper is to
disentangle the stabilization properties (the rule) from the implementation of the
rule.
Table 2.6: Second Order Moments (Main aggregates)
Var. Baseline τw Lump-sum Tax τk Model τc Model
Volatilities
y 1.60 1.57 1.67 1.62
c 1.05 1.01 0.98 1.08
i 6.90 6.98 7.45 7.23
h 1.89 1.85 1.93 1.91
pi 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73
R 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.95
Correlation with Output
c 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.20
i 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.85
h 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
pi -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
R -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17
Note: Average of the posterior distribution of HP filtered moments
(λ = 1600)
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Does this however mean that implementation does not matter? The answer
to this question is clearly negative. Table 2.7 reports the volatility and the co-
movements of the fiscal variables in the model. It then appears that the baseline
labor tax model allows to achieve output stabilization without requiring too much
volatility in tax revenues and public debt.
Table 2.7: Second Order Moments (Fiscal Variables)
Var. Baseline τw Lump-sum Tax τk Model τc Model
Volatilities
F 2.41 2.62 2.48 2.60
D 3.70 3.93 3.91 4.02
τw 3.22 – – –
T – 24.20 – –
τk – – 7.36 –
τc – – – 29.46
Correlation with Output
F 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.57
D -0.32 -0.28 -0.36 -0.32
τw -0.24 – – –
T – -0.09 – –
τk – – -0.24 –
τc – – – -0.14
Note: Average of the posterior distribution of HP filtered moments
(λ = 1600).
For instance, while the labor tax model generates a volatility of tax revenues
(resp. public debt) of 2.4% (resp. 3.7%), the model in which the consumption
tax adjusts yields higher a volatility of 2.6% (resp. 4%). This is due to the lower
volatility of the labor tax, 3.2%, relative to that of the consumption tax, 29.5%. In
other words, and it comes as no surprise, the positive properties of the tax system
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are strongly affected by the implementation. While, as the preceding analysis
showed, this is innocuous from a positive point of view, it ought to have strong
implications for a normative analysis. Although such an analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, two points are worth mentioning. The presence of a time
varying labor (or capital or consumption) tax adds an additional time varying
distortion to the model beyond the price and wage markups, which can adds to the
welfare cost of fluctuations for the agents. Second, in world where the central bank
takes fiscal policy as given, the presence of a time varying tax rate can bring back
an inflation output stabilization trade-off that would affect the shape of optimal
monetary policy (see for instance Collard and Dellas (2006)).
2.6 Sensitivity analysis
The preceding results suggested that implementing the tax rule through adjustments
in the labor tax performs best in terms of stabilization. This section assesses
the robustness of these findings against (i) alternative monetary policies —i.e.
parametrization of the Taylor rule, (ii) alternative fiscal rules, and (iii) alternative
specification of nominal rigidities, in particular those that abstract from the nominal
wage rigidity.
2.6.1 Monetary Policy
The present model is an attempt at modeling the interactions between monetary
and fiscal policies. It is commonly thought among policy makers that monetary
policy is responsible for inflation stabilization while fiscal policy is in charge of
output and debt stabilization. These differing objectives can be a source of conflict,
and monetary policy may actually undo what fiscal policy tries to achieve (and vice
versa). Consider, for example, a central bank that is solely concerned with inflation
stabilization and implicitly leaves output stabilization to the fiscal authority.21 The
21Note however that in the standard New Keynesian model a central bank that would achieve
full price stability would also achieve full output stability, which leaves the fiscal authority in
charge of controlling the debt level. We will study this case later on.
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fiscal authority, if it is also required to ensure public debt sustainability, may be
less effective in terms of output stabilization as the fiscal instrument —.e. tax
rate— then faces the opposing demands from output and debt stabilization. Let us
consider the case of a negative technology shock that reduces output and increases
inflation. A central bank that follows a Taylor rule increases the nominal interest
rate. This, in turn, makes public debt servicing costlier22 and therefore calls for a
tax rise which further depresses output and deepens the recession. It follows that
the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy –and the resulting trade off
between inflation and output stabilization– have significant implications both for
financing of public debt and output stability. This section investigates this issue
and reports the output elasticities to taxes when the central bank’s response to the
inflation gap, κpi, and to the output gap, κy, are varied (see Equation 2.24). It is
assumed that the central bank follows either
(i) full price stabilization (κpi =∞), or
(ii) countercyclical (κy = 0.5), or finally
(iii) a-cyclical monetary policy (κy = 0).
The output responses to tax rate changes are computed individually for each of the
eight shocks that hit the economy. The first column of Table 2.8 reports the output
elasticity based on the mean posterior of monetary policy parameters as estimated
for the benchmark labor tax model (see Section 2.4.2). The next column shows the
output elasticity estimates following various shocks when the central bank achieves
full price stability, while the remaining two columns show what happens when,
under partial price stabilization, its focus on the output gap is varied.
In the standard New-Keynesian model, and under full price stabilization policy,
the central bank fully closes the inflation gap and, by so doing, sets markups
constant and closes the gap between actual and natural output.23 In such an
equilibrium, the nominal interest rate is insensitive to the shocks hitting the
22The Taylor principle implies that the increase in the nominal rate also corresponds to an
increase in the real rate.
23Here, the natural output refers to the level of output reached in the flexible price allocation.
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economy—to the notable exception of a monetary policy shock. This is not the case
in this model. The reason is that fiscal policy introduces an additional time varying
wedge in the output gap: time varying tax rates. In such a setting variations in
the tax rate are different in the flexible price allocation and in the sticky price
allocation, and monetary policy is not sufficient to shut this channel down. This
has multiple implications. A first implication is that the nominal interest rate still
varies with the output gap, such that debt services are affected by movements in
the interest rate. A second implication is that variations in the tax rate ought to
counter the effects of monetary policy, and this may introduce a trade off between
price and output stabilization.24 To see this let us consider the case of a technology
shock. In the benchmark model a positive technology shock implies a decrease in
inflation which, given that nominal wages are sticky, yields an increase in the real
wage which mitigates the increase in the demand for labor. By fully stabilizing
inflation, the central bank shuts this mechanism down and the real wage does
not move (or very little under the Calvo scheme), therefore firms are willing to
increase their labor relatively more than in the benchmark Taylor rule, therefore
fostering the volatility of labor and hence output. Not surprisingly then, fiscal
policy under full price stabilization achieves the lowest level of output stabilization
—as confirmed by the standard deviation of output unconditional of shocks hitting
the economy —the output volatility increases from 1.60% as in the baseline case
to 1.75%. This however does not undermine the potency of fiscal policy. Since
the monetary policy still closes, partially, the gap between actual output and its
natural level, some of this correction is left up to the fiscal policy to make. The
results in Table 2.8 show that the output elasticity to taxes increases (decreases)
in magnitude for each shock with the exception of technology and wage markup
shocks —increasing fiscal policy potency to stabilize output. Additionally, another
noteworthy results is that the output elasticity turns positive for the investment
efficiency shock —with a coefficient of 0.133 compared to -0.315 for the benchmark
labor tax model— implying that the labor tax rate co-moves positively with output
24This is reminiscent of Collard and Dellas (2006) who obtain a similar trade-off in a model
where the level of the income tax rate is indexed on output.
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conditional on the investment shock.
Table 2.8: Tax Elasticities of output (20 periods horizon)
Baseline Inflation Output
Shock τw Model κpi =∞ κy = 0 κy = 0.5
Labor Tax Model
Technology -0.406 -0.507 -0.401 -0.447
Government Expenditures -0.227 -0.165 -0.227 -0.231
Investment Efficiency -0.315 0.133 -0.265 -0.407
Cost Push -0.404 -0.343 -0.402 -0.437
Monetary Policy -0.222 -0.193 -0.222 -0.220
Wage Markup -0.818 -1.144 -0.750 -0.626
Preference -0.401 -0.356 -0.372 -0.376
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.094 -0.099 -0.095 -0.095
Std(y) 1.601 1.747 1.607 1.541
Note: Average of Posterior Distribution of Elasticities.
Let us now consider the case of a central bank which (partially) stabilizes prices
and has no concern for the output gap (κy = 0). The a-cyclical monetary policy
implies that no systematic relationship between the nominal interest and output
fluctuations exists —widening or narrowing of the output gap are neither reinforced
nor stabilized by the nominal interest rate. An implication of this is that output
stabilization is left solely up to the fiscal authorities. For example, higher inflation,
following a positive wage markup shock, calls for an increases in the nominal
interest rate. This, in turn, makes debt services costlier and leads to an increase
in taxes. But output stabilization demands lower taxes. There appears a conflict
between output and debt stabilization. In other words, fiscal policy potency is
reduced, although marginally, under a-cyclical monetary policy. The marginally
higher output volatility is confirmed by standard deviation of output —it increases
to 1.61% from 1.6% in the benchmark labor tax model. The tax elasticity of output
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under a-cyclical policy is relatively robust for any shocks with the exception of an
investment efficiency shock for which fiscal policy is less potent —it increases from
-0.315 in the benchmark labor tax model to -0.265.
As the central bank’s concern for stabilization of the output gap rises, positive
spillovers from monetary to fiscal policy grow—the fiscal authority needs less to
worry about stabilizing the output and is thus freer to focus on controlling debt
stabilization. In other words, the fiscal policy potency is improved for all the shocks
—with the sole exception of a wage markup shock— as confirmed by higher output
elasticities (see fourth column in Table 2.8). Fiscal policy becomes most potent in
the face of an investment shock with an output elasticity increasing from -0.315 in
the benchmark labor model to -0.407.
2.6.2 Fiscal Rule
Fiscal policy in this paper is modeled by a simple fiscal rule (deficit rule) which
serves two main purposes: (i) to achieve output stability and (ii) to discipline the
evolution of real debt and aid its sustainability. These fiscal pursuits might conflict
over the business cycle and as such reduce the potency of fiscal policy. For example,
in the face of positive wage markup shock, the resulting output loss demands
a tax cut to foster growth but the ensuing increase in debt issuance demands
higher taxes. The resulting trade off between output and debt stabilization places
constraints on the fiscal policy and restricts its potency. This section investigates
this issue by reporting the labor tax elasticities of output computed by varying
fiscal authorities’ responses to output and debt fluctuations —γy and γd in Equation
(2.29), respectively. The response to output fluctuations, γy, is varied from 0.5 to
1, hence shifting the main objective of fiscal policy towards output stabilization.
Then, the response to changes in debt, γd, is varied as a way to evaluate the role of
shifting the objective towards more debt discipline, as the recent crisis has brought
back to most governments in the world.
Table 2.9 reports the output elasticities to the labor tax for each shock and
for each imposed parametrization. For comparison purposes, the first column of
the table reproduces the output elasticities in the benchmark labor tax model
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based on the posterior distribution of fiscal policy parameters. Although the results
exhibit a lot of variations in the size of elasticities both across shocks and across
the different parameterization of the fiscal rule, a systematic pattern emerges
from the results. The largest variation in the tax elasticity of output, across all
parameterizations, is obtained in the case of investment efficiency, wage markup
and technology shocks —the shocks identified in the benchmark analysis as major
contributers to the business cycle fluctuations. Fiscal policy becomes most potent
in the face of investment and wage markup shocks for lower γy. The trade-off
between output and debt stabilization is reduced once the fiscal authorities concern
themselves less with a pursuit of output stability. But as fiscal authorities move
towards greater output stabilization (see third column of Table 2.9) —where any
deviations of output from its steady state level leads to a one-for-one increase in
tax revenue achieved by a raise in the tax rate —the effectiveness of fiscal policy is
improved for the government shock but lowered for technology and wage markup
shocks. Furthermore, in the face of investment shock, the elasticity turns positive
which implies that labor tax rate co-moves positively with output conditional on
the investment shock.
Unsurprisingly, fiscal policy that pursues greater output stabilization brings
about lower output volatility —1.55 relative to 1.6 in the benchmark labor tax
model. Note however that the volatility gains are quantitatively small.
Consider now the case where the fiscal authorities have higher concern for debt
stabilization (γd = 1).25 This shift in the concerns of fiscal authorities reinforces
the trade-off between disciplining the evolution of debt and stabilizing output. To
understand this trade-off let us consider the case of a positive technology shock.
As previously explained, this shock leads to a decrease in public debt and hence
in the tax rate (in particular the labor tax rate) which, by a substitution effect,
increases equilibrium hours, therefore reinforcing the initial effect of the shock.
Labor, and henceforth output, volatility increases. Debt discipline therefore comes
at the cost of greater output volatility. In this setting it is then not surprising that
output volatility increases with the greater concern for debt stabilization (1.6 in
25Note that the concern for output is still maintained, but appears to be relatively smaller.
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Table 2.9: Tax Elasticities of output (20 periods horizon)
Baseline Output Debt
Shock τw model γy = 0.50 γy = 1.00 γd = 0.1 γd = 1
Labor Tax Model
Technology -0.406 -0.497 -0.123 -0.381 -0.460
Government -0.227 -0.132 -0.455 -0.187 -0.342
Investment -0.315 -1.198 0.176 -0.219 -0.943
Cost Push -0.404 -0.382 -0.423 -0.466 -0.382
Monetary Pol. -0.222 -0.211 -0.229 -0.232 -0.366
Wage Markup -0.818 -1.101 -0.176 -0.676 -0.653
Preference -0.401 -0.569 -0.363 -0.447 -0.421
Disc. Fiscal Pol. -0.094 -0.099 -0.095 -0.093 -0.144
Std(y) 1.60 1.70 1.55 1.58 1.80
Note: Average of Posterior Distribution of Elasticities.
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the benchmark case, versus 1.8 for γd = 1). Does this reduce the potency of fiscal
stabilization? Table 2.9 indicates that, as the debt stabilization concern increases,
the output elasticities for each shock rises —with the exception of cost push and
wage markup shocks— suggesting an improved potency of fiscal policy. The largest
increase in the effectiveness of fiscal policy is in the face of investment shocks —by
more than a threefold increase in the output elasticity.
2.6.3 Endogenous Government Spending Rule
So far, government spendings have been held constant over time, gt = g¯ ∀ t =
0, . . . ,∞.26 However, government spending are often used as “automatic stabilizers”
(Blanchard (1984)) to stabilize output. This section investigates the implications of
endogenous government spending for the effectiveness of tax policy. For example,
the previous section has shown that a positive wage markup shock depresses
output and therefore calls for a tax cut. But the government might increase its
spending, therefore counting on a multiplier effect, to foster the recovery which
in turn might either mitigate or worsen the ensuing trade off between output and
debt stabilization. To investigate this issue, this section considers the case where
government expenditure follows the simple rule
log(gt) = ρg log gt−1 + ζy log
(
yt
y¯
)
+ εgt (2.40)
where ρg ∈ (0, 1) and ζy < 0. The rule indicates that the government follows a
countercyclical policy and hence raises public expenditures whenever output falls
below its steady state. Finally, it is assumed that the government spending shocks
εgt follow a first–order autoregressive process of order 1
log εgt = ρg log εgt−1 + gt , (2.41)
where |ρg| ∈ (0, 1) and gt ∼ N(0, σr).
Table 2.10 compares the variance decomposition of output in the baseline model
with constant government spending and in a variant with the exogenous spending
26The government spending is set at its steady state value of g¯ = 0.2y¯
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rule. On the one hand, the contribution of technology and wage markup shocks to
output volatility reduces –while technology shock previously explained around 16%,
at the impact, now it barely accounts for 5.6% of output variations. On the other
hand, preference and cost push shocks all become more important contributer to
the business cycle. This is especially pronounced in the face of preference shocks
whose contribution to output volatility significantly increases both on impact and
at higher horizons –it accounted for 2.2% in the baseline case and now to 60% in
the output volatility at the 5 year horizon.
Table 2.10: Variance Decomposition of output
at gt ε
i
t ε
pi
t ε
R
t ε
w
t ε
b
t ε
f
t
Labor Tax Model: constant government spending
1 16.43 12.79 27.18 16.46 2.60 22.25 1.32 0.98
4 15.00 2.78 20.58 18.12 1.03 39.40 1.80 1.28
8 11.80 1.96 16.11 18.05 0.76 48.37 1.97 0.99
20 9.09 2.32 12.59 17.37 0.61 55.09 2.18 0.74
Labor Tax Model: government spending rule
1 5.50 11.75 26.06 24.50 2.54 9.40 19.31 0.94
4 6.68 2.11 24.41 22.65 1.19 10.70 31.49 0.76
8 5.43 1.30 20.97 20.22 0.91 8.34 42.43 0.42
20 3.68 1.23 13.96 15.45 0.63 5.29 59.51 0.24
Note: Variance Decomposition are evaluated at the posterior mean
of the distribution.
In order to provide a better understanding of the role of endogenous government
spending in shaping macroeconomic dynamics, Figures 2.9 and 2.27 compare the
impulse responses of selected macroeconomic aggregates and fiscal policy variables
to a one standard deviation technology shock both with exogenous (dashed line) and
endogenous (unbroken line) government spending (Equation 2.40). As previously
explained, following the temporary increase in productivity, output, consumption
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Figure 2.9: Macroeconomic Aggregates: endogenous government spending (1
std.dev. Technology Shock)
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and investment increase. A government that has a concern for output stabilization
then sees output rising above its steady state level and, following rule (2.40),
contracts its expenditures. This policy eases then a pressure on public finances and,
accordingly, debt issuance recedes (Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.27). Lowering in
the public debt also sees its servicing fall which is then reflected in the lower fiscal
pressure (both the tax rate and fiscal revenue decrease).
Fiscal policy with an active expenditure rule, however, achieves lower level
of output stabilization —as confirmed by the standard deviation of output
unconditional of shocks hitting the economy —the output volatility increases from
1.60% as in the baseline case to 2.07%. This increase reflects the higher persistence
of the response of output tot he shocks. This however does not undermine the
potency of fiscal policy. Table 2.11 indicates that the output elasticities for each
shock rises —with the exception of markup shocks— suggesting an improved
potency of fiscal policy. The largest increase in effectiveness of fiscal policy is in
the face of investment shock —by more than a threefold increase in the output
elasticity.
2.6.4 Absence of Nominal Wage Rigidity
The preceding sections assumed nominal rigidities for both prices and wages, and
hence some real wage rigidities which magnify the role of labor fluctuations in
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Figure 2.10: Fiscal Policy: endogenous government spending (1 std.dev. Technology
Shock)
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Table 2.11: Output Elasticity to Taxes: Varying government spending
Shock Benchmark Endogenous
τw model gt
Technology -0.406 -0.460
Government Expenditures -0.227 -0.276
Investment Efficiency -0.315 -0.995
Cost Push -0.404 -0.370
Monetary Policy -0.222 -0.262
Wage Markup -0.818 -0.357
Preference -0.401 -1.044
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.094 -0.160
Std(y) 1.601 2.071
Note: Elasticities are evaluated at the posterior mean of the
distribution.
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shaping the business cycle. Adjustments in the labor tax rate, by affecting the
wage selected by the households when she can reset it, therefore plays a key role for
output stabilization. To investigate this issue, this section assesses the robustness
of our previous findings to relaxing the nominal wage rigidity.
Table 2.21 compares the variance decomposition of output in the baseline model
and in a variant where only prices are sluggish. Eliminating the nominal wage
rigidity affects marginally the variance decomposition of output. The contribution
of the investment efficiency shock reduces at all horizon, which is in line with
previous findings in the literature pointing to the role of nominal wage rigidities
for the importance of investment shocks (see, among others, Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2010)). On the contrary, the technology and the price markup
shocks become bigger contributors to output volatility.
Table 2.12: Variance Decomposition of output: Nominal Price Rigidities
at gt ε
i
t ε
p
t ε
R
t ε
w
t ε
b
t ε
f
t
Labor Tax Model: Benchmark
1 16.43 12.79 27.18 16.46 2.60 22.25 1.32 0.98
4 15.00 2.78 20.58 18.12 1.03 39.40 1.80 1.28
8 11.80 1.96 16.11 18.05 0.76 48.37 1.97 0.99
20 9.09 2.32 12.59 17.37 0.61 55.09 2.18 0.74
Labor Tax Model: Absent Nominal Wage Rigidity
1 19.96 19.70 12.55 23.33 2.13 20.53 0.61 1.18
4 24.14 4.10 7.09 24.23 0.65 37.02 1.28 1.50
8 19.27 3.03 5.11 23.56 0.47 46.13 1.29 1.14
20 14.79 3.11 3.91 21.18 0.38 54.44 1.30 0.88
Note: Variance Decomposition are evaluated at the posterior mean of
the distribution.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 compare the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
aggregates and fiscal policy variables to a one standard deviation technology shock,
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in an economy featuring both nominal price and wage rigidities and those obtained
in the flexible nominal wage economy. Exclusion of nominal wage rigidities does not
Figure 2.11: Macroeconomic Aggregates: Removing Nominal Wage Rigidities (1
std.dev. Technology Shock)
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affect either the dynamics or the magnitude of the response of aggregate and fiscal
variables. Only aggregate consumption is marginally affected. It is only in the face
of shocks that affect the intertemporal substitution between leisure and consumption
and, thus, the real wage –in particular, in the face of preference, fiscal and wage
markup shocks– that the endogenous responses of macroeconomic aggregates to a
fiscal implementation are affected (see Technical Appendix). Furthermore, removal
of nominal wage rigidities reduces inflation persistence and therefore affects the
propagation of monetary policy shocks (see Gali and Gertler (1999) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005b)).
Unsurprisingly, absence of nominal wage rigidity achieves bigger output
stabilization –the output volatility falls from 1.60% in the baseline case to 1.36%.
Fiscal policy potency is only marginally affected by exclusion of nominal wage
rigidities as evident by the output elasticities to taxes. The largest change in output
elasticity is in the face of investment shock which turns positive —with a coefficient
of 0.192 compared to -0.315 for the benchmark labor tax model— implying that the
labor tax rate now co-moves positively with output conditional on the investment
shock.
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Figure 2.12: Fiscal Policy: Removing Nominal Wage Rigidities (1 std.dev.
Technology Shock)
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the potency and efficiency of individual fiscal instruments,
typically used by governments for public debt financing, in stabilizing the business
cycle. To this end, it estimates the DSGE model that incorporates a fiscal policy rule
and the non-trivial debt dynamics. Contrary to previous papers in the literature,
the fiscal rule employed in the model does not use a particular instrument but
rather relies on total tax revenues to stabilize the economy. When government
spending are held constant, as is the case in the first part of this paper, this rule
essentially corresponds to a deficit rule. This makes it possible to investigate the
important question of the implementation of the deficit rule, more precisely it
permits to evaluate the effects of using alternative tax instruments to implement
a particular deficit and compare their relative performance in terms of output
stabilization.
The results indicate that fiscal policy implementation achieved through
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Table 2.13: Elasticities to Labor Taxes
Shock benchmark nominal prices
Output
Technology -0.406 -0.467
Government Expenditures -0.227 -0.169
Investment Efficiency -0.315 0.192
Cost Push -0.404 -0.374
Monetary Policy -0.222 -0.155
Wage Markup -0.818 -0.934
Preference -0.401 -0.379
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.094 -0.091
Std(y) 1.601 1.359
Note: Elasticities are evaluated at the posterior mean of the
distribution.
adjustment in labor tax attains the highest level of output stabilization. However,
the effects are quantitatively small indicating that as soon as the government uses
a deficit rule, the exact details of its implementation have very little quantitative
consequences for the positive properties of the economy. This is contrary to models
that specify a rule for each individual tax rate (for example Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2010)) where altering one particular tax rate (and hence one of the tax
rules) can have sizable consequences for the business cycle properties of the model
–both in terms of volatility or co-movements. However, in those models, the rules are
relatively difficult to compare as they differ significantly from one fiscal instrument
to another. Furthermore, they do not separate the objective, output stabilization,
from implementation. One contribution of the paper was to show that once the
objective is set, its exact implementation does not really matter from a positive
point of view.
Quantitatively small effects of fiscal policy, as found in this paper, do not
however imply that the fiscal implementation does not matter. In fact, we find
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that the baseline labor tax model achieves output stabilization without requiring
too much volatility in tax revenues and public debt. In other words, the positive
properties of the tax system are strongly affected by the implementation. Even
though we find that this is innocuous from a positive point of view, it ought to
have strong implications for a normative analysis. Although such an analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper, two points are worth mentioning. The presence
of a time varying labor (or capital or consumption) tax adds an additional time
varying distortion in the model beyond the price and wage markups, which can
add to the welfare cost of fluctuations for the agents. Second, in world where the
central bank takes fiscal policy as given, the presence of a time varying tax rate can
bring back an inflation output stabilization trade-off that would affect the shape of
optimal monetary policy. This normative analysis is left for further research.
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appendix
2.A Data
The data is from the Saint–Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database. The sample
ranges from 1960Q1 to 2007Q4. To avoid dealing with the financial great recession,
which the present model is not designed to deal with, the sample was stopped
at the end of 2007. All quantities are expressed in real terms –deflated by the
implicit GDP deflator (GDPDEF)– and also in per capita terms –deflated by
civilian non-institutional population (CNP16OV). Since the latter series is available
on monthly basis, the value reported for the last month of each quarter was taken
as the quarterly observation. Similarly, as the effective federal funds rate is only
available on monthly basis, the average over quarter is considered. Table 2.14 and
2.15 summarize the information about the data.
Table 2.14: Data Description
Mnemonic Description Units
CBI Change in Private Inventories Billions of Dollars
CNP16OV Civilian Non–institutional Population Thousands of Persons
COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour Index 2005=100
FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate Percent
FPI Fixed Private Investment Billions of Dollars
GDP Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal Billions of Dollars
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator Index 2005=100
GRECPT Government Current Receipts Billions of Dollars
HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons Index 2005=100
PCDG Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods Billions of Dollars
PCESV Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services Billions of Dollars
PCND Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods Billions of Dollars
Source of original data: Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis
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Table 2.15: Data Description
Data Formula
Consumption C=log((PCND+PCESV)/(GDPDEF*CNP16OV))
Investment I=log((FPI+CBI+PCDG)/(GDPDEF*CNP16OV))
Output Y=log(GDP/(GDPDEF*CNP16OV))
Fiscal Receipts F=log(GRECPT/(GDPDEF*CNP16OV))
Real Wage W=log(COMPNFB/GDPDEF)
Hours Worked L=log(HOANBS/CNP16OV)
Inflation Rate pi=log(GDPDEF)-log(GDPDEF)−1*4
Nominal Interest Rate R=FEDFUNDS
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2.B Derivation of log-linearized baseline model
This appendix reports the first order conditions for the optimization problems
described in the paper and other relationships that define the equilibrium of the
baseline model. Further, it presents the model’s steady state and its log-linear
approximation.
2.B.1 Final goods producers
The final good, Yt, is formed by combining intermediate goods according to a
standard Dixit-Stiglitz technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+εp
t di
)1+εpt
(2.B.1)
The demand for intermediate goods is derived from profit maximization, where
profits are given by
max
Yt
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
where Pt and Pt(i) denote, respectively, the price of the final and intermediate
goods respectively. εpt ∈ (0,∞) is an exogenous process that reflects shocks to
the aggregating function that results in changes in the elasticity of demand and
therefore in the mark–up. εpt follows the exogenous ARMA process
log εpt = (1− ρp) log εp + ρp log εpt−1 − θppt−1 + pt , pt ∼ N(0, σp)
The optimal demand for good i is then given by
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t
Yt (2.B.2)
Perfect competition on the final good market drives profits to zero. Using the zero
profit condition together with Equation (2.B.2)), one gets the aggregate price level
as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
− 1
ε
p
t di
)−εpt
(2.B.3)
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2.B.2 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate producer i ∈ (0, 1) produces a specific good by means of capital,
Kst (i), and labor services, Lt(i), according to the technology represented by the
production function
Yt(i) = εatKst (i)αLt(i)1−α − Φ (2.B.4)
where α ∈ (0, 1), Φ > 0 is a fixed cost. εat is a total factor productivity and follows
following process
log εat = (1− ρa) log εa + ρa log εat−1 + at , at ∼ N(0, σa)
The presence of a fixed cost makes technology exhibit increasing returns to scale
which, together with the fact that intermediate i is the sole producer of good i
and the elasticity of substitution is finite in the final good bundle, implies that the
intermediate good has monopoly power on its market. Note however that the firm
is price taker on the market for inputs.
The production plan is obtained by standard cost minimization that leads to
the capital labor ratio
Kst (i)
Lt(i)
= α1− α
Wt
PtRkt
where Wt/Pt denotes the real wage paid to the labor packers, and Rkt is the real
rental rate of capital. Note that the capital labor ratio is in fact independent from
the firm’s type i.
The aggregate real marginal cost, st, is then given by
st =
WtLt
(1− α)εatKst αL1−αt
which, using the capital labor ratio can be rewritten as
st =
Rkt
α(Wt/Pt)1−α
αα(1− α)1−αεat
2.B.3 The price setting
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and are therefore
price setters. However, following Calvo (1983), they only get a chance to set their
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price in the current period with probability ξp, with the complement probability
they index their former price to steady state and past inflation according to
Pt(i) = pi1−ιppiιpt−1Pt−1(i)
where ιp ∈ [0, 1] controls for the degree of backward indexation. Accordingly, a
firm that resets its price in the current period sets it so as to maximize the profits
max
P˜t(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
ξkpΨt,t+k
(
Ωpt,t+kP˜t(i)− st+k
)
Yt+k(i)
]
subject to the total demand it faces (Equation 2.B.2)), where Ψt,t+k is a proper
stochastic discount factor and Ωpt,t+k is a term that keeps track of the nominal
growth component
Ωpt,t+k ≡

1 if k = 0
Ωpt,t+k−1pi
ιp
t+k−1pi
1−ιp if k > 0
The optimality condition associated to the price setting behavior is
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξp)kΨt,t+k
(
Ωpt,t+kYt+k(i) +
(
Ωpt,t+kP˜t(i)− Pt+kst+k
) ∂Yt+k(i)
∂P˜t(i)
)]
= 0
which, using the form of the demand function, simplifies to
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξp)kΨt,t+kYt+k(i)
εpt+k
(
Ωpt,t+kP˜t − (1 + εpt+k)Pt+kst+k
)]
= 0 (2.B.5)
or
P˜t =
Npt
Dpt
where
Npt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξp)kΨt,t+kYt+k(i)
εpt+k
(1 + εpt+k)Pt+kst+k
]
Dpt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξp)kΨt,t+kYt+k(i)
εpt+k
Ωpt,t+k
]
Using the Poisson property of the Calvo setting, the aggregate price index (2.B.3)
rewrites
Pt =
(
ξpP˜t(i)
− 1
ε
p
t + (1− ξp)(piιpt−1pi1−ιpPt−1)
− 1
ε
p
t
)−εpt
(2.B.6)
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2.B.4 Households
Households j ∈ (0, 1) chooses consumption Ct, hours worked Lt(j), bonds Bt,
investment It and capital utilization Zt, so as to maximize the following objective
function
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtεbt
(
log(Ct − χCt−1)− ϑLt(j)
1+ν
1 + ν
)
(2.B.7)
subject to the budget constraint and the capital accumulation
(1 + τ ct )PtCt + PtIt +
Bt
Rt
=Bt−1 + (1− τwt )Wt(j)Lt(j)
+ (1− τ kt )PtRktZtKt − PtΦz(Zt)Kt + Πt + PtTt
(2.B.8)
Kt+1 =εit
(
1− Φi
(
It
It−1
))
It + (1− δ)Kt (2.B.9)
εbt and εit are both assumed to follow stationary AR(1) stochastic processes, as
described in the main text.
log εbt = ρb log εbt−1 + bt
log εit = ρi log εit−1 + it
where |ρb| < 1, bt ∼ N(0, σb), |ρi| < 1 and it ∼ N(0, σi).
Household’s optimality conditions are as follows
(1 + τ ct )PtΛt =
εbt
(Ct − χCt−1) − Et
βχεbt+1
(Ct+1 − χCt)
1 =Qtεit
(
1− Φi
(
It
It−1
)
− Φ′i
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
)
+ βEt
[
Pt+1Λt+1
PtΛt
Qt+1ε
i
t+1Φ′i
(
It+1
It
)
I2t+1
I2t
]
Λt =βRtEt [Λt+1]
Qt =βEt
Pt+1Λt+1
PtΛt
(
(1− τ kt+1)Rkt+1Zt+1 − Φz(Zt+1) + (1− δ)Qt+1)
)
Φ′z(Zt) = (1− τ kt )Rkt
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and in the flexible wage allocation only
εbtϑL
ν
t =(1− τwt )ΛtWt
where Λt and PtΛtQt denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget
constraint and capital accumulation constraint, respectively. The definition of the
Lagrange multiplier of the law of motion of capital permits to obtain explicitly the
marginal Tobin’s Q Qt in terms of goods, rather than in utility terms. The last
equation, the marginal disutility of working, is reported here as it will be relevant
later for the computation of flexible price equilibrium. Otherwise the optimal wage
will be obtained from the wage contracts as explained in the next section.
2.B.5 Wage Settings (Intermediate labor union sector)
Each household supplies a continuum of differentiated type of labor service, Lt(i), to
the labor market. These differentiated labor inputs are purchased by a representative
competitive firm referred to as a labor packer. The labor packer then assembles
the differentiated labor inputs to produce a composite labor service, Lt, by using a
Dixit–Stiglitz aggregating technology
Labor used by the intermediate goods producers Lt is a composite
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
Lt(j)
1
1+εw
t dj
)1+εwt
There are labor packers who buy the labor from the unions, package Lt, and
resell it to the intermediate goods producers. Labor packers maximize profits in a
perfectly competitive market. From the first–order conditions of the labor packers
one obtains
Lt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t
Lt (2.B.10)
Combining this condition with the zero profit condition one obtains an expression
for the wage cost for the intermediate goods producers
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
− 1
εw
t dj
)−εwt
(2.B.11)
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It is assumed that εwt follows an exogenous ARMA process
log εwt = (1− ρw) log εw + ρw log εwt−1 − θwwt−1 + wt , wt ∼ N(0, σw)
I follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and assume that labor packers buy the
labor from the unions, which act as intermediate between the households and
the labor packers. Unions have monopoly power over type j labor and set the
wage, internalizing the labor demand 2.B.10. The union takes the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure as the cost of labor services, W ht :
W ht =
Lνt
(1− τwt )Λt
The wage is set then by applying a markup over this cost. However, just like the
intermediate good producers, unions are subject to the willingness of the Calvo
fairy and can only set the wage in the current period with probability ξw ∈ (0, 1).
When it is not select to re-optimize the wage, it can index it on steady state and
past inflation as Wt(j) = pi1−ιwpiιwt−1Wt−1(j). A firm that can re-optimize the wage
in the current period selects a wage W˜t(j) by solving the program
max
W˜t(j)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξw)kΨt,t+k
(
(W˜t(j)Ωwt,t+k −W ht+k)Lt+k(j)
)]
(2.B.12)
subject to the demand for labor of type j (Equation 2.B.10). In the latter equation,
Ψt,t+k is a proper discount factor and where Ωwt,t+k is defined as
Ωwt,t+k ≡

1 if k = 0
Ωwt,t+k−1piιwt+k−1pi1−ιw if k > 0
(2.B.13)
The first order condition associated to the wage setting is given by
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξw)kΨt,t+k
(
Ωwt,t+kLt+k(j) + (W˜t(j)Ωwt,t+k −W ht+k)
∂Lt+k(j)
∂W˜t(j)
)]
= 0
which, in the case of the particular demand function (2.B.10) rewrites
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξw)kΨt,t+kLt+k(j)
εwt+k
(
W˜t(j)Ωwt,t+k − (1 + εwt+k)W ht+k)
)]
= 0 (2.B.14)
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or
W˜t =
Nwt
Dwt
where
Nwt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξp)kΨt,t+kLt+k(i)
εwt+k
(1 + εwt+k)W ht+k
]
Dwt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξp)kΨt,t+kLt+k(i)
εwt+k
Ωwt,t+k
]
Using the Poisson property of the Calvo scheme, the aggregate wage index
(2.B.11) rewrites
Wt =
(
ξwW˜
1
εw
t
t + (1− ξw)(piιwt−1pi1−ιwWt−1)
1
εw
t
)εwt
(2.B.15)
2.B.6 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule by adjusting its instrument in
response to deviations of inflation and output from their respective target levels
Rt = (1− ρr)
(
R + κy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ κpi log
(
pit
pi
))
+ ρrRt−1 + εrt (2.B.16)
where R is the steady state nominal rate (gross rate) and Y is the natural output.
The parameter ρr determines the degree of interest rate smoothing. The monetary
policy shock εrt is determined as
εrt = ρrεrt−1 + rt
The government budget constraint is of the form
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + PtGt − Ft (2.B.17)
The government spending expressed relative to the steady state output path
gt = GtY follows the exogenous stochastic process, whose properties are defined as
log gt = (1− ρg) log g + ρg log gt−1 + ρgaat + gt , gt ∼ N(0, σg)
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The fiscal authority abides by following fiscal rule
Ft = F ? exp
(
γy(log Yt − log Y ) + γdBt−1/Pt−1 −B
Y
+ εft
)
(2.B.18)
where
εft = ρrεft−1 + rt
Ft are government fiscal receipts composed as
Ft = τ ctCt + τwt
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
Pt
Lt(j)dj + τ kt Rkt
∫ 1
0
Zt(j)Kt(j)dj + Tt
where Tt are nominal lump–sum taxes (or subsidies) that also appear in household’s
budget constraint.
2.B.7 Aggregation
Using the fact that
WtLt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Lt(j)dj, Kst =
∫ 1
0
Kst (j)dj
and the government budget constraint, aggregating the individual budget
constraints yields
(1 + τ ct )PtCt + PtIt + PtTt =(1− τwt )WtLt + (1− τ kt )PtRktKst − Ptϕ(Zt)Kt + Πt
+ τ ct PtCt + τwt WtLt + τ kt )PtRktKst + PtTt − PtGt
and simplifies to
PtCt + PtIt + PtGt + Ptϕ(Zt)Kt = WtLt + PtRktKst + Πt
The aggregate profits in the economy are given by
Πt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)−Wt(i)Lt(i)− PtRktKst (i)di
which rewrites as
Πt = PtYt −WtLt − PtRktKst
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Plugging in the aggregated budget constraint,
PtYt = PtCt + PtIt + PtGt + PtΦz(Zt)Kt
Note that the data only permit the observation of
Y t =
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t
Ytdi =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t diYt =
(
P t
Pt
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t
Yt
where P t is given by
P t =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
− 1+ε
p
t
ε
p
t di
−
ε
p
t
1+εp
t
=
ξpP˜−
1+εp
t
ε
p
t
t + (1− ξp)(pi1−ιppiιpt−1P t−1)
− 1+ε
p
t
ε
p
t

− ε
p
t
1+εp
t
Likewise for labor
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t
Ltdj =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t djLt =
(
W t
Wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t
Lt
where W t is given by
W t =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
− 1+ε
w
t
εw
t dj
)− εwt1+εw
t
=
ξwW˜− 1+ε
w
t
εw
t
t + (1− ξw)(pi1−ιwpiιwt−1W t−1)
− 1+ε
w
t
εw
t
−
εwt
1+εw
t
Using the fact that the capital labor ratio is independent from the firm’s type,
we have ∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di = Y t = εat
(
Kst
Lt
)α ∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di− Φ
which yields
Y t = εat
(
Kst
Lt
)α
Lt − Φ
which rewrites
(
P t
Pt
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t
Yt =
(
W t
Wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t
εat (ZtKt)αL1−αt − Φ
In a general equilibrium, the discount factor of the firm is proportional to the
stochastic discount facor fo teh household such that Ψt,t+k ∝ βkΛt+k/Λt, then
P˜t =
Npt
Dpt
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where
Npt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(β(1− ξp))kΛt+kΛt
Yt+k(i)
εpt+k
(1 + εpt+k)Pt+kst+k
]
Dpt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(β(1− ξp))kΛt+kΛt
Yt+k(i)
εpt+k
Ωpt,t+k
]
which can be recursively written as
Npt =
Yt(i)
εpt
(1 + εpt )Ptst + β(1− ξp)Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
Npt+1
]
Dpt =
Yt(i)
εpt
+ β(1− ξp)Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
pi1−ιppiιpt D
p
t+1
]
Likewise for the wage
W˜t =
Nwt
Dwt
where
Nwt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(β(1− ξw))kΛt+kΛt
Lt+k(i)
εwt+k
(1 + εwt+k)
Lνt+k
(1− τwt+k)Λt+k
]
Dwt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(β(1− ξw))kΛt+kΛt
Lt+k(i)
εwt+k
Ωwt,t+k
]
which can be recursively written as
Nwt =
Lt(i)
εwt
(1 + εwt )
Lνt
(1− τwt )Λt
+ β(1− ξw)Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
Nwt+1
]
Dwt =
Lt(i)
εwt
+ β(1− ξw)Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
pi1−ιwpiιwt D
w
t+1
]
2.B.8 Exogenous processes
There are eight exogenous processes in the model: (i) technology process shock, εat ,
(ii) financial risk premium shock, εbt , (iii) investment relative price shock, εit, (iv)
monetary policy shock, εrt , (v) wage mark–up shock, εwt , (vi) price mark–up shock,
εpt , (vii) government expenditure shock, εgt , and (viii) discretionary component of
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fiscal policy, εft .
log εat =ρa log εat−1 + at ,
log εbt =ρb log εbt−1 + bt ,
log εit =ρi log εit−1 + it,
log gt =ρg log gt−1 + (1− ρg) log g + ρgaat + gt ,
log εwt =ρw log εwt−1 + (1− ρw) log εw + wt − θwwt−1,
log εpt =ρp log εpt−1 + (1− ρp) log εp + pt − θppt−1,
εrt =ρrεrt−1 + rt ,
εft =εft−1 + ft .
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2.B.9 Equilibrium Conditions
The set of equations characterizing the general equilibrium of the economy deflated
for the nominal components is given by
The firm
p
− 1+ε
p
t
ε
p
t
t Yt =
(
wt
wt
)− 1+εwt
εw
t εat (ZtKt)αL1−αt − Φ (2.B.19)
ZtKt =
α
1− α
wt
Rkt
Lt (2.B.20)
st =
Rkt
α
w1−αt
αα(1− α)1−αεat
(2.B.21)
Kt+1 = εit
(
1− Φi
(
It
It−1
))
It + (1− δ)Kt (2.B.22)
The household
(1 + τ ct )λt =
εbt
(Ct − χCt−1) − βχEt
εbt+1
(Ct+1 − χCt) (2.B.23)
1 = Qtεit
(
1− Φi
(
It
It−1
)
− Φ′i
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
)
+ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Qt+1ε
i
t+1Φ′i
(
It+1
It
)
I2t+1
I2t
]
(2.B.24)
λt = βRtEt
[
λt+1
pit+1
]
(2.B.25)
Qt = βEt
λt+1
λt
(
(1− τ kt+1)Rkt+1Zt+1 − Φz(Zt+1) + (1− δ)Qt+1)
)
(2.B.26)
Φ′z(Zt) = (1− τ kt )Rkt (2.B.27)
and in the flexible wage allocation only
εbtϑL
ν
t = (1− τwt )λtwt (2.B.28)
Aggregate Resource Constraint
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Φz(Zt)Kt (2.B.29)
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Wages and Prices
1 =
ξpp˜ 1εptt + (1− ξp)
(
pi
ιp
t−1pi
1−ιp
pit
) 1
ε
p
t
ε
p
t
(2.B.30)
pt =
ξpp˜−
1+εp
t
ε
p
t
t + (1− ξp)
(
pi1−ιppiιpt−1
pit
pt−1
)− 1+εpt
ε
p
t

− ε
p
t
1+εp
t
(2.B.31)
p˜t =
npt
dpt
(2.B.32)
npt =
Yt(i)
εpt
(1 + εpt )st + β(1− ξp)Et
[
λt+1
λt
npt+1
]
(2.B.33)
dpt =
Yt(i)
εpt
+ β(1− ξp)Et
[
λt+1
λt
pi1−ιppiιpt
pit+1
dpt+1
]
(2.B.34)
wt =
(
ξww˜
1
εw
t
t + (1− ξw)
piιwt−1pi
1−ιw
pit
wt−1)
1
εw
t
)εwt
(2.B.35)
wt =
ξww˜− 1+ε
w
t
εw
t
t + (1− ξw)
(
pi1−ιwpiιwt−1
pit
wt−1
)− 1+εwt
εw
t

− ε
w
t
1+εw
t
(2.B.36)
w˜t =
nwt
dwt
(2.B.37)
nwt =
Lt(i)
εwt
(1 + εwt )
Lνt
(1− τwt )λt
+ β(1− ξw)Et
[
λt+1
λt
nwt+1
]
(2.B.38)
dwt =
Lt(i)
εwt
+ β(1− ξw)Et
[
λt+1
λt
pi1−ιwpiιwt
pit+1
dwt+1
]
(2.B.39)
Policies
Rt = (1− ρr)
(
R + κy log
(
It
y
)
+ κpi log
(
pit
pi
))
+ ρrRt−1 + εrt (2.B.40)
bt = εbt
Rt−1
pit
bt−1 +Gt − Ft (2.B.41)
Ft = τ ctCt + τwt wtLt + τ kt RktZtKt + Tt (2.B.42)
Ft = F ? exp
(
γy(log Yt − log Y ) + γd bt−1 −B
Y
+ εrt
)
(2.B.43)
where bt = Bt/Pt, wt = Wt/Pt, pit = Pt/Pt−1, p˜t = P˜t/Pt, pt = P t/Pt, w˜t = W˜t/Pt,
wt = W t/Pt, λt = ΛtPt, njt = N jt /Pt, djt = Djt/Pt, j = w, p.
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2.B.10 The system of log-linear equations
Before proceeding, note that, in the steady state, we have
pi? = p? = 1, w? = w?
The fixed cost is computed such that, in the steady state, profit are zero.
− y
? + Φ
y?
(
−1 + ε
w
εw
(ŵt − ŵt) + ε̂at + α(ẑt + k̂t) + (1− α)L̂t
)
− 1 + ε
p
εp
p̂t + ŷt = 0 (2.B.44)
r̂kt + ẑt + k̂t − ŵt − L̂t = 0 (2.B.45)
ŝt + ε̂at − αr̂kt − (1− α)ŵt = 0 (2.B.46)
k̂t+1 − δît − δε̂it − (1− δ)k̂t = 0 (2.B.47)
(1 + βχ2)ĉt − χĉt−1 − βχEtĉt+1 + (1− βχ)(1− χ)λ̂t
+ (1− βχ)(1− χ) τ
c
1 + τ c τ̂
c
t − (1− χ)ε̂bt + βχ(1− χ)Etε̂bt+1 = 0 (2.B.48)
q̂t + ε̂it − ϕ(1 + β)̂it + ϕît−1 + βϕEtît+1 = 0 (2.B.49)
λ̂t − R̂t − Etλ̂t+1 + Etp̂it+1 = 0 (2.B.50)
q̂t + λ̂t − Etλ̂t+1 − β(1− δ)Etq̂t+1
+ (1− β(1− δ))Et
[
r̂kt+1 −
τ k
1− τ k τ̂
k
t+1
]
= 0 (2.B.51)
σz ẑt − r̂kt +
τ k
1− τ k τ̂
k
t = 0 (2.B.52)
r̂t − ρrr̂t−1 − (1− ρr)κyŷt − (1− ρr)κpip̂it − ε̂rt = 0 (2.B.53)
p̂it − ξt(1− β(1− ξp))(1− ξp)(1 + βιp) ŝt −
ιp
1 + βιp
p̂it−1 − β1 + βιpEtp̂it+1 − ε̂
p
t = 0 (2.B.54)
p̂t − (1− ξp)p̂t−1 = 0 (2.B.55)
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(
1 + β(1− ξw)2
)
ŵt − (1− ξw)ξ̂t−1 − β(1− ξw)Et [ŵt+1 + p̂it+1]
+ (1− ξw)(1 + βιw)p̂it − ιw(1− ξw)p̂it−1
− ξw(1− β(1− ξw))
[
νL̂t − λ̂t + τ
w
1− τw τ̂
w
t +
εw
1 + εw ε̂
w
t
]
= 0 (2.B.56)
ŵt − ŵt = 0 (2.B.57)
β
b?
y?
(b̂t − r̂t)− b
?
y?
(b̂t−1 − p̂it) + g
?
y?
ĝt − f
?
y?
f̂t = 0 (2.B.58)
f ?
y?
f̂t − τ
cc?
y?
(τ̂ ct + ĉt)−
τww?L?
y?
(τ̂wt + ŵt + L̂t)
− τ
kRk
?
k?
y?
(τ̂ kt + r̂kt + ẑt + k̂t)−
T ?
y?
T̂t = 0 (2.B.59)
f̂t − γyŷt − γdb̂t−1 − ε̂ft = 0 (2.B.60)
ŷt − c
?
y?
ĉt − i
?
y?
ît − g
?
y?
ĝt − α(1− τ k)ẑt = 0 (2.B.61)
where equation (2.B.54) was obtained by manipulating log-linear versions of
Equations (2.B.30), (2.B.32)–(2.B.34). Equation (2.B.56) was obtained by
combining log-linear versions of Equations (2.B.35), (2.B.37)–(2.B.39). Equation
(2.B.55) was obtained by combining log-linear versions of Equations (2.B.30)–
(2.B.31), while equation (2.B.57) was obtained by combining log-linear versions of
Equations (2.B.35)–(2.B.36). Note that as long as the economy is started from
a situation where pt is at its steady state value, then p̂t = 0, ∀t, and given that
ŵt = ŵt, then Equation (2.B.44) simplifies to
ŷt − y
? + Φ
y?
(
ε̂at + α(ẑt + k̂t) + (1− α)L̂t
)
= 0
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2.B.11 Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure 2.13: Convergence
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Figure 2.14: Prior and posterior distributions
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Figure 2.15: Prior and posterior distributions
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3. Supplementary impulse responses for benchmark model
Figure 2.16: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Government Expenditures
Shock)
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Figure 2.17: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Government Expenditures Shock)
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Quarters
0 10 20
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
0.2
0.4
0.6
Fiscal Receipts
Quarters
0 10 20
0.5
1
1.5
2
Public Debt
Quarters
0 10 20
-5
0
5
10
Lump Sum Tax
(b) Tax Rates
Quarters
0 10 20
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
22.2
22.3
22.4
22.5
Labor Tax Rate
Quarters
0 10 20
18.2
18.4
18.6
18.8
Capital Tax Rate
Quarters
0 10 20
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
Consumption Tax Rate
(c) Tax Revenues
Quarters
0 10 20
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Labor Tax Income
Quarters
0 10 20
-1
0
1
2
Capital Tax Income
Quarters
0 10 20
-5
0
5
10
Consumption Tax Income
Lump sum Tax Model Labor Tax Model Capital Tax Model
Consumption Tax Model
Note: Average of posterior distribution of IRFs.
150 CHAPTER 2. FISCAL RULES: DOES IMPLEMENTATION MATTER?
Figure 2.18: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Investment Efficiency Shock)
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Figure 2.19: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Investment Efficiency Shock)
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Figure 2.20: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Cost Push Shock)
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Figure 2.21: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Cost Push Shock)
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Figure 2.22: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Wage Markup Shock)
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Figure 2.23: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Wage Markup Shock)
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Figure 2.24: Macroeconomic Aggregates (1 std.dev. Preference Shock)
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Figure 2.25: Fiscal Policy (1 std.dev. Preference Shock)
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3. Sensitivity Analysis
3.1 Monetary Policy
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Table 2.16: Tax Elasticities of output (20 periods horizon): Varying Monetary
Policy
Benchmark Inflation Output
Shock Estimate κpi = 1 κpi =∞ κy = 0 κy = 0.5
Lump Sum Tax Model
Technology -0.038 -0.007 -0.054 -0.039 -0.043
Government Expenditures -0.013 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 -0.014
Investment Efficiency -0.028 -0.127 0.020 -0.029 -0.036
Cost Push -0.042 -0.053 -0.033 -0.041 -0.047
Monetary Policy -0.012 -0.013 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012
Wage Markup -0.092 -0.031 -0.144 -0.092 -0.092
Preference -0.037 -0.025 -0.032 -0.037 -0.039
Discretionary Fiscal Policy 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std(y) 1.574 1.583 1.660 1.580 1.516
Capital Tax Model
Technology -0.200 -0.125 -0.244 -0.200 -0.219
Government Expenditures -0.115 -0.100 -0.099 -0.114 -0.118
Investment Efficiency -0.227 -0.485 -0.003 -0.211 -0.132
Cost Push -0.196 -0.238 -0.167 -0.196 -0.211
Monetary Policy -0.108 -0.108 -0.093 -0.108 -0.105
Wage Markup -0.357 -0.135 -0.538 -0.361 -0.329
Preference -0.187 -0.148 -0.176 -0.185 -0.198
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.058 -0.059 -0.057 -0.058 -0.058
Std(y) 1.673 1.628 1.832 1.680 1.602
Consumption Tax Model
Technology -0.038 -0.012 -0.048 -0.038 -0.040
Government Expenditures -0.015 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 -0.016
Investment Efficiency -0.036 -0.109 0.012 -0.033 -0.032
Cost Push -0.038 -0.047 -0.030 -0.038 -0.042
Monetary Policy -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.013
Wage Markup -0.079 -0.019 -0.127 -0.085 -0.076
Preference -0.037 -0.027 -0.031 -0.033 -0.038
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
Std(y) 1.624 1.617 1.733 1.630 1.557
Note: Average of Posterior Distribution of Elasticities.
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3.2 Fiscal Policy Rule
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Table 2.17: Tax Elasticities of output (20 periods horizon): Varying Fiscal Policy
Baseline Output Debt
Shock τw model γy = 0.50 γy = 1.00 γd = 0.1 γd = 1
Lump Sum Tax Model
Technology -0.038 -0.057 -0.005 -0.042 -0.057
Government Expenditures -0.013 0.001 -0.035 -0.010 -0.026
Investment Efficiency -0.028 -0.163 0.015 -0.008 -0.127
Cost Push -0.042 -0.040 -0.043 -0.050 -0.042
Monetary Policy -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 -0.015 -0.029
Wage Markup -0.092 -0.147 -0.008 -0.097 -0.081
Preference -0.037 -0.067 -0.034 -0.044 -0.053
Discretionary Fiscal Policy 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Std(y) 1.574 1.574 1.574 1.574 1.574
Capital Tax Model
Technology -0.200 -0.236 -0.090 -0.200 -0.220
Government Expenditures -0.115 -0.075 -0.181 -0.114 -0.149
Investment Efficiency -0.227 -0.570 0.105 -0.138 -0.440
Cost Push -0.196 -0.181 -0.210 -0.234 -0.177
Monetary Policy -0.108 -0.100 -0.113 -0.129 -0.158
Wage Markup -0.357 -0.514 -0.105 -0.395 -0.288
Preference -0.187 -0.277 -0.186 -0.247 -0.204
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.058 -0.058 -0.058 -0.061 -0.066
Std(y) 1.673 1.765 1.626 1.631 1.856
Consumption Tax Model
Technology -0.038 -0.050 -0.009 -0.043 -0.047
Government Expenditures -0.015 -0.005 -0.029 -0.015 -0.016
Investment Efficiency -0.036 -0.149 0.008 -0.036 -0.100
Cost Push -0.038 -0.036 -0.040 -0.046 -0.036
Monetary Policy -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.019 -0.021
Wage Markup -0.079 -0.124 -0.008 -0.081 -0.067
Preference -0.037 -0.060 -0.034 -0.046 -0.045
Discretionary Fiscal Policy -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 0.000
Std(y) 1.624 1.648 1.611 1.606 1.669
Note: Average of Posterior Distribution of Elasticities.
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2.B.12 Endogenous Government Spending
Figure 2.26: Macroeconomic Aggregates: endogenous government spending (1
std.dev. Government Expenditures Shock)
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Figure 2.27: Fiscal Policy: endogenous government spending (1 std.dev.
Government Expenditures Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Receipts
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Note: Average of posterior distribution of IRFs.
Figure 2.28: Macroeconomic Aggregates: endogenous government spending (1
std.dev. Investment Efficiency Shock)
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Figure 2.29: Fiscal Policy: endogenous government spending (1 std.dev. Investment
Efficiency Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Receipts
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Note: Average of posterior distribution of IRFs.
Figure 2.30: Macroeconomic Aggregates: Varying Government Spending Rule (1
std.dev. Cost Push Shock)
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Figure 2.31: Fiscal Policy: Varying Government Spending Rule (1 std.dev. Cost
Push Shock)
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Note: IRFs are evaluated at the mean of the posterior distribution.
Figure 2.32: Macroeconomic Aggregates: Varying Government Spending Rule (1
std.dev. Monetary Policy Shock)
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Figure 2.33: Fiscal Policy: Varying Government Spending Rule (1 std.dev.
Monetary Policy Shock)
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Note: IRFs are evaluated at the mean of the posterior distribution.
Figure 2.34: Macroeconomic Aggregates: Varying Government Spending Rule (1
std.dev. Wage Markup Shock)
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Figure 2.35: Fiscal Policy: Varying Government Spending Rule (1 std.dev. Wage
Markup Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Rate
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Note: IRFs are evaluated at the mean of the posterior distribution.
Figure 2.36: Macroeconomic Aggregates: Varying Government Spending Rule (1
std.dev. Preference Shock)
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Figure 2.37: Fiscal Policy: Varying Government Spending Rule (1 std.dev.
Preference Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Rate
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Note: IRFs are evaluated at the mean of the posterior distribution.
Figure 2.38: Macroeconomic Aggregates: Varying Government Spending Rule (1
std.dev. Discretionary Fiscal Policy Shock)
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Figure 2.39: Fiscal Policy: Varying Government Spending Rule (1 std.dev.
Discretionary Fiscal Policy Shock)
(a) Debt and Tax Rate
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2.B.13 Absence of Wage Rigidities
2.B. DERIVATION OF LOG-LINEARIZED BASELINE MODEL 171
Table 2.18: Posterior Results (Forcing Variables Processes)
Priors Posterior (Tax Model)
Distrib. Mean Std. Dev. Lump Sum Labor Capital Consumption
ρa B 0.70 0.10 0.6374 0.6262 0.6668 0.6403
[0.5993,0.6812] [0.5873,0.6711] [0.6314,0.7077] [0.6018,0.6836]
ρg B 0.70 0.10 0.7602 0.7516 0.7639 0.7640
[0.7335,0.7965] [0.7231,0.7881] [0.7370,0.8003] [0.7360,0.8001]
ρi B 0.70 0.10 0.5564 0.5507 0.5717 0.5727
[0.5199,0.5956] [0.5144,0.5900] [0.5368,0.6104] [0.5365,0.6115]
ρp B 0.70 0.10 0.8138 0.8184 0.8022 0.7963
[0.7905,0.8480] [0.7951,0.8554] [0.7795,0.8366] [0.7713,0.8329]
ρr B 0.70 0.10 0.5014 0.4882 0.4971 0.5050
[0.4546,0.5460] [0.4411,0.5306] [0.4498,0.5388] [0.4582,0.5479]
ρh B 0.70 0.10 0.9134 0.9190 0.9073 0.9158
[0.9021,0.9318] [0.9089,0.9362] [0.8951,0.9279] [0.9051,0.9348]
ρb B 0.70 0.10 0.6071 0.6385 0.5918 0.5782
[0.5700,0.6502] [0.6029,0.6806] [0.5555,0.6345] [0.5406,0.6198]
ρf B 0.70 0.10 0.7730 0.7683 0.7642 0.7690
[0.7464,0.8103] [0.7403,0.8088] [0.7365,0.8021] [0.7415,0.8072]
σa IG 1.00 ∞ 0.6606 0.6657 0.6639 0.6641
[0.6139,0.6919] [0.6197,0.6951] [0.6171,0.6953] [0.6177,0.6936]
σg IG 1.00 ∞ 1.9867 2.0060 1.9741 1.9951
[1.8498,2.0708] [1.8694,2.0955] [1.8309,2.0630] [1.8572,2.0843]
σi IG 1.00 ∞ 1.7941 1.8979 1.7977 1.6445
[1.6426,1.8950] [1.7309,2.0023] [1.6357,1.8961] [1.4959,1.7357]
σp IG 1.00 ∞ 0.6966 0.6827 0.7032 0.6910
[0.6128,0.7405] [0.5974,0.7275] [0.6082,0.7410] [0.6067,0.7360]
σr IG 1.00 ∞ 0.4574 0.4525 0.4565 0.4563
[0.4249,0.4776] [0.4214,0.4734] [0.4255,0.4774] [0.4265,0.4770]
σh IG 1.00 ∞ 1.6084 2.1789 1.5901 1.8294
[1.3921,1.6980] [1.8462,2.3070] [1.3797,1.6838] [1.5932,1.9432]
σb IG 1.00 ∞ 1.2249 1.2145 1.2966 1.4065
[1.1320,1.2837] [1.1162,1.2716] [1.2003,1.3623] [1.2938,1.4808]
σf IG 1.00 ∞ 1.1045 1.1754 1.1744 1.1035
[1.0088,1.1619] [1.0733,1.2409] [1.0764,1.2411] [1.0068,1.1616]
Note: B: Beta distribution, IG: Gamma Inverse distribution. 66% HPDI into brackets.
172 CHAPTER 2. FISCAL RULES: DOES IMPLEMENTATION MATTER?
Table 2.19: Posterior Results (Structural Parameters)
Priors Posterior (Tax Model)
Distrib. Mean Std. Dev. Lump Sum Labor Capital Consumption
ρR B 0.75 0.10 0.3996 0.4092 0.3995 0.4043
[0.3666,0.4322] [0.3752,0.4421] [0.3665,0.4316] [0.3716,0.4373]
κpi G 1.50 0.25 2.2322 2.1528 2.2327 2.2533
[2.1056,2.3379] [2.0315,2.2616] [2.1033,2.3435] [2.1218,2.3604]
κy G 0.12 0.05 0.0988 0.0992 0.0983 0.1037
[0.0771,0.1112] [0.0765,0.1113] [0.0768,0.1115] [0.0808,0.1168]
ρf B 0.50 0.20 0.3651 0.2803 0.3118 0.3714
[0.3148,0.4197] [0.2278,0.3261] [0.2610,0.3595] [0.3218,0.4226]
γy N 0.50 0.25 0.7397 0.8568 0.8361 0.7744
[0.6650,0.8157] [0.7862,0.9281] [0.7591,0.9122] [0.7023,0.8445]
γd N 0.50 0.25 0.1924 0.2168 0.1916 0.1843
[0.1499,0.2236] [0.1733,0.2496] [0.1435,0.2210] [0.1418,0.2126]
ξpi B 0.50 0.10 0.6421 0.6352 0.6403 0.6417
[0.6220,0.6616] [0.6153,0.6570] [0.6194,0.6609] [0.6218,0.6617]
νpi B 0.50 0.15 0.4090 0.4059 0.4048 0.4087
[0.3346,0.4682] [0.3316,0.4674] [0.3295,0.4673] [0.3310,0.4664]
φ G 4.00 1.50 0.9537 1.3277 0.9405 1.0518
[0.7570,1.0424] [1.0321,1.4462] [0.7513,1.0296] [0.8316,1.1638]
b B 0.50 0.20 0.7412 0.7313 0.7721 0.7397
[0.7010,0.7926] [0.6912,0.7816] [0.7355,0.8187] [0.6992,0.7892]
ν G 2.00 0.75 2.0084 1.9802 2.0172 2.0233
[1.6173,2.2463] [1.6028,2.2253] [1.6175,2.2619] [1.6337,2.2643]
ψ B 0.50 0.20 0.4917 0.4945 0.5019 0.4962
[0.3955,0.5867] [0.3996,0.5906] [0.4066,0.5992] [0.4010,0.5885]
Log–Likelihood -158.1269 -158.5828 -157.6207 -162.5627
Note: B: Beta distribution, G: Gamma distribution, N: Normal distribution. 66% HPDI into
brackets.
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Table 2.20: Second Order Moments (Main aggregates)
Var. Lump-sum τw Model τk Model τc Model
Volatilities
y 1.32 1.36 1.49 1.36
c 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.75
i 4.85 4.86 5.20 5.05
h 1.29 1.35 1.33 1.33
pi 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.85
R 1.06 1.02 1.05 1.09
F 2.41 2.23 2.14 2.40
D 3.88 3.68 3.74 3.96
T 24.52 – – –
τw – 3.23 – –
τk – – 7.24 –
τc – – – 29.83
Tw 1.96 2.90 2.11 2.00
Tk 1.96 1.97 6.36 2.00
Tc 0.70 0.72 0.67 29.58
Correlation with Output
c 0.32 0.37 0.29 0.34
i 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.81
h 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.71
pi -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06
R -0.27 -0.29 -0.24 -0.27
F 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.50
D -0.32 -0.35 -0.41 -0.35
T -0.16 – – –
τw – -0.31 – –
τk – – -0.42 –
τc – – – -0.20
Tw 0.81 0.22 0.86 0.82
Tk 0.81 0.84 -0.19 0.82
Tc 0.32 0.37 0.29 -0.19
Note: Average of the posterior distribution of HP filtered moments
(λ = 1600).
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Table 2.21: Variance Decomposition of output: Nominal Price Rigidities
at gt ε
i
t ε
p
t ε
R
t ε
w
t ε
b
t ε
f
t
Labor Tax Model: Benchmark
1 16.43 12.79 27.18 16.46 2.60 22.25 1.32 0.98
4 15.00 2.78 20.58 18.12 1.03 39.40 1.80 1.28
8 11.80 1.96 16.11 18.05 0.76 48.37 1.97 0.99
20 9.09 2.32 12.59 17.37 0.61 55.09 2.18 0.74
Labor Tax Model: Absent Nominal Wage Rigidity
1 19.96 19.70 12.55 23.33 2.13 20.53 0.61 1.18
4 24.14 4.10 7.09 24.23 0.65 37.02 1.28 1.50
8 19.27 3.03 5.11 23.56 0.47 46.13 1.29 1.14
20 14.79 3.11 3.91 21.18 0.38 54.44 1.30 0.88
Note: Variance Decomposition are evaluated at the posterior mean of
the distribution.
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Figure 2.40: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Technology
Shock)
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176 CHAPTER 2. FISCAL RULES: DOES IMPLEMENTATION MATTER?
Figure 2.41: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Technology Shock)
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Note: IRFs are evaluated at the mean of the posterior distribution.
Figure 2.42: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Government
Expenditures Shock)
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Figure 2.43: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Government Expenditures
Shock)
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Figure 2.44: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Investment
Efficiency Shock)
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Figure 2.45: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Investment Efficiency Shock)
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Figure 2.46: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Cost Push
Shock)
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Figure 2.47: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Cost Push Shock)
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Figure 2.48: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Monetary
Policy Shock)
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Figure 2.49: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Monetary Policy Shock)
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Figure 2.50: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Wage Markup
Shock)
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Figure 2.51: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Wage Markup Shock)
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Note: IRFs are evaluated at the mean of the posterior distribution.
Figure 2.52: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Preference
Shock)
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Figure 2.53: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Preference Shock)
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Figure 2.54: Macroeconomic Aggregates (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Discretionary
Fiscal Policy Shock)
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Figure 2.55: Fiscal Policy (Price Rigidity) (1 std.dev. Discretionary Fiscal Policy
Shock)
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Consolidation and
Employment Loss
3.1 Introduction
The recent sovereign debt crisis has brought back fiscal consolidation in the policy
debate. Between 2004 and 2012 the sovereign debt to GDP ratio has increased
around 35 percentage points for France, Greece, and United States; and for countries
like Portugal and United Kingdom this increase has been around 60 percentage
points (see Table 3.1). Such high levels of public debt are not without consequences
for these economies in particular in terms of growth (see Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010)). Governments in most advanced economies have acknowledged the problem
and have been making efforts to design and implement fiscal consolidation plans in
an attempt to reduce public debt. These plans have been implemented via either a
reduction in government expenditure or by increasing the tax rates (either labor,
consumption, or capital tax rates).
There exists a sizable literature that studies that effect of fiscal consolidation
on the economy (e.g. Perotti (1996), Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2014), among
others). This literature has shown that the effects of fiscal consolidation episodes on
output vary a lot with the fiscal instrument used to achieve the fiscal consolidation,
the timing, the speed and the size of the consolidation. The type of the consolidation
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Table 3.1: Sovereign debt (% of GDP)
France Greece Iceland Italy Portugal Spain UK US
2004 71.4 128.1 50.4 110.6 67.4 41.7 43.5 56.4
2012 103.8 164.3 117.5 131.1 126.2 67.6 103.2 93.8
Change 32.4 36.2 67.1 20.5 58.8 25.9 59.7 37.4
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators. Note: Changes in ratio
are expressed in percentage point.
plan also plays a role. While the output loss and the associated sacrifice ratio have
been extensively analyzed, the effect of fiscal consolidation episodes on employment
remains largely unaddressed in the literature. This is however interesting for at
least two main reasons. First, since most of the countries that undergo a fiscal
consolidation experience high and persistent unemployment rates (e.g. Spain, Italy,
France,. . . ), it is then critical to evaluate (i) the potential employment loss (rise in
unemployment) associated with the effort required to achieve the debt reduction and
(ii) the persistence of this loss. Second, countries in which unemployment is still at
a low level may also need to evaluate the potential output loss for monetary policy
considerations. For instance, on September, 17, 2014, the FOMC re-affirmed the
existence of an “FOMC’s objective of maximum sustainable employment”, which,
in the context of fiscal consolidation, makes it critical to evaluate employment
losses for the conduct of monetary policy. The objective of this paper is therefore
to offer a minimal theoretical framework –a dynamic general equilibrium model–
that allows to evaluate the employment loss associated with debt reduction plans.
This paper is related to the literature that studies fiscal consolidation within
DSGE models. In particular, it relates to the seminal paper by Erceg and Linde´
(2012) which investigated to what extent and how fiscal consolidation can harm
output in a monetary union. In their setting, given the constraints imposed by
monetary union and the focus of the central bank on area wide aggregate, monetary
policy cannot accommodate the fiscal consolidation. In this setting, they find that
an expenditure-based consolidation depresses output by more than a tax-based
consolidation for several years. They also show that the “optimal strategy”—in
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terms of minimization of sacrifice ratio— is to mix sharp–temporary tax raise with
gradual spending costs. The present paper builds upon their analysis, in particular
in terms of the design of the fiscal consolidation process. It however fundamentally
departs from their analysis in two important ways. First of all, I consider a real
closed economy as my benchmark setting. The closed economy setting allows
for a clear understanding of the mechanism at work by building intuition from
a much more stylized model. By considering a real economy, I initially abstract
from any interplay between monetary and fiscal policy, thereby isolating the mere
fiscal mechanisms. I however also consider, as a sensitivity analysis, a nominal
version of the model which enables to retrieve the interplay between the two types
of policies. A second important point of departure from their analysis lies in the
fact that the labor market of the economy considered in this paper features search
and matching frictions. The existence of frictions in the labor market permits to
study employment dynamics and to derive a measure of employment loss associated
with fiscal consolidation episodes. In that respect, this paper is also related to
the paper by Pappa, Sajedi, and Vella (2015), who also analyzes the effects of
fiscal consolidation episodes within a DSGE model featuring labor market frictions.
However, their analysis focuses on the role of rent seeking and tax evasion during
spending cuts and tax hikes episodes more so than evaluating the role of labor
market frictions. Doing so their analysis is relevant for Southern countries in which
these phenomena prevail.
The model builds upon the textbook neoclassical growth model extended to
(i) the presence of public debt and (ii) the existence of search and matching
frictions a` la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer and Rogerson (2010)
on the labor market. The motivations for these two basic assumptions are
grounded in the question addressed in this paper: the evaluation of employment
(and output) loss generated by fiscal consolidation. There are several ways of
generating (un)employment fluctuations in a general equilibrium framework (gift
exchange, shirking, implicit contracts, search. . . ); in this paper, I follow Merz
(1995), Andolfatto (1996) Fe`ve and Langot (1996) by integrating this search and
matching setup in a general equilibrium model to explain the cyclical behavior
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in wages and employment fluctuations. Within this framework, the matching
of workers and firms is costly, which results in a surplus for existing jobs and a
bargaining situation over the wage. The model is otherwise standard.
Following Erceg and Linde´ (2012), the government aims at reducing its debt
to output ratio. It is reasonable to assume that policymakers would reduce the
debt target gradually to help avoid potentially large adverse consequences on
output. The main experiment assumes an initial 100% debt/GDP level which is
then gradually reduced to 75%, which, thus, reflects 25% reduction in desired debt
target –debt to output ratio. Its implementation is reached by adjusting the fiscal
revenue to keep both the debt to output and deficit close to its target path. This is
captured by a simple fiscal rule that fiscal authority abides by. The fiscal revenue
adjustments are administered through the distortionary time varying taxation. In
the baseline experiment, only the labor tax rate is allowed to adjust and government
spendings are kept constant over time. Given that the model does not consider
stochastic shocks, the model is solved under perfect foresight, and all potential
non-linearities affecting the adjustment dynamics are preserved. Later, the model
is also extended to incorporate nominal rigidities. Specifically, it integrates price
stickiness and a standard Taylor rule allowing for a potential interaction between
fiscal and monetary policies.
The fiscal austerity is accompanied by a recession in an attempt to achieve the
debt reduction objective. Thus, both employment and output decrease. At the
trough of the recession (4.5 years following the beginning of the adjustment), output
is 1.5% below its initial steady state. In the benchmark experiment, the initial
unemployment rate is 5.5% and it climbs up to 7.3% after 3.35 years following
the commencement of fiscal consolidation. Thus, at its peak the employment loss
reaches 1.9 percentage points in deviations from its steady state. The employment
losses are persistent and lasting on average 12 years.
The mechanism at work is as follows. A debt reduction requires that tax
revenue increase in order to finance the constant flow of government expenditures.
The government substitutes debt for tax revenues, therefore creating a negative
wealth effect on the agents. As will become clear later, the presence of the negative
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wealth effect will lead to a decrease in consumption and investment –and therefore
capital accumulation– which will affect negatively the tax base. Tax rates have to
adjust. Given that both the consumption tax, the capital income tax and lump
sum taxes are held constant, the labor tax has to increase to permit the increase
in the tax revenues. The tax increases from 25% to about 30% at the peak. As
the debt reduction process approaches completion, the effort in debt reduction is
compensated by a reduction in debt services. Tax revenues can then be lowered,
which translates eventually into a reduction in the labor tax that eventually reaches
a lower level of 23.8%.
Higher labor tax rate, then, leads to an increase in the wage. This reflects the
fact that the household uses the Nash bargaining process to be compensated for
the increase in the tax burden. The increase in the wage reduces the marginal
value of employment for the firm, which then cut on their vacancy postings. This
therefore increases unemployment, and its duration. Hence the persistent drop in
employment in the economy.
Over the whole adjustment (from period t to ∞), the cumulative output losses
amount to 13% (the discounted cumulative losses are 17%, given the discount factor
of household), meaning that the short–run losses outweigh the long run gains. On
the other hand, the employment experiences cumulative gains amounting to 9%. As
the beneficial effects of fiscal consolidation kick in, the losses do recede. However,
it takes 58 years for the cumulative output losses to cancel out and eventually turn
into gains, 45 years for employment. This points to the existence of an intertemporal
trade-off between the long–run gains of debt reduction on the one hand, and the
short–run employment and output losses generated by fiscal consolidation. In a
nutshell, the main results reveal that fiscal consolidation episodes are costly in the
short to medium run, both in terms of output and in terms of employment. Thus,
households have to be patient enough to experience the gains associated to such
policies.
The robustness of these findings are then assessed to alternative settings for the
consolidation policy. In particular, the sensitivity to the state of the business cycle,
the speed and size of the debt reduction, the presence of alternative instruments
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(government spendings, and other taxes) and the timing of the consolidation are
investigated. The robustness analysis shows the losses tend to be higher during
recessions due to the opposing demands placed on the labor tax adjustment by (i)
fiscal consolidation and (ii) output stabilization. Faster debt consolidation comes
at the cost of a bigger initial adjustment which magnifies the employment loss in
the short–run. A slower adjustment allows for smooth debt adjustment that limits
the initial employment loss, but in that case it lasts longer and the economy, thus,
suffers longer. Moreover, the paper shows that endogenous government spending,
the type of tax instrument used to achieve fiscal adjustment, and expected future
debt reduction also matter. Finally, the interplay between fiscal and monetary
policy is analyzed. The monetary policy is non neutral and it affects the fiscal
consolidation process. The central bank by adjusting the nominal interest rate
affects debt services and therefore calls for an adjustment of the tax. This aids the
whole debt reduction process and, thus, speeds up the fiscal consolidation in the
short–run. But, by hindering demand, it magnifies the output and employment
losses.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark real model.
Section 3 details the model calibration. Section 4 investigates the implications
of fiscal consolidation in terms of output and employment loss and sheds light
on the main mechanisms at work in the model. Section 5 conducts a sensitivity
analysis of the results to changes in the way the fiscal consolidation is achieved. In
particular, I investigate how the choice of the fiscal instruments, the timing, the
size of the debt reduction matter. I also study how sensitive are the results to the
state of the business cycle. Section 6 extends the model to the presence of nominal
rigidities, thereby allowing to address the interplay between fiscal and monetary
policies. In this section the sensitivity analysis for a nominal economy is performed:
it studies the nominal aspect for an alternative fiscal instrument –consumption
tax–, the degree of price rigidity, and the responsiveness of central bank to output
fluctuations and price stabilization. A last section offers concluding remarks.
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3.2 Model
This section presents a standard neoclassical model extended to (i) the presence of
public debt and (ii) the existence of search and matching frictions a` la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer and Rogerson (2010) on the labor market. The
motivation for these two assumptions is grounded in the question addressed in
this paper: the evaluation of the employment (and output) loss generated by fiscal
consolidation. Given that the fiscal consolidation considered in this paper takes the
form of a reduction in the sovereign debt to output ratio, the model includes public
debt. Given that we are interested in the effects on (un)employment, the model
shall feature a motive for the existence of unemployment. There are several ways
of generating (un)employment fluctuations within a general equilibrium framework
(gift exchange, shirking, implicit contracts, search. . . ); In this paper, I follow Merz
(1995), Andolfatto (1996) Fe`ve and Langot (1996) who showed, within alternative
frameworks, how search and matching frictions provide a fairly good representation
of unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle. The model is otherwise
standard.
3.2.1 Labor Market Frictions
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we assume that trade on the labor
market is costly and subject to coordination failures that are captured by the
existence of search and matching frictions. There exists a continuum of mass 1 of
individuals who, in each and every period, can be either employed (a fraction nt)
or unemployed (ut = 1−nt). All individuals are assumed to possess the same skills
and abilities, implying that their status on the labor market is not determined by
their relative productivity, but by the outcome of a random search process. Given
this ex-post heterogeneity across individuals, and given that these individuals will
accumulate assets as a way to transfer wealth across periods, the wealth distribution
in the economy is potentially a state variable. In order to avoid dealing with a
distribution and face a typical Krusell and Smith’s (1998) problem, we assume
that all individuals are members of a single representative household and meet at
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the end of the period and pool resources –therefore implementing a perfect risk
sharing environment. This way the only relevant state variable pertaining to wealth
accumulation will be the level of assets, and not their distribution.
The existence of search and matching frictions on the labor market is captured
by the existence of a matching function that relates the number of successful
matches, Mt, to the number of unemployed, ut, and the number of vacancies, vt,
posted by firms
Mt = m(ut, vt)
The function is strictly increasing, concave in both ut and vt and exhibits constant
returns to scale.1 Following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008a), we use the following
matching function
m(ut, vt) =
vt(1− nt)
(vξt + (1− nt)ξ)1/ξ
(3.1)
where the matching function parameter is ξ ∈ (0, 1). The evolution of aggregate
employment can then be described as follows. At the beginning of period t, nt
individuals are employed. During period t, Mt new matches are formed and add
to the existing level of employment. Finally a constant fraction ψ ∈ (0, 1) of
individuals separate from their employer. Hence, the level of employment available
as of t+ 1 is given by
nt+1 = Mt + (1− ψ)nt (3.2)
Note that, because the matching function depends on aggregate quantities that
are out of the control of the individuals, this equation captures all externalities at
work in the search and matching process.
Consider the case of an individual looking for a job. Using the law of large
numbers, this individual has a probability
st =
Mt
ut
= m(ut, vt)
ut
of finding a job. This individual faces two types of externalities. First she benefits
from a positive trade externality created by firms: by posting more vacancies
1This assumption of constant returns to scale is consistent with the empirical findings reported
by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for US data and by Pissarides (1986) for UK data.
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on the market, firms increase the probability that an individual will find a job
(∂st/∂vt > 0). Second, it suffers a congestion externality: when more individuals
are searching, the probability of finding a job decreases (∂st/∂ut < 0). Given
the existence of constant returns to scale, the probability of finding a job can be
rewritten
st = s(θt)
where θ = vt/ut is a measure of labor market tightness. It should also be clear
from the previous discussion that s′(·) > 0.
Likewise, consider a firm posting vt vacancies. Using the law of large numbers,
the probability of filling a vacancy is given by
qt =
Mt
vt
= m(ut, vt)
vt
As in the case of a single individual, each firm faces two types of externalities.
First it benefits from a positive trade externality created by unemployed workers:
The larger the pool of workers the firm faces, the larger the probability it will fill
a vacancy (∂qt/∂ut > 0). Second, it also faces a congestion externality created
by the other firms: by posting more vacancies on the market, firms increase the
probability that an individual will find a job (∂st/∂vt > 0). Second, it suffers from
a congestion externality: the larger the number of aggregate vacancies the smaller
the probability that each individual firm will fill its vacancy (∂qt/∂vt < 0). Note
that this probability can also be expressed in terms of labor market tightness as
qt = q(θt) where q′(·) < 0. In that context the employment level of firm j, nt(j),
evolves as
nt+1(j) = qtvt(j) + (1− ψ)nt(j) (3.3)
The fact that qt is beyond the control of the firm captures the existence of
externalities.
3.2.2 Households
There exists a representative household who is composed of a continuum of
individuals. At the beginning of period t, the members of the household visit
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the labor market. As explained in the previous section, a fraction nt of these
members are employed. These individuals supply inelastically 1 unit of labor. The
complementary fraction is unemployed and performing search activities. At the end
of the period, all these members go back to the household and pool their resources,
therefore enabling perfect risk sharing. As explained in the previous section, this
assumption simplifies our analysis as it allows us to ignore any distributional issue.2
The household has preferences over consumption and leisure described by the
following intertemporal utility function3
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log ct − ϑ n
1+ν
t
1 + ν
)
(3.4)
where ν > 0 and ϑ > 0. ct denotes the household’s consumption and nt is the
fraction of employed household members, which is determined by the matching
process and is beyond the control of the household.
The household enters a period with some initial financial wealth bt−1 that yields
a gross real return rt−1, earns a wage wt per unit of labor, pays a proportional labor
tax τwt ∈ (0, 1), such that the total after tax labor income is given by (1− τwt )wtnt.
The household leases capital at the after–tax rental rate (1−τ kt )zt, where τ kt ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the capital income tax. Each member also receives a share of the profits of
all firms, Πt, and a lump–sum government transfer, Tt. This income is then used
to consume, ct (net of the consumption tax τ ct ∈ (0, 1)), invest, it, and purchase
assets, bt, as a way to transfer wealth towards next period. She therefore faces the
2An alternative way of dealing with this issue would be to create a perfect unemployment
insurance market. At the beginning of the period, each household buys an insurance contract
that insures her against labor market risk. Assuming that insurance companies are risk neutral,
this insurance mechanism is perfect in the sense that be she employed or not the household would
enjoy the same marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, all household would accumulate the
same amount of assets, which then implies that the distribution of assets is irrelevant for the
model solution.
3Implicit in this formulation of the utility is that the household’s disutility of labor is determined
by the disutility of the aggregate labor supplied by her members rather that the aggregation of
the disutilities. This assumption is consistent with the fact that individuals pool resources within
the household.
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following budget constraint
(1 + τ ct )ct + it + bt = rt−1bt−1 + (1− τwt )wtnt + (1− τ kt )ztkt + Πt + Tt (3.5)
Investment, it leads to the formation of the capital stock, kt, whose law of motion
is described by
kt+1 =
(
1− φ
(
it
it−1
))
it + (1− δ)kt (3.6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the rate of depreciation of capital. Implicit in this
formulation is that capital accumulation is subject to convex investment adjustment
costs, φ(·), a` la Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005a). These costs satisfy
φ(1) = φ′(1) = 0, so that these costs are absent in the steady state, and ϕ ≡
φ′′(1) > 0. 4
The household determines her consumption, investment and accumulation plans
by maximizing her utility subject to her budget constraint (3.5), transition equation
for capital (3.6), and given the perceived law of motion of employment (3.2) (which
remains beyond her control at this stage of the problem). In doing so, a household
takes as given prices, taxes and transfers, and aggregate quantities.
The household’s optimal behavior is then characterized by the set of Euler
conditions
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
= β rt
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(3.7)
qit = β
ct(1 + τ ct )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(zt+1(1− τ kt+1) + qit+1(1− δ)) (3.8)
1 = qit
(
1− φ
(
it
it−1
)
−
(
it
it−1
)
φ′
(
it
it−1
))
+ β ct
ct+1
qit+1φ
′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2
(3.9)
where qit is the marginal Tobin’s Q associated with the capital decision. Equation
(3.7) is the standard consumption saving intertemporal arbitrage condition, which
4Note that for the quantitative analysis, the costs will take the form
φ(x) = ϕ2 (x− 1)
2
where ϕ ∈ R+ control for the size of the costs.
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is just distorted by the presence of the consumption tax. Equation (3.8) describes
the standard consumption investment tradeoff faced by the household. As in the
case of the consumption savings decision, this arbitrage condition is also affected
by the tax. The last equation describes the evolution of the marginal Tobin’s Q, qit,
which differs from unity due to the presence of investment adjustment costs. The
presence of potentially time varying taxes in the optimal decisions of the household
highlights how fiscal consolidation will affect the economy.5 Fiscal consolidation, in
the form of a reduction of the debt to output ratio, requires the government to find
alternative ways of financing its public expenditures. This will then require some
adjustment in the tax rates, which will in turn affect the optimal consumption,
investment and savings decisions of the household.
3.2.3 Firms
There exists a continuum of firms, indexed by j ∈ (0, 1), which produce a
homogenous good that can be either consumed or invested by means of capital and
labor. The technology exhibits constant returns to scale and can be described by
the Cobb–Douglas production function
yt(j) =Atkαt (j)nt(j)1−α (3.10)
where α ∈ (0, 1). At denotes the total factor productivity of the firm, which
sequence, {At}∞t=0, is exogenously given. Note that given that firms all face the
same technology and that there does not exist any idiosyncratic uncertainty, firms
will be identical ex-post. Contrary to the standard neoclassical framework, the
existence of labor market frictions implies that firms that enter in period t with
employment nt(j) have to post vacancies vt(j) should it want to increase its level
of employment in the next period. However posting a vacancy involves paying a
constant unit cost a > 0. The firm has a probability qt (beyond the control of the
firm) of filling this vacancy, and faces a probability ψ that an employee separates.
The law of motion of employment in firm j is therefore described by Equation
5As will become clear later, the wage faced by the household will also be affected by variations
in a tax.
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(3.3). The firm decides its production and vacancy posting plans by maximizing its
intertemporal discounted profit
max
∞∑
t=0
Ψ0,t (yt(j)− ztkt(j)− wtnt(j)− avt(j)) (3.11)
subject to the law of motion of employment, Equation (3.3). Ψ0,t denotes the
discount factor of the firm between periods 0 and t. Given that, in the model, the
interests of the manager of the firm are aligned with those of the shareholder –the
household– the proper discount factor is given by Ψ0,t = βt(1 + τ ct )
∂U(ct,nt)
∂ct
.
The optimal production and vacancy posting plans are characterized by the
following optimality conditions
zt = α
yt(j)
kt(j)
(3.12)
a
qt
= β ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(
(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
)
(3.13)
The first condition is the standard demand for capital. The second condition deter-
mines the optimal vacancy posting behavior–and hence the optimal employment
level. Firm j chooses the number of vacancies such that the marginal advertising
costs equalizes the expected discounted future payoff. The expected payoff is
conditional on the marginal vacancy leading to a match with probability qt. The
left hand side of (3.13) captures effective marginal hiring costs, which a firm trades
off against the surplus over wage payments it can appropriate and against the
benefit of not having to hire someone next period. Note that, in a symmetric
equilibrium, it must therefore be the case that xt(j) = xt(i) = xt, with x ∈ {k, n, v}.
3.2.4 Wage determination
The existence of labor frictions implies that there does not exist an auctioneer that
would set the wages competitively. A mechanism to determine the wage must be
specified. In this paper, I follow the literature (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) among others) and assume that wages
are determined as the outcome of a bilateral bargaining process between workers
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and firms. Since the workforce is homogeneous, each worker is marginal when
bargaining with the firm. Both parties choose wage rates to maximize the joint
surplus generated from their employment relationship: surpluses accruing to the
matched parties are then split according to a Nash bargaining mechanism.
The surplus of a firm, ΩFt , is given by
ΩFt = (1− α)
yt
nt
− wt + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
and corresponds to the marginal value –expressed in terms of goods– of a match,
which corresponds to the marginal product of employment net of the wage paid to
the new hire, plus the marginal benefit of not having to hire a new worker in the
next period.
The before tax surplus of the household, ΩHt , is given by the marginal utility
value of a match, expressed in terms of goods by dividing by the marginal utility
of consumption. The marginal utility value of a match can be found by comparing
the options available to the worker. When the worker is employed, she contributes
to the household value by earning a wage wt, but suffers a disutility from working
and forfeits an outside option payment Xt. This is weighted against next period’s
expected utility. The marginal utility value of a match is thus given by
ΩHt = wt −
Xt
1− τwt
− ϑctn
ν
t
1− τwt
+ β (1 + τ
c
t+1)ct+1
(1 + τ ct )ct
1− τwt+1
1− τwt
ΩHt+1(1− ψ − qtθt)
where I made use of the expression for the marginal utility of consumption, and
the derivative of next period employment with respect to current employment.
The joint surplus, St, is then given by
St ≡ ΩHt ηΩFt 1−η (3.14)
where η ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative bargaining power of workers. The wage is
then set so as to maximize the joint surplus, which leads to the surplus sharing
(1− η)ΩHt = ηΩFt
Substituting of the individual surplus values results, after tedious algebra, in the
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following wage setting rule:
wt =
η
(
(1− α) yt
nt
+ aθt + (1− ψ) aqt
)
+ (1− η) ((1− τwt )Xt + ϑnνt ct(1 + τ ct ))
1− τwt (1− η)
(3.15)
As is typical in models with surplus sharing, the wage is a weighted average of the
payments accruing to workers and firms, with each party appropriating a fraction
of the other’s surplus. The bargained wage also includes mutual compensation for
costs incurred, namely hiring costs and the utility cost of working. The bargaining
weight determines how close the wage is to either the marginal product of labor
or to the outside option of the worker, the latter of which has two components,
unemployment benefits and the consumption utility of leisure. Note that the wage
setting rule is fundamentally affected by the labor tax rate. It can be readily verified
that as long as the worker’s outside option Xt is smaller than the wage –which
would be the case if the outside option is a fraction of the wage, like unemployment
benefits– this function is increasing in the tax. It is then clear that should fiscal
consolidation lead to an increase in the labor tax, as a way to substitute debt for
tax revenues when financing public expenditures, this would put upward pressure
on the bargained wage rate and will, in turn, reduce the labor demand and increase
equilibrium unemployment. Likewise the consumption tax ought to have a similar
effect, should it be used to financed public expenditures.
3.2.5 Fiscal policy and Debt adjustment
Fiscal authorities collect taxes (ft) and issue public bonds (bt) as a way to finance
an exogenously given sequence of government spending {gt}∞t=0. Accordingly, the
government budget constraint is given by
bt = rt−1bt−1 + gt − ft (3.16)
Tax revenues, ft, comprise consumption tax revenues, τ ct ct, labor tax revenues,
τwt wtnt, capital tax revenues, τ kt ztkt and the lump–sum tax, Tt, such that
ft = τ ct ct + τwt wtnt + τ kt ztkt + Tt (3.17)
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Given this setting, I am now in a position to describe the fiscal consolidation
process. Policymakers are assumed to use the proceeds from taxation to control
the path of public debt. More precisely, let us denote b?t the target debt to output
ratio, then the fiscal authorities set the tax revenues according to the simple rule
log(ft) = log(f) + γ1
(
log
(
bt−1
yt
)
− log(b?t )
)
(3.18)
where γ1 > 0. This rule stipulates that any positive (negative) deviation of the
debt/output ratio from its targeted value leads to an increase (decrease) in tax
revenues that the government should collect (γ1 > 0). That way the government
substitute debt for tax revenues (and vice versa). Let us then consider the case
where, initially, public debt is on target (bt−1/yt = b?t ), and assume that the targeted
value of the debt/output ratio, b?t , is shifted downward. As aforementioned, given
that debt is predetermined, the debt/output gap increases leading to an upward
adjustment of tax revenues. Then, given that the government spending are given,
Equation (3.16) implies that the debt bt adjust downward. This adjustment requires
one or several tax rates to be adjusted. Which of the tax should be adjusted is
a priori indeterminate. In this paper, I adopt a purely positive approach to the
problem. Following Tinbergen’s rule, only one instrument will be used to achieve
this increase in tax revenues. In what follows, as a benchmark experiment, the
labor tax will be used to adjust tax revenues, holding all other tax rates (and
the lump sum tax) constant.6 Adjustment in the consumption tax will also be
considered in a separate experiment as a sensitivity analysis exercise.
The adjustment in the debt/output ratio remains to be described. Following
Erceg and Linde´ (2012), policymakers are assumed to reduce public debt gradually
to avoid large adverse consequences for output. This is implemented by assuming
that the targeted debt/output ratio, b?t , follows the exogenous process
log b?t = ρb log b?t−1 + (1− ρb)
(
log
(
b
y
)
+ εbt
)
(3.19)
6Note that things are a bit more subtle. In a general equilibrium, tax revenues will adjust for
two reasons: (i) adjustment in the tax instrument (the margin) and (ii) adjustment in the taxed
revenue (general equilibrium effect).
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where b/y denotes the initial steady state value of the debt/output ratio and {εbt}∞t=0
is an exogenous sequence that will control for the fiscal consolidation. This process
is akin to a simple AR(1) process where the persistence is controlled by parameter
ρb. For instance, should εbt be a purely transient shock (e.g. {εbt}∞t=0 = {εb, 0, . . .})
with εb < 0, b?t would drop on impact and converge back to log(b/y) monotonically.
Fiscal consolidation in this setting will then be implemented by considering the
sequence {εbt}∞t=0 = {εb, εb, . . .}, with εb < 0, implying that b?t will converge smoothly
to log(b/y) + εb < log(b/y). The coefficient ρb controls the speed of debt target
adjustment such that high values of ρb lead to slower adjustments.
3.2.6 General Equilibrium
A competitive general equilibrium is a sequence of prices Pt ≡ {rt+i, zt+i}∞i=0, a
sequence of wages Wt ≡ {wt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of taxes Tt ≡ {τwt+i, τ ct+i, τ kt+i, Tt+i}∞i=0,
a sequence of policy instruments Gt ≡ {gt+i, ft+i, b?t+i}∞i=0 and a sequence of
quantities Qt ≡ {ct+i, yt+i, kt+i, nt+i, vt+i, bt+i}∞i=0 such that
1. for a given sequence of prices, Pt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of
taxes, Tt and a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, the sequence of quantities,
Qt, solves the optimization problems of the agents,
2. for a given sequence of prices, Pt, a sequence of taxes, Tt, a sequence of
policy instruments, Gt, and a sequence of quantities, Qt, the sequence of
wages, Wt, is set according to the wage bargaining process,
3. for a sequence of quantities, Qt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of taxes,
Tt and a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, the sequence of prices, Pt, clears
the capital and good markets,
4. for a sequence of quantities, Qt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of
quantities, Qt and a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, the sequence of taxes,
Tt, implies that the government budget constraint is satisfied.
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3.3 Model calibration
The model presented in the previous section does not admit an analytical solution
and is therefore solved numerically, using Dynare. This requires the structural
parameters to be assigned values. The model is calibrated for the post-WWII US
economy at the quarterly frequency. Table 3.2 reports the parameter values.
The parameters pertaining to preferences and technology are standard and
borrowed from the Real Business Cycle literature. The psychological discount
factor, β, is set such that the rental rate of capital is about 4% (β = 0.99). The
capital elasticity in the production function, α is set to match the capital share of
income in the National Income and Product Accounts (α = 0.33).7. The capital
depreciation rate, δ is set such that the annual depreciation rate is equal 10 percent
(δ = 0.025). The investment adjustment cost parameter, ϕ, is set to be 2, which
lies in the range of values considered in the DSGE literature.
7Note that since the wage rate in this model economy does not correspond to the marginal
product of labor, 1− α is not equal to the labor share of total income. (1− α) equals the sum
of the labor share of total income and the return to investing in job search. Contrary to the
standard neoclassical growth model in which labor’s share of income is constant, the model with
labor frictions in the labor market exhibits a labor share that varies over the business cycle,
thereby mirroring this variable’s behavior in the data.
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Table 3.2: Model parametrization
Param. Value Interpretation Target
β 0.990 discount rate 4% annual interest rate
α 0.330 capital elasticity of output 33% capital share of income
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate 10% annual depreciation rate
G/Y 0.201
st. st. government spending
in output ratio
Average government spending to
GDP ratio
τw 0.250 st. st. labor income tax rate
Estimate of average effective labor
income tax rate by Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994)
τ c 0.060 st. st. consumption tax rate
Estimate of average effective consump-
tion tax rate by Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994)
τ k 0.430 st. st. capital income tax rate
Estimate of average effective capital
income tax rate by Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994)
st 0.8094 probability of finding a job
qt 0.9469 probability of filling a vacancy
ψ 0.0648 separation rate
θ labor market tightness
v vacancy
a 0.07 vacancy posting cost
η 0.05 worker’s bargaining power
X outside option
n 0.945 steady state employment
ν 2 labor disutility parameter –
Annual debt is assumed to amount to 100% of GDP, which, on a quarterly
basis, implies a debt to output ratio of 4. This corresponds to the amount of debt
required to finance government spending that constitutes 20% of GDP –the average
government share over the post-WWII period in the US. The steady state level of
taxes is borrowed from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), who sets τw, τ c and
τ k, equal to the average effective US tax rates for labor, consumption and capital
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income: 0.25, 0.06 and 0.43 respectively. The parameters pertaining to the rules
(3.18) and (3.19) will be given when we describe the baseline experiment.
The parameters pertaining to the labor market are set following the approach
outlined in Shimer and Rogerson (2010) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b).8
Their approach amounts to set the parameters of the labor market to match,
as closely as possible, the volatility of market tightness in the data. This is
achieved as long as the model is also able to replicate the data along the other
dimensions, namely the volatility of vacancies, the volatility of unemployment,
and the correlation between vacancies and unemployment. The data indicate that
the probability of finding a job (st) within the quarter is 0.8094, and that to fill
a vacancy, qt, is 0.9469. They also give the separation rate to be ψ = 0.0648.
Using the probability of finding a job, the separation rate and the law of motion of
aggregate employment in the steady state, the steady-state level of employment is
n = s(θ)
ψ + s(θ) = 0.945
implying an unemployment rate of 5.5%.
Given a value for the steady state employment, the other labor market variables
are solved using the remaining equations and the remaining parameters can be
set. The elasticity in the disutility of labor, ν, is set to 2, which lies well within
the range of values used in the literature.9 Following Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008b) the total cost of posting a vacancy, in terms of average quarterly labor
productivity, is set to 4.67 percent. Given that the labor’s share of income averages
0.66 in US data, this implies a quarterly vacancy posting cost, a, of 0.07. Also,
following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b), the worker’s bargaining power, η
is set at 0.05. Using the wage setting equation, and the combination of low
vacancy posting costs, together with a bargaining power favoring firms, leads to
a disutility parameter, ϑ of 0.349. Finally, the outside option is calibrated as
8Note that since Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b) calibrated the model on a weekly basis,
their approach is modified to accommodate the quarterly frequency.
9Although this parameter does not correspond to the inverse Frisch elasticity, it is reminiscent
of it. Estimates for this elasticity range from 0.333 in representative macroeconomic studies to
100 for microeconomic studies.
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Xt = labor replacement rate× wt(1− τwt ).10
3.4 Results
This section discusses our baseline experiment and presents our main results.
3.4.1 Transition Analysis
In this paper, fiscal consolidation takes the form of a permanent 25% points decrease
in the debt to output ratio (εb = −0.25). However, this reduction in the size of
debt is achieved smoothly. More precisely, the persistence parameter of the debt
target process (3.19), ρb, is set such that half of this adjustment is performed within
a business cycle –e.g. 6 years11 (ρb = 0.875).12 In the fiscal rule the parameter
governing the reaction of fiscal receipts to debt adjustments, γ1 is set to 0.8, such
that half of the adjustment is completed within a business cycle or, in other words,
within 6 years. Given the importance of this parameter, variations in its value will
be considered in Section 3.5. Given that the model does not consider stochastic
shocks, the model is solved under perfect foresight using the relaxation method
proposed by Boucekkine (1995), as implemented in Dynare. This approach allows to
preserve all potential non-linearities affecting the adjustment dynamics. Finally, in
the baseline experiment, only the labor tax rate is allowed to adjust and government
spendings are kept constant over time.
The left panel of Figure 3.1 reports (i) the evolution of the debt target ratio,
b?t , (dashed line) alongside (ii) the evolution of the actual debt to GDP ratio in
the economy (plain line). For the sake of interpretation, the debt/output ratio is
expressed in annualized terms. Initially, the actual debt/output ratio is on target,
100% of GDP. As of the next period, the target debt ratio starts adjusting toward
10The statistics on labor market replacement rate comes from Bureau of Labor Statistics and
is set at 0.6.
11This value corresponds to the average duration of a complete business cycle from trough to
trough (or from peak to peak) for the post–war US economy, as reported by the NBER.
12In Section 3.5, other levels and speed of debt reduction will also be considered as a way to
provide a better understanding of the consolidation dynamics.
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Figure 3.1: Fiscal Consolidation
0 50 100
75
80
85
90
95
100
Quarters
%
 o
f O
ut
pu
t
Debt/GDP
0 50 100
−5
0
5
10
15
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Tax revenues
0 50 100
22
24
26
28
30
Quarters
pe
rc
en
ts
Labor tax rate
its new long run level, 75%. Note the target debt ratio adjusts much quicker to its
new long–run value than the actual debt ratio. For instance, half of the adjustment
of the target has to be done within 6 quarters for the actual debt ratio to achieve
half of its adjustment in 6 years. This can be interpreted as the willingness of
the policymaker to anchor the expectations of the agents to the new target in a
relatively short time. This lag in the actual debt adjustment implies that the gap
in the dynamics of actual and target debt ratio is positive, immediately after the
implementation of the policy, and remains positive throughout the transition. This
implies that tax revenues have to increase in order to finance the constant flow
of government expenditures (see middle panel of Figure 3.1). The government
substitutes debt for tax revenues, therefore creating a negative wealth effect on
the agents. As will become clear later, the presence of the negative wealth effect
will lead to a decrease in consumption and investment –and therefore capital
accumulation– which will affect negatively the tax base. Tax rates have to adjust.
Given that both the consumption tax, the capital income tax and lump sum taxes
are held constant, the labor tax has to increase to permit the increase in the tax
revenues (see right panel of Figure 3.1). The tax increases from 25% to about 30%
at the peak. As the debt reduction process approaches completion, the effort in
debt reduction is compensated by a reduction in debt services. Tax revenues can
then be lowered, which translates eventually into a reduction in the labor tax that
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eventually reaches a lower long-run level of 23.8%.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the effects of fiscal consolidation on output and employment,
and reports the percentage deviations of both variables from their initial steady state
level. Output and employment are left unaffected on impact as both employment
and capital are predetermined in the model. As of the second period, both
employment and output decrease. The government therefore creates a recession in
order to achieve its debt reduction objective. At the trough of the recession (4.5
years following the beginning of the adjustment), output is 1.5% below its initial
steady state. Employment reaches its trough of 1.9 percentage points in deviations
from its steady state after 3.35 years. The negative effects on employment and
output are persistent. Employment reaches back its steady state after 12.9 years,
Figure 3.2: Evolution of Output and Employment following 25% debt reduction
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and only after this date the economy starts to benefit from its fiscal consolidation
effort, and both its employment level and output increase above the initial steady
state. There clearly is an intertemporal tradeoff the policymaker has to consider.
Reduction of debt requires to plunge the economy in a recession for a long period,
before output increases and unemployment recedes in the longer run.
As aforementioned, the fiscal consolidation process entails an increase in the
labor tax rate. The associated increase in the tax burden creates a negative wealth
effect that, everything else equal, reduces both consumption and investment (see
Figure 3.3). This is the standard effect, also present in the standard neoclassical
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Figure 3.3: Macroeconomic responses (Benchmark Experiment)
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model, that reduces the demand for goods and triggers a recession. The increase
in the labor tax has another effect on the economy that is fundamentally related
to the presence of labor frictions. From the wage setting equation (3.15), we have
∂wt
∂τwt
= (1− η)(wt −Xt)1− τwt (1− η)
> 0⇐⇒ wt > Xt
Given that the outside option corresponds to a fraction of the wage in the model,
an increase in the labor tax leads to an increase in the wage. This reflects the fact
that the household uses the Nash bargaining process to be compensated for the
increase in the tax burden. The increase in the wage reduces the marginal value of
employment for the firms, which then cut on their vacancy postings (see middle of
Panel (b) in Figure 3.3). Given that unemployment is predetermined, the labor
market conditions improve (θt decreases, see left of Panel (b) in Figure 3.3). On
the one hand this improves the situation of firms that then face a larger probability
of filling a vacancy, qt (positive trade externality). On the other hand, the situation
of the household deteriorates as she now faces a lower probability of finding a job,
st (congestion effect). This therefore increases unemployment, and its duration.
Hence the persistent drop in employment in the economy.
As already outlined in Section 3.3, the above described transitional dynamics are
obtained starting from a 5.5% unemployment rate. If, instead, higher unemployment
rates are considered —as observed in southern European countries— the results
are, if at all, barely affected. In other words, these results are not affected by the
initial steady state level of unemployment, and our analysis remains valid whether
the economy is initially started from a high or low unemployment rate.
3.4.2 Cumulative losses
This section offers a quantitative representation of the adjustment dynamics
described in the previous section. More precisely, cumulative losses of output and
employment are computed. The cumulative loss, `(y, k), of output (respectively
employment, `(n, k)) at horizon k is given by
`(y, k) = −100×
k∑
j=0
(
yt+j − y
y
)
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such that `(y, k) is a positive number –expressed in percentages– that corresponds
to the cumulative losses the economy experience, in terms of output (resp.
employment), between period t and period t + k. In the case of output, the
discounted loss, `(y; β) is also computed
`(y; β) = −100×
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
yt+j − y
y
)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the psychological discount factor of the household.
Table 3.3 report the cumulative output and employment losses associated to the
fiscal consolidation process at various horizons. Inspection of Table 3.3 reveals that
Table 3.3: Cumulative Losses
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
Employment 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
fiscal consolidation episodes are costly in the short to medium run, both in terms
of output and in terms of employment. For instance, after one year, the economy
would have experienced about 1% output loss and would have, in total, lost 1.3
percentage points employment. Given the persistence of the recession, these losses
amplify over time, and after 5 years, the cumulative loss in terms of output is
about 21%, 30% for employment. Losses recedes as the horizon increases since the
beneficial effects of fiscal consolidation kick in. It takes 58 years for the cumulative
output losses to cancel out and eventually turn into gains, 45 years for employment.
This, once again, points to the existence of an intertemporal trade-off between the
long–run gains of debt reduction on the one hand, and the short–run employment
and output losses generated by fiscal consolidation. In the case of output, the
discounted loss is still sizable, 17%, over the whole adjustment (from period t to
∞), meaning that, given the discount factor of the household, the short–run losses
outweigh the long run gains.
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3.5 Sensitivity analysis
The preceding results have shown that the output and employment costs of reducing
public debt can be sizable in the short to medium run, and that agents have to be
patient enough to experience the gains associated to such policies. This section
assesses the robustness of the previous findings to alternative settings for the
consolidation policy. In particular, the sensitivity to the state of the business cycle,
the speed and size of the debt reduction, the presence of alternative instruments
(government spendings, and other taxes) and the timing of the consolidation are
investigated.
3.5.1 Recessions
The recent fiscal consolidation episode has taken place within a particular economic
environment: most economies were experiencing a recession. This section
investigates the role of the state of the business cycle for the impact of debt
reducing policies on employment and output. To this end, we compare the response
of output and employment to the fiscal consolidation policy described in the
previous section when the economy is started from steady state to the case where
the economy is plunged into a recession initially. The recession is triggered by a
downward shift in total factor productivity At that brings output 2.5% below trend
on impact. Figure 3.4 reports the dynamics of output and employment during the
fiscal consolidation episode. The plain dark line corresponds to the benchmark
experiment described in the previous section, whereas the red line corresponds to
the deviation of output from its path in recession during the fiscal consolidation.
The results indicate that reducing debt in a recession does not generate significantly
larger output and employment losses than when the economy is started from its
steady state. The cumulative losses are marginally larger than in the benchmark
experiment in the short-run, as witnessed by Table 3.4. As time goes on, the losses
increase a bit more during a recession. For instance, fiscal consolidation yields a 30%
cumulative employment loss when the fiscal consolidation is started in a recession,
28% when started from steady state. The reason is that in a recession fiscal policy
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Figure 3.4: Output and employment responses during recession
0 5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
Output
0 5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
Employment
Benchmark case Recession
Table 3.4: Cumulative losses due to fiscal consolidation
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.12 0.97 4.65 22.32 58.08 14.47 18.93
Employment 0.19 1.47 6.86 29.38 44.74 -8.20 –
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is constrained as there is a direct trade-off between the fiscal consolidation and
output stabilization in the recession. Thus, there are two opposing demands on
the labor tax adjustment; the fiscal consolidation demanding a hike in wage tax
while the output stabilization calling for a fall in wage tax. Consequently, the
fiscal consolidation will be slower in recession compared to the benchmark scenario,
reflecting a direct trade-off between the fiscal consolidation and output stabilization.
3.5.2 Consumption taxes
In the benchmark experiment, the debt reduction was achieved by adjusting the
labor tax rate holding the other taxes —namely consumption and capital taxes—
constant, at their steady state levels. In this section, I investigate the effects of
fiscal austerity as achieved through adjustment of the consumption tax rate (for
example, retail sales tax, a value-added tax, and a consumption-type flat tax)
instead.13
Figure 3.5 reports the adjustment dynamics of fiscal aggregates and the tax
rate during the fiscal consolidation. The consumption tax increases from 6% —its
steady state level in the initial regime— to about 10.3% at the peak (reached in 3.5
years following the beginning of fiscal austerity) — a 4.3 percentage points increase
which is of the same order as the increase in the labor tax. As the debt reduction
process approaches completion, the effort in debt reduction is compensated by a
reduction in debt services. Tax revenues can then be lowered, which translates
eventually into a reduction in the consumption tax that eventually reaches a lower
level of 4.75%.
The initial increase in the consumption tax makes consumption relatively more
expensive. As a way to smooth their consumption over time, the households
extract a greater surplus during the wage bargaining process which puts upward
pressure on the real wage (see equation (3.15) which is an increasing function of
the consumption tax). The real wage increases, but the marginal value of a new
employee for the firm decreases which leads to a fall in vacancies. However, this
13Such a consumption tax adjustment was recently put forward in France as a way to obtain a
social V.A.T. (see Fe`ve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2010)).
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Figure 3.5: Fiscal Consolidation: Consumption Tax (I)
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effect on the real wage is indirect and as such results in a smaller decrease in the
wage and vacancy posting compared to the case of the labor tax adjustment. Hence,
the permanent income of the agents is not as affected and consumption decreases
less than in the benchmark case, even though the adjusting tax is the consumption
tax. Likewise the adjustment of investment is dampened. Employment reaches
back its steady state after 12.9 years, and only after this date the economy starts
to benefit from its fiscal consolidation effort, and see both its employment level and
output be above the initial steady state. Just as in our benchmark case, the policy
maker faces an intertemporal tradeoff: plunging the economy in a recession for a
long period, before output increases and unemployment recedes in the longer run.
Inspection of Figure 3.7 reveals, that compared to using the labor tax rate,
the use of consumption tax generates (i) lower output loss –it stands at a 1.01%
deviations from its initial steady state compared to 1.5% for the labor tax (reached
in 4.5 years following the beginning of fiscal austerity), (ii) lower employment loss
of 1.28% after 3.5 years – for the labor tax rate this is a 1.9% deviations from its
steady state after 3.35 years. The negative effects on employment and output are
persistent.
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Figure 3.6: Macroeconomic responses (Consumption Tax Experiment)
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of Output and Employment (II)
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This is confirmed by inspection of Table 3.5 which reveals that, when government
adjusts the consumption tax rate, fiscal consolidation episodes are less costly in
the short to medium run, both in terms of output and in terms of employment.
For instance, after two years, the economy would have experienced an output loss
of about 3% and would have, in total, lost 4.5 percentage points of employment–
when using the labor tax the output loss is around 4% and the employment loss
is about 6%. Given the persistence of the recession, these losses amplify over
time. In the long run, after 50 years, the economy experiences cumulative gain
of 9.2% for employment – in the case of a labor tax this is lower and stands at
8.9%. Losses recede as the horizon increases since the beneficial effects of the fiscal
consolidation kick in. Under the consumption tax adjustments, it takes one year
less for the cumulative output losses to cancel out and eventually turn into gains,
57 years versus 58 years under the labor tax adjustments. In the case of output,
the discounted loss is still sizable, 10.2%, over the whole adjustment (from period t
to ∞), but much lower than for the labor tax, 17%. On the other hand, for both
tax regimes, it takes the same length of time for the cumulative employment losses
to cancel out – that is 45 years.
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Table 3.5: Cumulative losses: Consumption Tax Adjustment
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.09 0.64 2.98 14.36 37.97 6.08 10.17
Employment 0.14 0.98 4.45 19.11 29.25 -9.15 –
For the consumption tax adjustment, the intertemporal trade-off between the
long–run gains of debt reduction on the one hand, and on the other hand the short–
run employment and output losses generated by fiscal consolidation, is still present.
However these tend to be smaller compared to the labor tax adjustment. These
results indicate that, in terms of employment and output losses, the consumption
tax is better suited for fiscal austerity.
3.5.3 Speed versus Amplitude
The fiscal consolidation is characterized by (i) the persistence and (ii) the amplitude
of the debt adjustment. In particular, as already explained above, the higher
the persistence, the smaller the amplitude effect, and vice versa. Intuitively, by
becoming more “aggressive” and by speeding up the reduction of public debt has
the advantage of reducing the time period during which the economy experiences
output and employment losses. However, a larger effort may be required in the
beginning of the fiscal consolidation given that the same adjustment has to be
performed in a shorter time. For the policy making purposes, the government can
strike the right balance between these two effects by varying (i) the speed of debt
adjustment, ρb, and (ii) its own “aggressiveness” towards the debt adjustment, γ1.
As a way to investigate this issue, Panels (a) of Figure 3.8–3.9 report the transition
dynamics of fiscal instruments, output and employment as the speed of the debt
adjustment is varied, with a half–life ranging from 4 to 27 years. This adjustment
is controlled by changing ρb in the range 0.6 to 0.99 –the benchmark case setting
being ρb = 0.875. Panels (b) of Figure 3.8–3.9 illustrate the transitional paths
when the initial amplitude of the debt adjustment is varied. This is achieved by
controlling the degree of “aggressiveness” of the fiscal authority to debt reduction,
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γ1, which is varied from 0.2 to 0.99 – with the benchmark case set at 0.8.
The main implications of varying the speed of the adjustment can be gathered
from Figure 3.8. A faster fiscal consolidation (lower ρb) requires that larger tax
revenues be raised upfront (see middle panel of Panel (a) of Figure 3.8), and leads
to a larger and shorter increase in the labor tax rate (see right panel of Figure
3.8). For instance, the peak in the evolution of the labor tax rate in the benchmark
experiment occurs 3.5 years after the beginning of the consolidation and amounts
to a tax rate of 29.2% (25% in the initial steady state). When the half life of the
debt ratio adjustment is shortened to 4.2 years (ρb = 0.6), this peak is reached
after 1.5 year with a labor tax of 31%. Very similar results are obtained when,
instead, the government increases the magnitude of the initial debt reduction. This
is achieved by increasing its own aggressiveness towards debt reduction, γ1. In the
benchmark experiment, γ1 = 0.8, the labor tax rate amounts to 29.14% of income
at the peak of the tax rate adjustment, which occurs 3.75 years after the beginning
of fiscal consolidation. When the government adopts a more aggressive approach
to debt reduction, γ1 = 0.99, this peak is reached in 3.25 years in the labor tax of
29.92%. In that context, the household needs to be given extra compensation in the
wage bargaining process, and the wage increases more relative to the benchmark
experiment. Firms post relatively less vacancies and the employment loss is larger
(see right panel of Figure 3.9). Likewise, and for similar reasons, the output loss is
also larger.
Most of the adjustment being accomplished over a shorter period of time, the
increase in the tax rate is shorter–lived. Accordingly the employment loss is less
persistent. These results are reflected in Table 3.6 which reports the cumulative
output and employment losses associated with these experiments. The table clearly
indicates that faster debt reduction is associated with larger employment losses in
the short run (1.54 percentage point for the case ρb = 0.6 versus 0.18 percentage
point in the benchmark), but these employment losses tend to recede quicker.
For instance, the cumulative employment loss canceled out after 45 years in the
benchmark experiment, 43 years in the fast adjustment case. Interestingly, while
the tax adjustment is much quicker in the ρb = 0.6 case compared to the benchmark,
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Figure 3.8: Varying the Speed and “Aggressiveness” of Debt Adjustment (I)
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Figure 3.9: Varying the Speed and “Aggressiveness” of Debt Adjustment (II)
(a) Varying the Speed of Debt Adjustment
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this decrease in persistence does not translate to employment, nor to output. The
reason for this is found in the matching process which generates a lot of persistence
in the model.
As the speed of debt adjustment is reduced –say ρb = 0.99– the reverse
mechanisms are at play. However, interestingly, a slower fiscal consolidation
is accompanied by an increase in debt in the short run. This is due to the fact
that the government can spread the debt adjustment over a longer period, and
in that way can achieve some form of tax smoothing. The tax increases by much
less in the transition (0.26 at the peak), and can even be lowered in the short run.
This initial fall in the tax rate puts downward pressure on the wage, which in turn
leads the firms to post more vacancies and hire more employees. Hence, in the
short run, employment losses turn into employment gains, and fiscal consolidation
actually generates mild employment and output gains. These gains are however
short lasting and turn into employment losses after 7 years and persist longer 56
additional years.
Table 3.6: Cumulative losses: Varying Speed
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
ρb = 0.600 1.04 4.21 11.98 32.53 58.18 12.53 20.45
ρb = 0.750 0.55 2.62 8.98 29.65 58.53 13.52 20.30
ρb = 0.875 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
ρb = 0.990 -0.24 -0.70 -1.47 -2.33 13.07 18.93 1.30
Employment
ρb = 0.500 1.54 6.15 16.81 39.27 40.66 -12.68 –
ρb = 0.750 0.82 3.87 12.81 36.82 42.08 -11.09 –
ρb = 0.875 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
ρb = 0.990 -0.35 -1.02 -1.98 -1.95 18.36 15.13 –
Similar results hold if the government instead decides to increase its aggres-
siveness to fiscal consolidation, γ1. As it is evident from the results presented in
Table 3.7, the more aggressive the government is about its fiscal consolidation plan,
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the larger are the losses in the short-run (for γ1 = 0.2 we have employment gains
of 0.27% while for the benchmark case, γ1 = 0.8, there are employment losses of
0.18%). But these employment losses tend to disappear more quickly. With a
lower extent of aggressiveness on the part of the government, γ1 = 0.2, it takes 36.5
years for the cumulative employment losses to be canceled out compared to the
benchmark experiment where it takes only 17.25 years.
Table 3.7: Cumulative losses: Varying Fiscal “Aggressiveness”
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
γ1 = 0.2 -0.18 -0.47 -0.67 0.63 14.40 15.64 2.56
γ1 = 0.5 -0.04 0.19 1.72 11.28 45.57 13.18 11.44
γ1 = 0.8 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
γ1 = 0.99 0.22 1.34 5.83 26.17 59.36 13.83 20.06
Employment
γ1 = 0.2 -0.27 -0.67 -0.83 1.69 16.46 11.34 –
γ1 = 0.5 -0.05 0.32 2.73 15.99 40.61 -3.58 –
γ1 = 0.8 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
γ1 = 0.99 0.33 2.02 8.56 33.95 43.63 -10.21 –
These transitional paths suggests that steady but gradual consolidation may
be the strategy that has the lowest cost in terms of lost output and employment.
Cutting too much debt today could throw the economy into a deep recession.
Cutting it slowly creates a much milder recession, but a more persistent one.
This is reminiscent of the gradualist versus “cold turkey” approaches described by
Sargent (1983). On the one hand, a gradualist approach yields smaller losses with
longer persistence. On the other hand, a “cold turkey” approach is associated with
larger losses in the short–run but with shorter duration. Thus, the policymakers
face a choice between two different approaches when deciding the policy which is
best suited for its fiscal consolidation plan, each with its own tradeoffs.
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3.5.4 The size of debt adjustment
The intertemporal tradeoffs that describe the fiscal consolidation –short–run
employment (output) losses versus long–run gains– would be also present when the
size of debt adjustment is varied.
Obviously, the larger reduction in the public debt requires a greater effort by
the fiscal authority and is more costly in terms of employment (output) losses, but
likewise, the long–run gains are also larger. However, one question remains open:
are output and employment losses proportional to the size of the fiscal adjustment?
Figures 3.10–3.11 explore the (dis)proportional effect of fiscal consolidation by
reporting the transitional paths of fiscal instruments, employment and output as the
size of debt adjustment, b?t , is varied in the range of 20% to 30% – the benchmark
case involves 25% debt adjustment. As expected, larger fiscal consolidations require
larger adjustment in the tax revenues and the labor tax rate. For instance moving
from a 20 to a 30% fiscal consolidation implies that the tax rate varies from 28
to 30% at the peak of its adjustment dynamics. Interestingly, the peaks reached
in each experiment are concomitant. However, given that the size of the tax rate
adjustment vary with the size of the debt reduction, the dynamics of debt are
different. For instance, a 20% reduction has a half life of 8 years, whereas a 30%
consolidation has a half life of 5 years. In other words, the dynamics are sensitive
to the size of the debt reduction. To investigate the (dis)proportional effects of the
Figure 3.10: Varying the Size of Debt Adjustment (I)
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size of the debt adjustment we plot in Panel (a) of Figure 3.11 the employment and
output losses corresponding to 20, 25 and 30% fiscal consolidations. A government
Figure 3.11: Varying the Size of Debt Adjustment (II)
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(b) Output and Employment Ratios
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willing to implement 20% debt reduction experiences employment and output losses
of 1.44% and 1.1%, respectively, at the time of the peak response, in 3.5 years. A
government willing to implement our benchmark debt reduction of 25% would then
have to bear an additional employment loss of 0.45% (and an additional output loss
of 0.34%). But yet an extra 5% increase in desired debt reduction would amount
to an additional 0.49% in employment losses (and an additional 0.38% for output
losses). So as expected from previous results, the size of employment (output)
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losses is positively related to the amplitude of the fiscal consolidation. Panel (b) of
the figure reports the ratio of employment (output) losses corresponding to 20%
and 25% debt reduction, and 25% and 30% debt reduction. This figure clearly
shows that employment losses increase proportionally with the level of the debt
reduction. Fiscal consolidation does not involve strong nonlinear effects.14
These results are also reflected in Table 3.8 which reports the cumulative output
and employment losses associated with these experiments. The table clearly points
to the existence of larger employment and output losses as we increase the desired
debt reduction from 20% to 25% and then to 30%. In the short-run increasing
debt reduction from 20% to 25% translates into 0.03% larger employment losses,
but increasing a desired debt reduction for another 5% amounts to an additional
0.04% employment losses –the net difference of 0.01%. These tiny differences are
explained by the way tax rate affects the wage in a nonlinear fashion.
Table 3.8: Cumulative losses: Varying Size
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
20% 0.10 0.70 3.28 15.99 43.92 9.72 13.02
25% 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
30% 0.14 1.08 5.25 26.34 68.86 16.71 22.25
Employment
20% 0.15 1.07 4.91 21.35 34.60 -7.36 –
25% 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
30% 0.22 1.65 7.84 34.94 52.95 -10.15 –
14A bit of qualification is in order. Employment and output losses are linearly related with
the size of the fiscal consolidation. In that sense the process does not display any nonlinearities.
However, while the dynamics of employment and output losses are proportional, those of debt are
not. The differential adjustment of debt (and hence some form of nonlinearities) actually ensures
the linearity in losses.
226 CHAPTER 3. FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND EMPLOYMENT LOSS
3.5.5 Endogenous government spending rule
So far, government spendings have been held constant over time, gt = g ∀ t =
0, . . . ,∞.15 As our previous results indicated, a fiscal consolidation plunges the
economy into a recession. The government may then use government spending
as an “automatic stabilizer” (Blanchard (1984)) to dampen the adverse effects of
debt reduction. A new tradeoff then emerges: fiscal consolidation versus output
stabilization. The government may use government spendings to fight the recession,
but by doing so it hinders the fiscal consolidation process. To investigate this
tradeoff, this section considers the case in which government expenditures follow a
simple rule
log(gt) = ρg log(gt−1) + (1− ρg) log(g¯) + rg log
(
y
y¯
)
(3.20)
where ρg ∈ (0, 1) and rg < 0. The form of this rule stipulates that, in an attempt
to influence the dynamics of output, the government raises public expenditures
whenever output falls below its steady state level. Hereafter, I set ρg = 0.5 and
rg = −0.5.
Figures 3.8–3.13 compare the transitional paths of fiscal instruments, output and
employment with exogenous government spendings (dashed line) —the benchmark
experiment described in the previous sections— and those obtained when the
government uses an active policy rule (plain line). As explained previously, the
fiscal consolidation process triggers a recession. A government that has a concern
for output stabilization then sees output falling below its steady state level and,
according to rule (3.20), expands its expenditures. The financing of this policy
cannot be achieved by issuing government bonds —this would obviously go against
the fiscal consolidation— and calls for an increase in taxes. For instance, at the
peak of its adjustment path, the labor tax rate reaches 31.5% compared to the 29%
with constant government spending. This has two main consequences. First, the
larger tax income collection accelerates the debt reduction process. Second, and
more importantly, higher taxes magnify employment (output) losses. For instance,
under constant government spendings, the maximal employment (resp. output)
15The government spending is set at its steady state value of g = 0.2y.
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Figure 3.12: Varying Government Spending Rule (I)
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loss was 1.8 percentage points (resp. 1.3%), under the active policy the maximal
employment (resp. output) loss is 2.9 percentage points (resp. 2.2%)— a 60%
increase. In other words, by pursuing the active policy, the government actually
exaggerates the recession. Note however, that again the persistence/magnitude
tradeoff occurs, i.e. while the recession is deeper it is shorter lasting, as the debt
reduction is faster.
Figure 3.13: Varying Government Spending Rule (II)
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These findings are also confirmed by results in Table 3.9 which reports the
cumulative output and employment losses for this experiment. It is apparent that
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in the short-run employment (and output) losses are more than twice as large than
when the government spending follows an exogenous process. For example, the
employment losses are 0.68% compared to 0.18% in the baseline experiment (the
output losses are 0.45% relative to 0.12% in the baseline case).
Table 3.9: Cumulative losses: Endogenous Government Responses
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.45 2.29 8.81 34.57 69.43 26.51 30.70
Employment 0.68 3.42 12.78 43.55 46.85 -5.22 –
The results imply that the government pushes the economy into a deeper
recession as it tries to pursue two conflicting goals: (i) debt reduction and (ii)
output stabilization. Thus, the government needs to consider carefully the tradeoff
between the two goals and its use of “automatic stabilizers”.
3.5.6 Announced Fiscal Consolidations
The preceding sections considered scenarios where the government started the fiscal
consolidation plan as soon as it announces it. This section investigates the case
where the government announces in period t that it will implement a debt reduction
policy starting in t+ 4.16 In such a situation, agent’s expectations play a key role
and may affect the adjustment path.
From a technical point of view, announcement amounts to introduce a shock
that is revealed to the agents 4 periods in advance in the debt target law of motion
as
b?t = ρbb?t−1 + (1− ρb)
(
log
(
b
y
)
+ εbt−4
)
(3.21)
where, as previously, b/y denotes the initial steady state value of the debt/output
ratio and {εbt}∞t=−4 is an exogenous sequence that will control for the fiscal
consolidation. ρb controls for the speed of fiscal consolidation adjustment.
16Note that full commitment and time consistency of the announcement will be assumed
throughout. Departure from these assumptions is left for future research.
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At the time the government makes the announcement, and for the next 4
periods, the target debt ratio remains unchanged —100% of GDP– and only starts
adjusting in t + 4. The adjustment dynamics that follow can then be better
understood by splitting the adjustment into two sub–periods. The first one starts
at the time of the announcement and ends with the implementation of the fiscal
consolidation, and captures the mere effect of the announcement. During this
period only announcement effects are at play. The second one starts with the
effective implementation of the fiscal consolidation.
During the first sub–period, agents, who have perfect foresight, correctly expect
that, as of period t + 4, the target debt ratio will start converging to its new
long-run level, 75%. Agents then expect higher future tax rates (see middle and
right panels of Figure 3.14) and therefore that they will suffer a negative wealth
effect in the future. The consumption smoothing behavior of the household makes
her (i) cut on her consumption at the time of the announcement, and (ii) start
accumulating more wealth, as a way to cushion themselves from higher taxes. In
the current model, the agent has two ways to accumulate wealth: capital and
bonds. Investment increases in the short-run as a way to accumulate capital. But,
more interestingly for the purpose of this paper, the household also purchases
government bonds. As shown in the left panel of Figure 3.14 public debt actually
increases during that period. This leads to actual debt building up, which relaxes
the government budget constraint. This explains why, in the few periods that follow
the announcement, tax revenues and the labor tax rate fall (see middle and right
panels of Figure 3.14). In other words, the announcement of the plan allows the
government to substitutes tax revenue for debt, therefore mitigating the negative
wealth effect on the agents. As already explained, the fall in the labor tax rate
leads to a decrease in the wage which increases the marginal value of employment
for the firm, which then posts more vacancies. On the one hand, a firm’s prospect
of filling a vacancy falls as it faces more competition from other firms in the labor
market and as the probability of filling a vacancy, qt falls (congestion externality).
On the other hand, households find it, at first, easier to find a job as the probability
of finding a job, st increases (positive trade externality). This, therefore, initially
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Figure 3.14: Expected Future Debt Adjustment (I)
0 50 100
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Quarters
%
 
debt/GDP
0 50 100
−5
0
5
10
15
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Tax revenue
0 50 100
22
24
26
28
30
Quarters
%
Labor tax rate
Immediate debt adjustment (Benchmark) , Expected future debt adjustment
increases employment. The peak employment gain is reached in the third quarter
and it amounts to 0.46%. In other words, the mere announcement of the fiscal
consolidation ameliorates labor market conditions in the very short-run.
After 4 periods, the actual debt reduction begins and the adjustment dynamics
enter in the second sub-period, during which the mechanisms at work are identical
to those detailed in Section 3.4. The results indicate that the whole dynamics is
essentially postponed by 4 quarters. For example, the peak in the evolution of
the labor tax rate occurs 4 years after the fiscal consolidation commences, and 4
quarters later than in the baseline experiment, and amounts to 29.2% (exactly the
same as in the baseline experiment). Employment reaches the trough after 4 years
(once again 4 quarters later than in the baseline experiment) but the loss is slightly
larger than in the baseline experiment and it amounts to 1.95% in deviations from
the steady state (compared to just 1.9% in the baseline experiment). The output
losses are also slightly higher than in the baseline case and amount to 1.49% (1.48%
in baseline case).
Given the preceding discussion, it comes as no surprise that the government’s
announcement of its future fiscal consolidation plans is accompanied, in the short-
run, by employment (and output) gains. For instance, there is an employment
cumulative gain of 1.43% (and an output cumulative gain of 1.02%) recorded (see
Table 3.10). These initial gains will be translated into lower overall cumulative
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Figure 3.15: Expected Future Debt Adjustment (II)
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losses than under the baseline scenario. For example, the discounted cumulative
losses of output are equal to 15.6%, which amounts to a 1.8% decrease relative to
the baseline case. This reduction is due to the prevailing negative wealth effect in
the first sub-period that creates an economic boom which is then translated into
the employment (and output) gains in the short-run and relatively lower losses in
the future.
Table 3.10: Cumulative losses: Future Anticipated Debt Reduction
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output -0.33 -1.02 -0.51 13.41 55.12 13.68 15.63
Employment -0.48 -1.43 -0.18 20.31 45.97 -6.08 –
These transitional paths suggest that a pre-announced fiscal consolidation
might generate lower costs in terms of employment (and output). This is obviously
conditional on the maintained assumption that the government fully commits to
implement the plan.
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3.6 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The preceding sections have investigated the adjustment dynamics to a fiscal
consolidation episode in a real economy. The emphasis was put on the real aspects
of such events, ignoring the potential nominal dimension of public debt reduction.
However, the interplay between fiscal and monetary policy ought to have important
consequences for the macroeconomy as monetary policy —by affecting the nominal
interest— may hinder or ease fiscal consolidation. This section investigates this
issue.
For monetary policy to matter, the model is amended in three ways. First,
two types of firms are introduced in the economy. Final goods retailers sell a
homogeneous good, which is an aggregate bundle of a set of intermediate goods
that are produced by intermediate goods producers. Because each and every good
is fully differentiated, the intermediate goods producers have monopoly power.
They are therefore price setters. Second, these price setters face nominal rigidities
in the form of price adjustment costs.17 Finally, the central bank pursues an active
monetary policy. Before going to the results, we describe how the model was
changed by introducing the non neutral nominal dimension in the model.
3.6.1 Towards a Nominal Model
Final Goods-Producing Firms
There exists a representative final good producer that bundles a continuum of
intermediate goods yt(j), j ∈ (0, 1), each purchased at price Pt(j) on an imperfectly
competitive market. This final retailer produces the homogenous good yt that can
be either consumed or invested using the technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.22)
17Our results would be the same should a Calvo price setting mechanism be considered instead.
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where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The
demand for each good j, as obtained by profit maximization, is then given by
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
yt (3.23)
where Pt is the aggregate price level. Competition in the market for the final good
drives the representative firm’s profit to zero. The zero-profit condition, along with
Equation (3.23), determines Pt as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)1−εdj
)1/(1−ε)
(3.24)
Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers that each produce a specific
intermediate good j ∈ (0, 1) by means of capital and labor according to the constant
return technology described in Equation (3.10). Given the imperfect substitutability
between intermediate goods, each good j ∈ (0, 1) is demanded in positive quantity
and each firm has local monopoly power. Thus, each intermediate good producer
sets the price Pt(j) for its output. However, changing prices entails a convex cost
(in terms of the final good)18 a` la Rotemberg (1982), which takes the form
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt (3.25)
where φ ∈ R+ controls for the size of these costs, and is a measure of the degree
of price stickiness. In particular, φ = 0 corresponds to the flexible price economy,
φ = +∞ implies the existence of constant prices. Given that the steady state
inflation level is zero (pi = 1), it is clear from Equation (3.25) that the cost is nil in
the long-run. Firm j set its price so as to maximize its intertemporal profits
max
∞∑
t=0
Φt,t+1
(
Pt(j)
Pt
yt(j)−Ψt(j)yt(j)− φ2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt
)
(3.26)
18This implies that the resource constraint of the economy must be changed to
yt = ct + it + avt +
φ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
yt
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subject to the demand it faces (Equation (3.23)). Φt,t+1 is the appropriate discount
factor of the firm defined in Section 3.2.3, Ψt(j) is the real marginal cost of the firm.
In a symmetric equilibrium, The price setting equation gives rise to a standard
Phillips curve
(1− ε)yt + εΨtyt−pitφ (pit − 1) yt +β 1 + τ
c
t
1 + τ ct+1
ct
ct+1
φpit+1 (pit+1 − 1) yt+1 = 0 (3.27)
where pit = Pt/Pt−1. The real marginal cost is given by the gap between the rental
rate of capital and the marginal product of capital
zt = Ψtα
yt(j)
kt(j)
(3.28)
Finally, the monopoly power of each firm affect its vacancy posting policy as
a
qt
= β ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(
Ψt+1(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
)
(3.29)
Monetary Authority
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy by adjusting short-term nominal
interest rate Rt in response to deviations of inflation pit from its steady–state value
and changes in the output gap. The monetary policy is assumed to be described
by the simple Taylor-type interest rate rule
Rt = ρrRt−1 + (1− ρr)
(
R + κy log
(
yt
y
)
+ κpi log
(
pit
pi
))
(3.30)
where ρr ∈ [0, 1], κy ∈ R+ and κpi > 1.
3.6.2 Results
In this section, we discuss the adjustment dynamics to a fiscal consolidation episode
in a nominal economy. However, before preceding to the results, we outline first
the relevant parametrization that remains outstanding. In particular, the elasticity
of substitution between differentiated goods, ε, is set at 6 implying a steady state
markup rate of 20%. The price adjustment cost parameter, φ, is set to 58.19 Given
19The choice of φ = 58 is dictated by the fact that it yields the same inflation persistence as a
Calvo price setting model with an average duration of price contracts of 3 quarters.
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its importance, we will conduct later the sensitivity analysis around its value. In a
monetary rule, the parameter governing the reaction of the interest rate to output,
κy, is set to 0.1, and the response to inflation, κpi, is set to 1.5. The persistence
parameter in the monetary policy rule, ρr, is fixed at 0.8.
The Figure 3.16–3.17 compare the transitional paths of fiscal instruments,
output and employment for a flexible price (dashed line)–the benchmark experiment
described in the previous section– and sticky price (solid line) setups. As already
explained, the commencement of fiscal consolidation brings about a negative
wealth effect, which plunges the economy in a recession. The concern for output
stabilization instructs the central bank to lower the interest rate, which pushes
both consumption and investment upward and therefore creates some inflation.
But, the concern for inflation makes the central bank increase the interest rate to
tame the increase in prices. The inflation starts to raise in the second quarter and
reaches a plateau at 0.44%, 3.25 years after fiscal consolidation commencement,
and remains at that level for the following 7 quarters, before it starts to fall.
The raising inflation requires (i) that government raises higher tax revenue to
achieve its debt target, and (ii) the central bank to raise nominal interest rates
to stabilize prices. The peak in the evolution of labor tax takes place 3.5 years
after the fiscal consolidation commences and reaches the value of 29.87% (29.17%
in the benchmark case). The long-run tax rate is reduced to 23.5% while in the
benchmark case it is 23.8%. Higher labor tax rate and nominal interest rate induce
“crowding out” effects on household consumption and investment (as the cost of
capital rises). In turn, the employment (and output) losses are larger than in
the real benchmark model. The peak in the evolution of output losses occurs at
4.5 years and it amounts to 1.7 percent deviations – 0.22% higher than in the
benchmark case. The unemployment reaches its trough earlier at 3.5 years and it
is 2.2% (compared to 1.89% in the benchmark case).
These findings are confirmed by results in Table 3.11, which shows that the
cumulative employment (and output) losses are larger than under the benchmark
case. The discounted output losses are 21.05% – 3.68% higher than in the benchmark
case. Likewise, the employment losses are higher across all of the horizons. For
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Figure 3.16: Fiscal Consolidation: Sticky Prices (I)
0 50 100
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Quarters
%
 
debt/GDP
0 50 100
−5
0
5
10
15
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Tax revenue
0 50 100
22
24
26
28
30
Quarters
%
Labor tax rate
flexible prices sticky prices
Figure 3.17: Evolution of Output and Employment (II)
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example, at 5 years 31.75% – 3.89% higher than in the benchmark case. The results
Table 3.11: Cumulative losses: Sticky Prices
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.12 0.93 4.63 23.65 66.26 16.86 21.05
Employment 0.19 1.44 7.01 31.75 51.32 -9.07 –
indicate that the price stickiness does play a role in the fiscal adjustment process,
which comes at higher output and employment losses. The interplay between fiscal
and monetary policy is relevant for the policy consideration as there is a direct
trade-off between the fiscal consolidation and price stabilization.
3.6.3 Sensitivity analysis
The preceding results have shown that the interplay between fiscal and monetary
policy can hinder fiscal consolidation, and that the output and employment costs
of reducing public debt can be sizable in the short to medium run. This section
assesses the robustness of the previous findings to alternative settings for the
consolidation policy. In particular, the sensitivity to an alternative choice of fiscal
instruments (namely, consumption tax), the degree of price rigidity, and the different
degree of monetary authority responsiveness to output and price stabilization are
investigated.
Consumption tax
The preceding section investigated the implications for employment and output of
a reduction in nominal debt accommodated by adjusting labor tax rate. In this
section, fiscal consolidation is obtaned through adjustments in the consumption
tax instead. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 report the transitional path of employment,
output and fiscal instruments obtained in this case. As the predominant interest of
this section is to explore the nominal aspect of fiscal consolidation, we compare an
economy with sticky prices (plain line) to an economy with flexible prices (dashed
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line) when, in both cases, the fiscal adjustment is performed by changes in the
consumption tax rate. The right panel of Figure 3.18 shows, to achieve the same
debt transition path, government needs to follow the identical tax revenue path by
adjusting its consumption tax. The peak in the evolution of consumption tax rate,
in the nominal economy, occurs at 3.5 years after the fiscal consolidation begins
–same as in the real economy– and it amounts to 9.98% –a marginally smaller
adjustment than for a real economy, 10.3%.
Figure 3.18: Fiscal Consolidation: Sticky Prices (I)
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Figure 3.18 indicates that employment (and output) losses are smaller in the
nominal economy. The employment losses reach its peak after 3.5 years and are
1.1% – compared to 1.28% in the real economy. The output reaches its trough after
4.5 years and amount to 0.91% – this is smaller than for a case of flexible prices,
which is 1.01%.
These findings are further confirmed by the results shown in Table 3.12 where
adjusting the consumption tax produces than it was the case in real economy. For
example, the employment cumulative losses in two years are 4.16% – while we
previously had it 4.45%, in the real economy.
These results suggest that, when the consumption tax is an instrument of choice,
the nominal dimension of fiscal austerity cannot be ignored, but it is, nevertheless,
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Figure 3.19: Evolution of Output and Employment (II)
0 5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Output
0 5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Employment
flexible prices sticky prices
Table 3.12: Cumulative losses: Consumption Tax Adjustment Under Sticky Prices
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.08 0.60 2.77 13.29 35.32 5.67 9.50
Employment 0.13 0.92 4.16 17.75 26.56 -8.96 –
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less prominent than for the labor tax. Thus, it is possible for a government to
minimize the hindering effects of monetary policy on its fiscal consolidation effort
by adjusting consumption tax.
The degree of price rigidity
In this section we investigate how the degree of nominal rigidities affects the fiscal
consolidation. Figure 3.20 – 3.21 show the transitional paths of fiscal instruments,
output and employment as the degree of price rigidity, φ, varies in the range from
0 to 200 –the benchmark experiment is set at φ = 58.20 From the right panel
of Figure 3.20 we see that the major difference in the labor tax, across different
degrees of price rigidity, is in the first quarter. The larger the degree of nominal
sluggishness the larger the initial increase in the tax, as the inflation tax cannot be
used to generate more tax revenues. Once inflation adjusts further, the effect of
price rigidity on the response of labor tax vanishes. On one hand, for a very low
price rigidity, φ = 0, the initial response of labor tax is a fall from its steady state
level – from 25% to 24.6% – before it starts to increase. On the other hand, for a
very high degrees of price rigidities, φ = 200, the labor tax sharply increases from
its steady state level – from 25% to 29.2% – but from the second quarter the labor
tax adjustment is about the same as for other cases. The peak responses in the
evolution of labor tax occurs after 3.5 years following the fiscal austerity and it
is only slightly higher for flexible prices – 29.9% as opposed to 29.4% for highly
sticky prices.
Figure 3.21 illustrates that, for flexible prices, φ = 0, the employment (and
output) losses are smaller in the first few quarters but consequently are more
profound than for the sticky prices. The results indicate that the employment and
output are both falling in the degree of price rigidity, but those deviations are
smaller for a higher degrees of price rigidities.
As we have previously seen for a real economy, when prices are able to fully
adjust, the intertemporal substitution effect will push inflation up straight away
20Note that the case φ = 0 does not exactly correspond to our benchmark economy as the
benchmark economy did not feature imperfect competition.
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Figure 3.20: Fiscal Consolidation: Sticky Prices (I)
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Figure 3.21: Evolution of Output and Employment: Sticky Prices (II)
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in the first quarter following the fiscal consolidation. The central bank then
reacts to stabilize prices by increasing the nominal interest rate. The consumption
drops sharply in the first quarter and investment at first increases in the attempt
by households to smooth their future consumption. This produces profound
employment and output losses. Contrary, when prices are slow to adjust the
response of the households will be muted, thus, producing smaller employment and
output losses.
Table 3.13: Cumulative losses: Varying Price Stickiness
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
φ = 0 -0.12 0.27 3.50 22.45 65.21 15.78 20.00
φ = 58 0.24 1.33 5.22 21.27 50.79 0.31 8.64
φ = 200 0.22 1.27 4.84 17.93 32.99 -20.01 -6.10
Employment
φ = 0 -0.12 0.78 6.39 32.14 51.98 -8.38 –
φ = 58 0.36 1.97 7.62 29.40 45.92 -15.14 –
φ = 200 0.32 1.89 7.15 25.76 35.91 -26.07 –
These results are confirmed by the cumulative employment and output losses
presented in Table 3.13. For example, the discounted cumulative output losses are
highest for flexible prices and in fact turn into cumulative gains for very high degree
of price rigidities – 20% employment losses for φ = 0 versus 6.1% employment
gains for φ = 200. After 5 years following the beginning of debt reduction, there
is negative relationship between the employment losses and the degree of price
rigidity. For example, for fully flexible prices the employment loss is about 32%
but this is reduced down to about 26% for high degree of price rigidity, φ = 200.
These results indicate that when prices are flexible the monetary policy is non
neutral and the central bank in its effort to stabilize prices can significantly hinder
the fiscal consolidation efforts.
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The conduct of monetary policy
This section explores if the central bank, through its concern for inflation and
output fluctuations, affects the process of fiscal consolidation. Figure 3.22 shows
the evolution of output and employment as we vary the degree of reactiveness by
central bank to inflation, κpi, and output fluctuations, κy.
The degree of responsiveness to output fluctuations, κy, varies in the range
from 0 to 0.25 –the benchmark experiment is set at κy = 0.1. Naturally, greater
emphasis on output stabilization is expected to bring about smaller losses in output
and employment. This is confirmed by results shown in Panel (a) of Figure 3.22
where an increase in the reaction of monetary authority to the output fluctuations
leads to smaller output and employment losses. Under this policy, the inflation
increases and subsequently prompts the central bank to increase nominal interest
rate. Higher nominal interest rate makes the public debt more expensive and
instigates the households to decrease its debt holdings. Subsequently, this effect
aids the whole debt reduction. Consequently, the fiscal revenue required to retire
the public debt will not be as high as previously and, thus, the labor tax rate
adjustment is lower. For example, with κy = 0 the peak in the evolution of tax
rate is 30.25% while with κy = 0.25 it is 29.4% (after 3.5 years following the
commencement of fiscal consolidation).
To explore the effect of price stabilization on the fiscal consolidation, the
degree of responsiveness to output fluctuations, κpi, is varied in the range from
1.01 to 2.5 –the benchmark experiment is set at κpi = 1.5– and to facilitate the
exposition a policy rule with κy = 0 is used. Naturally, reaction by central bank to
subdue inflation by increasing nominal interest rates will suppress the output and
employment further. This is affirmed by Panel (b) of Figure 3.22 which depicts the
evolution of employment and output as a function of the reaction to inflation, κpi.
An increased emphasis on price stability leads to higher output and employment
losses. This points to the existence of another trade-off between price stabilization
and fiscal consolidation effort.
The cumulative output losses as presented in Table 3.14 similarly point out that
greater emphasis on the output stabilization leads to lower output and employment
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Figure 3.22: Evolution of Output and Employment: Varying κpi and κy
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(b) Reaction to Inflation (κpi)
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losses in the short– and medium–run. For example, for the higher reactiveness by
central bank to output fluctuations, κy = 0.25, after 1 years following the beginning
of fiscal consolidation we have 0.5% loss in output –0.93% in the benchmark
experiment – and 0.8% in employment – 1.44% in the benchmark experiment.
Table 3.14: Cumulative losses: Varying Response to Output
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
κy = 0 0.22 1.30 5.62 26.50 72.31 22.91 26.15
κy = 0.1 0.12 0.93 4.63 23.65 66.26 16.86 21.05
κy = 0.25 0.01 0.50 3.45 20.19 58.91 9.60 14.90
Employment
κy = 0 0.34 1.99 8.40 35.21 55.98 -4.70 –
κy = 0.1 0.19 1.44 7.01 31.75 51.32 -9.07 –
κy = 0.25 0.02 0.80 5.33 27.52 45.58 -14.35 –
Table 3.15: Cumulative losses: Varying Response to Inflation
Horizon 1 Quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
κpi = 1.01 0.09 0.83 4.39 23.05 64.74 15.22 19.76
κpi = 1.5 0.22 1.30 5.62 26.50 72.31 22.91 26.15
κpi = 2.5 0.19 1.20 5.35 25.75 70.50 20.83 24.55
Employment
κpi = 1.01 0.15 1.30 6.67 31.02 50.01 -10.35 –
κpi = 1.5 0.34 1.99 8.40 35.21 55.98 -4.70 –
κpi = 2.5 0.30 1.83 8.02 34.29 54.44 -6.36 –
The results indicate that the interplay between fiscal and monetary policies
is non neutral. One one hand, the central bank’s effort to stabilize the output
fluctuations can ease the recession brought by fiscal consolidation but it prolongs
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the whole process of the debt reduction. On the other hand, the price stabilization
efforts hinder the public debt reduction process and, thus, leads to greater output
and employment losses.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper offers a quantitative evaluation of employment (and output) losses
generated during the fiscal consolidation episodes. It does this in the context
of a textbook neoclassical growth model featuring —search and matching a´ la
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer and Rogerson (2010)— frictions on
the labor market. Sovereign debt reduction is achieved by imposing fiscal authority,
either by tax hikes or government expenditures cuts, which plunges the economy in
a persistent recession and therefore generates output and employment losses. In the
baseline experiment —a targeted 25% debt reduction— unemployment increases
by about 50%, starting from 5.5% and reaching 7.3% after 3.35 years. These
employment losses are persistent and last on average 12 years. Furthermore, at
the trough of the recession (4.5 years following the beginning of the adjustment),
output is 1.5% below its initial steady state.
These losses are found to be especially acute during times of recession as there
are competing goals placed on the labor tax adjustment by (i) fiscal consolidation
and (ii) output stabilization. The sensitivity analysis indicates further that sizable
and speedier debt adjustments are associated with bigger employment and output
losses. The front–loading of debt reduction brings bigger initial adjustment which
magnifies the employment loss in the short–run. However, economy recovers
quicker compared to gradualist approach. A slower adjustment allows for smooth
debt adjustment that limits the initial employment loss, but in that case it lasts
longer and the economy, thus, suffers longer. Likewise, the more determined fiscal
authority is to front–load its debt, the bigger are employment and output losses,
but the painful adjustment period is shorter. These findings point to the existence
of an intertemporal trade–off between short–run losses from fiscal consolidation
and long–run gains from reduced debt.
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Moreover, the paper shows that, as already found in the econometric literature
(see e.g. Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2014)), the exact details of the consolidation
plan do matter; government spending cut versus tax hikes, the type of tax instrument
used to achieve fiscal adjustment, and the timing of the plan. Finally, monetary
policy interplays with fiscal policy. The central bank, by adjusting the nominal
interest rate, affects the value of debt used by households to transfer wealth from
one period to the next. Higher nominal interest rate increases the value of debt,
which then reduces its demand by households. This aids the whole debt reduction
process and, thus, speeding up the fiscal consolidation in the short–run.
The results of this paper suggest that debt reduction should be accompanied
with reforms on the labor market to tame down labor market frictions. This is left
for future research.
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—APPENDIX—
3.A Model
3.A.1 Household
The household has preferences over consumption and leisure described by the
following intertemporal utility function
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log ct − ϑ n
1+ν
t
1 + ν
)
(3.A.1)
subject to the budget constraint, the law motion of capital and the law motion of
employment, respectively,
(1 + τ ct )ct + it + bt =rt−1bt−1 + (1− τwt )wtnt + (1− τ kt )ztkt + Πt + Tt (3.A.2)
kt+1 =
1− ϕ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2 it + (1− δ)kt (3.A.3)
The optimality conditions are given as
λt =
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
(3.A.4)
λt =βλt+1rt (3.A.5)
ζt =β
(
λt+1(1− τ kt+1)zt+1 + ζt+1(1− δ)
)
(3.A.6)
λt =ζt
1− ϕ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
− ϕ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)
it
it−1

+ βζt+1ϕ
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2
(3.A.7)
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where λt and ζt are the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to the budget
constraint and the capital equation. This system rewrites as The household’s
optimal behavior is then characterized by the set of Euler conditions
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
= β rt
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(3.A.8)
qit = β
ct(1 + τ ct )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(zt+1(1− τ kt+1) + qit+1(1− δ)) (3.A.9)
where qit = ζt/λt denotes the marginal Tobin’s Q.
3.A.2 Firm
The firm decides its production and vacancy posting plans by maximizing its
intertemporal discounted profit subject to the law of motion of employment
max
∞∑
t=0
Ψt,0
(
Atk
α
t (j)nt(j)1−α − ztkt(j)− wtnt(j)− avt(j)
)
(3.A.10)
subject to
nt+1(j) = qtvt(j) + (1− ψ)nt (3.A.11)
Ψt,0 denotes the discount factor of the firm between periods 0 and t, given that,
in the model, the interests of the manager of the firm are aligned with those of
the shareholder –the household– the proper discount factor is given by Ψt,0 ∝
βt(1 + τ c0)
∂U(ct,nt)
∂ct
/(1 + τ ct )
∂U(c0,n0)
∂c0
. The optimality conditions are then given as
µt(j) = Ψt+1,t
{
(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ)µt+1(j)
}
(3.A.12)
a = qtµt(j) (3.A.13)
zt = α
yt(j)
kt(j)
(3.A.14)
where µt(j) denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the law of motion of
employment.
The optimal production and vacancy posting plans are characterized by the
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following optimality conditions
zt = α
yt(j)
kt(j)
(3.A.15)
a
qt
= β ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(
(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
)
(3.A.16)
The first condition is the standard demand for capital. The second condition deter-
mines the optimal vacancy posting behavior–and hence the optimal employment
level.
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3.B Additional Figures
3.B.1 Real Model
Figure 3.23: Macroeconomic responses (Anticipated Debt Reduction Experiment)
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3.B.2 Sticky Price Model
Figure 3.24: Macroeconomic responses (Sticky Prices Experiment)
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Figure 3.25: Macroeconomic responses: Adjusting Consumption Tax Rate
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Figure 3.26: Macroeconomic responses: Varying the degree of price rigidity
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Figure 3.27: Fiscal Consolidation: Reaction to Output Gap
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Figure 3.28: Macroeconomic responses: Reaction to Output Gap
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Figure 3.29: Fiscal Consolidation: Reaction to Inflation
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Figure 3.30: Macroeconomic responses: Reaction to Inflation
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